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Children in sub Saharan Africa are growing up in an environment of poverty, 
chronic hunger, disease and inequality.  Previous literature documents the nature, 
causes, and consequences of poverty but largely ignores inequality. Yet, ongoing 
economic, demographic and cultural transformations suggest possible divergence in 
both economic investments and social outcomes for children.  This dissertation 
provides several substantive, theoretical, methodological, and policy contributions 
towards an understanding of socio-economic inequality among children within and 
across sub Saharan African countries.   Methodologically, it draws on data from Penn 
World Tables, World Bank World Development Indicators, and Demographic and 
Health Surveys to explore three issues.  First, it applies standard inequality measures 
to estimate levels and trends in educational resource and mortality inequality among 
children.  Second, it applies decomposition techniques to account for factors that drive 
resource inequality.  Third, it evaluates the effectiveness of informal institutions that 
are historically relied upon to buffer inequality among children.  Specifically, it 
applies an innovative concentration index to evaluate the macro level effectiveness of 
African extended family systems and how they changed over time.  Additionally, it 
estimates multivariate regression models that explain variation in fosterage prevalence 
and effectiveness across countries.   Substantively, this study reveals substantial levels 
of educational resource inequality among children that are partly driven by the size of 
country‘s economy and countries‘ relative allocation to children.  In addition, 
demographic factors such as age dependency drive inequality more than the size of 
child population within country per se. Further, the study cautions against inferring 
about children‘s experiences from adult data as observed resource inequality among 
children is more than double adult rates.  While child mortality inequality between 
countries is low, DHS data reveals steep mortality gradients along socio-economic 
lines within countries.  With significant variation across countries, the African 
extended family system continues to buffer inequality among children in terms of 
scope of coverage but its effectiveness waned over time in some countries.  Overall, 
the study makes theoretical propositions about trends, drivers, and buffers of 
inequality among children.  Like poverty, inequality deserves a place at the center of 
intellectual enquiry and policy debates on children‘s wellbeing in sub Saharan Africa. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 The Problem 
 Inequality, especially inequality among children in sub Saharan Africa is understudied and 
underappreciated.  The sheer scope and depth of poverty, hunger, malnutrition, and infant 
mortality often seems daunting.  Understandably, a rich literature captures the scope, trends and 
consequences of growing up in poverty, hunger or malnutrition (Pinstrup-Andersen et al 1999; 
Sanchez 2002; Borlaug 2002; Toenniessen et al 2008; Ejeta 2010; Ahmed et al 2007; UN 2009 
and others).  While this literature is helpful, it provides an incomplete picture on the diverging 
destinies of African children.  In particular, a focus on poverty typically evaluates the 
circumstances of the component of the population that is at the lower ranks of the distribution 
without paying similar attention to the welfare impacts on the rest of the population distribution. 
The paucity of knowledge on inequality among children is rather surprising given ongoing 
economic, demographic and cultural transformations that portend a future of divergence in 
children‘s social outcomes (Shapiro and Tambashe 2001; Madhavan 2004).  At a time when the 
world adopted universal welfare standards for children, it is important to evaluate the extent to 
which the playing ground for children in Africa remained flat, at least in terms of economic 
opportunities and social outcomes.  Moreover, existing theories fail to provide clear signals on 
the nature of, and future of inequality among children. Theories also fail to provide sufficient 
guidance on the effectiveness of institutions that may buffer inequality among children. 
Optimists believe globalization improves welfare for all. Like a rising tide that lifts all boats, 
globalization is expected to pay off for most people (Sachs 2005) and systematic studies 
document this equalizing effect (Firebaugh and Goesling 2004).  Yet, these global trends mask 
substantial regional differences. For instance, while global income inequality converged over 
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time, the opposite is true across sub Saharan African countries (Kandiwa 2006).  Further, 
aggregate trends may not mirror trends within subgroups or within national populations 
(Eloundou-Enyegue and Rehman 2009). On the other hand, uneven fertility transitions, 
economic and cultural transformations portend a future of greater inequality among children.  
For instance, uneven fertility transitions within and across countries portend inequality in as 
much as they alter average resources available to children, and the share of child population in 
individual African countries respectively (Shapiro and Tambashe 2001).  Similarly, economic 
downturns affect countries capacity to allocate resources to children.  Moreover, cultural 
transformations such as westernization and family nucleation could weaken traditional 
mechanisms that buffer inequality among children such as the African extended family system as 
family become unwilling to foster children from less fortunate backgrounds (Madhavan 2004). 
Overall, previous studies document dynamics of global and regional economic inequality as well 
as global inequality among children.  But, few studies systematically examine the nature of 
resource inequality among children in sub Saharan Africa or explicate salient drivers and buffers 
of observed inequality.   
 
1.2 Study Objectives 
This study has three main objectives.  First, it aims to document the levels and trends of 
socio-economic inequality among children in sub Saharan Africa.  Second, it accounts for factors 
that drive changes in economic inequality over time.  Lastly, it examines the effectiveness of 
existing institutional mechanisms that traditionally buffer inequality among children.  
Specifically, the study evaluates the changing effectiveness of informal African Extended Family 
Systems. 
 
 
 
 
3 
1.3 Research Questions 
The study is guided by the following set of research questions: 
 Determining the trends in resource and outcome inequality among children 
(i) What are the levels and trends in educational resource inequality among sub Saharan 
African children?  
(ii) How do observed trends in resource inequality among children compare to those among 
adults? 
(iii) What are the levels and trends in child mortality inequality within and across countries in 
sub Saharan Africa? 
Determining Drivers of Inequality 
(i) What factors account for the observed changes in inequality over time?   
Determining the effectiveness of mitigating institutions: African Extended Family System 
i) How prevalent is the practice of child fosterage and what factors explain cross country 
differences in scope of fosterage? 
ii) How effectively does the informal mechanism of child fosterage operate at national level 
and how has the effectiveness changed over time within and across countries? 
iii)  Does fosterage effectiveness vary across gender?  
iv) What contextual factors explain observed differences in fosterage effectiveness across 
space in sub Saharan Africa? 
This moment is apposite to examine cross country inequality in sub Saharan Africa, as well as 
change over time because large datasets such as the World Bank and Demographic Health 
Surveys are now publicly available. 
 
1.4 Study Hypotheses 
The study is guided by three key hypotheses.  First, Income and health inequality among 
children are not only high, but have grown over time.  Second, economic and demographic 
factors account for a large proportion of the growth in socio-economic inequality among 
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children.  Third and finally, the macro level effectiveness of the African extended family system 
in buffering inequality among children has waned over time. 
 
1.5 Central thesis 
The central thesis of this dissertation is that inequality among children in sub Saharan 
Africa is not only high, but has been increasing within the last two decades.  I argue that the level 
and changes in inequality are largely driven by the balance between two competing forces which 
I call catalysts and buffers, respectively, of inequality (Figure 1.1).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 1.1. Catalysts and Buffers of Inequality among Children in sub Saharan Africa 
 
Catalysts comprise factors that tend to exacerbate inequality rather than contain it.  I identify two 
main forces that are driving the growth of inequality among children; demographic change and 
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economic transformations.  First, inequality is driven by differential shifts in population size as 
well as in the composition of that population (changes in age dependency ratio).  Secondly, 
income inequality is driven by economic transformations in the region which allow for 
disproportionate income growth across geographical locations and downturns in others.   
Buffers, on the other hand, comprise forces that work towards reducing levels of inequality 
among children.  These buffers include public policies and private strategies.  First, the state is 
capable of reducing inequality through the political will to redistribute resources.  For instance, 
the state can (1) increase resources available to children or (2) target resources towards 
particularly disadvantages groups through measures such as supporting orphanages or providing 
financial resources for formal social safety nets. These safety nets could be drawn upon to 
support foster care programs, initiate programs that directly target the poor‘s access to health and 
education for instance. Apart from formal public policies, inequality among children in sub 
Saharan Africa is buffered informally through private strategies.  For example, in the absence of 
effective formal safety nets, the African extended family has historically been relied upon to 
equalize opportunities among children.  Because a large number of children depend on this 
cultural practice, its effectiveness has a large bearing on levels of inequality among children, and 
how they change over time. 
 Overall, I argue that the momentum for future inequality is already in motion.  First, 
catalysts such as demographic change and economic transformations foster the increase in 
inequality.  Additionally, factors that we might generally expect to buffer inequality are actually 
working towards increasing it.  That is, the political will to invest in inequality reducing 
strategies is not met with the economic ability to do so.  Moreover, the effectiveness of cultural 
practices such as child fosterage in buffering inequality among children waned over time in some 
countries.  Taken together, these factors portend an uneven landscape for children in Africa. 
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1.6 Organization of Dissertation 
The rest of the dissertation is organized as follows: Chapter 2 lays out the relevance of 
this study.  Chapters 3 and 4 review the literature on inequality.  The former focuses on global 
and regional inequality.  The latter discusses the literature on the practice of child fosterage 
within the African extended family context.  Chapter 5 reviews economic, sociological, and 
demographic theories of inequality.  Chapter 6 provides the study methodology.  Chapters 7 and 
8 lay out the study findings.  First, Chapter 7 discusses the trends and drivers of economic and 
health inequality.  Chapter 8 presents results on the trends and effectiveness of the African 
extended family system in buffering inequality among children.  Chapter 9 draws substantive and 
theoretical conclusions from the study findings 
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CHAPTER 2 
STUDY RELEVANCE 
 2.1 Introduction 
This study examines the levels and trends in economic and social inequality 
among children in sub Saharan Africa.  Specifically, it documents the levels and trends 
in educational resources and health inequality among children.  Second, it applies 
decomposition techniques to account for observed changes in inequality over time.  
Third, in the absence of effective formal social safety nets for children in sub Saharan 
Africa, the burden of child rearing largely falls on the extended family.  To that end, 
this study provides insights on the macro level effectiveness of the African extended 
family in buffering inequality among children.  But, why should anyone care about 
inequality in general and inequality among children in particular?  First, this chapter 
defines the concept of inequality, and examines the theoretical and empirical reasons 
why it matters.  Next, it provides the scientific relevance of the study of inequality in 
general, and inequality among children in particular.  This is followed by a description 
of the current study‘s contribution to (i) the literature on inequality among children (ii) 
levels and determinants of inequality among children in sub Saharan Africa, and (iii) 
methodological approaches that improve our understanding of patterns and drivers of 
inequality.  
 
2.2 What is inequality and Why Does it Matter? 
Inequality refers to the unequal distribution of resources, services and positions 
between individuals or society (Grusky 2001; Kerbo 2000).  Although economic 
inequality is the most studied, it is by no means the only, nor the most important form 
of inequality (Sen 2005; Kenny 2005).  Like poverty, inequality is complex and 
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multidimensional. Other assets that are often unequally distributed within families, 
nations and across the globe include; physical, human capital, civic, honor, social, 
culture and power
1
 (Grusky 2001). Inequality can either be absolute or relative 
inequality.  Absolute inequality refers to the absolute gap between for instance the rich 
and the poor.  On the other hand, relative inequality refers to a function of the ratios of 
individual incomes to the mean. An example helps to illuminate this distinction.  
Imagine a world with two individuals: one with $1, 000 and another with $5, 000.  If 
we double the incomes of these two individuals, each will have $2, 000 and $10, 000 
respectively.  In this new scenario, the absolute gap (inequality) between the two 
individuals changes from $4, 000 to $8, 000 (a doubling).  Yet, the relative gap 
remained the same: in both scenarios, the wealthier individual has 5 times more 
money than his/her poorer counterpart.  Most people, however, think of inequality in 
absolute terms (Ravallion 2005). However, whether viewed in relative or in absolute 
terms, inequality still reflects a differential gap in the distribution of some kind of 
valued social, economic, or political resource in society.   
 While every society, past and present, distributes scarce goods and services 
unequally, what is distinctive about historical moments is not the presence of, but, the 
extent of inequality (Tumin 1963).  Our values today are shaped by the post 
enlightenment view that all human beings are equal.  In fact, contemporary democratic 
societies are founded on the principle that ―men are free and equal in rights‖ (Grusky 
2001; Kolm 1999). Therefore, the real and perceived magnitude of inequality informs 
debates on equity and social justice (Kolm 1999; Gilbert 2007).  Additionally, 
inequality, especially income inequality, is invariably related to the most salient of 
societal problems as either cause or as effect.   
                                                             
1
 Physical assets refer to health while civic assets refer to dues process, right to work; honorific assets 
refer to occupational, religious, and merit based assets; social assets refer to informal networks, 
workplace associations and social clubs. 
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 Unsurprisingly, research documents the relationship between inequality and 
macroeconomic phenomena such as poverty, economic growth, war, crime, and 
terrorism (Thorbecke. and Charumilind, 2002; Kanbur 2004; Ravallion 2005; 
Milanovic 2006) or the role of social structure in conditioning patterns of inequality in 
society (Sorensen 1996).
2
   If the study of inequality is salient among adults, it is even 
more critical among children because it is a potent ingredient for social reproduction.  
In essence, disadvantages suffered during childhood, translates into material social 
outcomes during one‘s life course.  In fact, the literature on educational assortative 
mating, differential fertility, and intergenerational transmission of social outcomes 
lays bare the long arm of childhood experiences.  Specifically, this literature supports 
the idea that inequality dynamics within children‘s population provide a useful lens 
through which one can understand future patterns of inequality (Schwartz and Mare 
2005; De la Croix and Doepke 2003; Mare and Maralani  (2006). 
2.3 Scientific relevance 
The study makes a number of thematic, substantive, and methodological 
contributions to the literature on children‘s inequality in general, and the demography 
of African population more generally. 
2.3.1 Areas of research 
This study places inequality in the center of debates on the wellbeing of 
African children at a time when the greatest literature on sub Saharan Africa is 
generally preoccupied with studying poverty dynamics.  Admittedly, poverty remains 
high, and is growing in sub Saharan Africa and the subcontinent remains the only 
regions whose food production levels cannot match demand of a growing population 
and remains among the regions that are off track in meeting most of the United 
                                                             
2
 Chapter 3 provides an extended discussion of the salience of inequality research. 
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Nations Millennium Development Goals on education, health, and gender equity 
outcomes compared to other world regions (Ahmed et al 2007; UN 2009).  Yet, as 
daunting as the poverty challenge is, it is not the only problem that faces African 
nations.  I argue that the distribution of social and economic resources within African 
countries is unequal in ways that are generally underappreciated. Indeed, a fuller 
account of the welfare of adults and children in Africa can only be reached when one 
grasps the scope and depth of not only poverty, but also inequality.  This call is neither 
new nor surprising.  In fact, Seers (1972) argued that if one is interested in assessing 
the welfare of a nation, they not only need to look at changes in poverty, but also cast 
a lens on inequality and unemployment. 
Unknown to most people, African countries exhibit astonishingly high levels 
of income inequality compared to other countries and regions of the world.  In fact, a 
larger number of countries in sub Saharan African exhibit income inequality levels 
that compare with, and even surpass those observed in other world regions such as 
Latin America, where inequality levels were historically high (for detailed accounts of 
inequality in Latin America, see for instance Wood and Lovell 1992; Fiszbein and 
Psacharopolous 1995; Hoffman and Canteno 2003; Lopez and Miller 2008).  To 
illustrate this point, consider Figures 2.1 and 2.2. 
 Figure 2.1 reproduces results from Fiszbein and Psacharopolous (1995).  This 
study documents the levels and trends in within country income inequality in seven 
Latin American countries; Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Panama, 
Uruguay, and Venezuela.   Fiszbein and Psacharopolous (1995) apply the Gini 
coefficient as their metric for income inequality.    The Gini coefficient is calibrated 
such that a score of zero represent total equality while a score of 1 represents a state of 
perfect inequality.  The latter reflects a state where one person controls all resources in 
an economy.   The study reveals three countries in which inequality levels increased 
 
11 
between 1979-81 and 1989 (Brazil, Argentina, and Panama).  On the other hand, four 
countries reflect lower levels of income inequality in 1989 compared to those for the 
1979-1981 period (Colombia, Venezuela, Uruguay, and Costa Rica). For instance 
between 1979 and 1981 Brazil‘s income Gini was 0.57 and it rose to 0.63 in 1989.  
Among the countries whose inequality levels declined, Colombia‘s Gini declined from 
0.59 to 0.51. Overall, income inequality within all the countries in this study remains 
high (over 0.4) and is rising in some countries as noted above. 
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FIGURE 2.1. Comparative Trends in Income Inequality in Latin America 
 
While historically, the inequality in the distribution of land and income resources is 
well acknowledged for Latin American for instance, it is much less so for sub Saharan 
Africa.  Yet, the regions‘ inequality levels are comparatively high.   
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Figure 2.2 Panel A shows that for the 40 countries for which income inequality 
data is available for 2003
3
, over three quarters had Gini coefficients above 0.4 and 
while more than a quarter had inequality levels above 0.5.   
While the Gini Coefficient for South Africa is unsurprisingly high (0.58), few 
people realize that a number of other African countries exhibit equally higher levels of 
inequality levels; Liberia (0.52); Angola (0.59); Botswana (0.61); Comoros (0.64); and 
Namibia (0.74).  Given that at global level the median Gini stands at 0.39 (PRB 2007), 
these data suggest that sub Saharan African countries exhibit extremely skewed 
internal patterns of income distribution.  Trend data for income inequality is sub 
Saharan Africa is generally lacking.  However, for the six countries (Lesotho, South 
Africa, Zambia, Cote d‘Ivoire, Kenya, Namibia) for which data is available for three 
time periods between 1993 and 2003, no country experienced a decline in within 
country income inequality.  Therefore not only are income inequality levels high, but, 
the either stagnated or increased over the years.  
In short, this study submits that a more complete understanding of African 
societies requires not only a focus on poverty, but also, on the emerging trends in 
inequality. 
 
                                                             
3
 Data for this analysis was derived from the World Bank.  2003 was selected because it was the year in 
which most countries had Gini coefficient data.  For some countries, the data reflects the most recent 
data point (generally between 2000 and 2006) 
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Panel A 
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FIGURE 2.2. Trends in Income Inequality in sub Saharan Africa 1993-2003 
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2.3.2 Substantive Contributions 
This study contributes to our understanding of children‘s wellbeing in sub 
Saharan Africa.  First, it documents the levels in resource inequality among children 
(educational resources available per pupil) and estimates how these levels changed 
over time. Second, the study reveals the differences in inequality among children 
compared to the adult population in sub Saharan Africa.  Third, decomposition results 
provide insights on factors that largely drive observed changes in inequality over time.  
Fourth, given that most people largely accept that income is a necessary but 
insufficient measure of human wellbeing (Sen 2005), the study also estimates 
inequality in the distribution of important child wellbeing indicators (health).  Fifth, 
the study evaluates the effectiveness of the African extended family system-- within 
and across nations, and over time  
 
2.3.3 Methodological Contributions 
The study makes a number of key methodological contributions.  Namely, it: 
(i) Illustrates ways to estimate resource and health inequality among children 
across sub Saharan African countries.  The approach makes it possible to 
isolate the influences of particular countries, as well as to compare between 
adult and children‘s trends. 
(ii) Demonstrates innovative ways of applying decomposition techniques to 
understand the drivers of resource inequality among children. 
(iii) Develops a concentration index that makes it possible to evaluate the macro 
level effectiveness of child fosterage patterns within the African extended 
family, and how these changed over time, and across gender. 
(iv) Develops multivariate regression models that explain contextual differences in 
the levels and effectiveness of child fosterage in sub Saharan Africa. 
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2.3.4 Theoretical Contributions 
The area of inequality among children in sub Saharan Africa, and inequality 
among children more generally is one that is not supported by axiomatic theoretical 
propositions.  As such, this study uses its findings to posit theoretical ideas on the 
future of inequality among children in sub Saharan Africa.  It theorizes the levels, 
trends, and drivers of inequality, as well as the potential effectiveness of existing 
institutional mechanisms such as the African extended family in buffering inequality 
among children. These theories provide a useful heuristic tool for future studies of 
inequality among children, especially in sub Saharan Africa. 
 
2.4 Policy Relevance 
Almost half of the African population comprises of children aged fifteen years 
or below.  If their wellbeing is of concern to policy makers, then this study provides 
useful insights on the current state of distribution of educational resources and health 
among them.  Additionally, the study provides insights on the determinants and 
drivers of inequality in ways that allow policy makers to understand key areas that 
either buffer or exacerbate inequality.  Further, the study provides useful evidence that 
tests the idea that the African extended family system is an effective social safety net 
that buffers inequality among children.   
 
2.5 Conclusion  
This chapter discusses the relevance of this study and lays out its scientific and 
policy contributions. First it defines the concept of inequality and provides the reasons 
why it warrants academic and policy attention.  It argues that inequality is a growing, 
and yet underappreciated phenomenon in sub Saharan Africa.   Second it adds to the 
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empirical literature on inequality among children by documenting (1) the trends in 
inequality in educational resources and social outcomes among children in sub 
Saharan Africa and (2) accounts for the factors that either drive or buffer observed 
changes in inequality (3) the changing effectiveness of formal and informal social 
safety nets to buffer inequality among children. Together, these analyses bring the 
issues of distribution (of both resources and social outcomes) from the periphery to the 
center of debate on the state of children on the African continent.  This is especially 
important because current global discourse on Africa primarily dwells on the quest to 
end poverty (Sachs 2005) and remains largely silent on issues of distribution 
(inequality).  Understandably, the best intellectual and financial capital has been 
brought to bear on poverty issues because the dimensions of material deprivation in 
sub Saharan Africa is undeniable.  Yet, a focus on poverty provides an important but 
painfully incomplete picture of the present and future status of African children and 
adult populations.   
 Besides, understanding patterns of inequality among children is intrinsically 
important because children may foretell future patterns of inequality.  In other words, 
the momentum for inequality among tomorrow‘s adults is built in within the current 
cohorts of children. It appears that global and local actors currently deal with poverty 
and inequality issues in sequential, rather than in concurrent ways. This approach 
assumes that once the basic needs of those in the lower ranks of the economic ladder 
are met, then either inequality takes care of itself, or that strategies to mitigate 
divergent outcomes can then be invoked at a later stage.  If the experiences of some 
countries in the Western world can provide useful guidance, it is one that shows that 
passively watching inequality grow is much easier than reversing the trend. 
 Overall, both these substantive and methodological contributions to the study 
of inequality in sub Saharan Africa are salient and timely because eliminating poverty 
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does not suggest an equalization of economic opportunity nor does it signal a 
convergence in social outcomes among children.  It argues that serious efforts in 
pursuit social justice need to begin with a solid understanding of the nature of the 
momentum that drives future patterns of inequality among children and adults on the 
African continent. 
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CHAPTER 3 
PREVIOUS STUDIES ON INEQUALITY 
 
3.1 Introduction 
This study primarily focuses on inequality among children in sub Saharan 
Africa.  Yet, it benefits from a rich and diverse literature on global inequality, social 
stratification, as well as inequality among children within and across other world 
regions.  As such, this chapter lays out the major theoretical ideas, and captures the 
key empirical findings on inequality in ways that help to locate the salience of 
research on inequality among children in sub Saharan Africa.    The chapter is 
organized as follows.  First, it defines the concept of global inequality and lays out the 
levels and trends in global income inequality.  Second, it compares the global trends in 
income inequality to those observed in sub Saharan Africa.  This is followed by a 
discussion of trends in global inequality among children.  Next, the chapter 
synthesizes studies on poverty and inequality among children in Europe, Latin 
America, the United States and in sub Saharan Africa.  The chapter ends by an 
expansive critique of the consequences of inequality. 
 
3.2 Global Inequality 
Different dimensions of inequality can be examined at the macro, meso, and 
micro levels.  In other words, inequality can be examined at global, regional, national, 
community, or household level.  Below I focus on global inequality.  First, I define the 
term ‗global inequality‘ before discussing the levels and trends in global income 
inequality. 
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3.2.1 Defining Global Inequality 
Inequality refers to the unequal distribution of resources across individuals in 
society.  Global inequality, on the other hand, refers to the unequal distribution of 
resources across the entire world‘s population.  Global inequality is therefore a 
composite figure that sums inequality within, and between nations.  Below, I use 
insights on income inequality to illustrate the scope and trends in global inequality. 
Recent evidence suggests that income inequality between nations constitutes a larger 
component of global income inequality (Firebaugh 1999; Goesling 2001). 
 Concerns about the impact of globalization spurred a rich literature among 
historians, economists, and sociologists that sought to test the divergence and 
convergence theories of income inequality.  Studies generally sought to investigate (i) 
how much inequality exists? (ii) how much inequality changed over time (iii) what 
accounts for the observed trends in inequality, and (iv) the impact of divergence?
1
   I 
examine these in turn. 
 
3.2.2 Levels of Global Income Inequality 
Historical studies provide a lens through which current levels of global 
inequality can be understood.  During the nineteenth century through the first half of 
the twentieth century, the world income distribution became uneven.  The West grew 
at unprecedented levels, Latin America, Europe and the former Soviet Union grew at 
the world average; Africa and Asia lagged behind (Maddison 1995; Pritchett 1997).
2
   
                                                             
1
 Related to this literature is a growing literature that questions the concern with global income 
inequality.  Part of this literature suggests a focus on consumption (Edward 2006) and argues that 
inequality should be viewed in its multi dimensional form to include such social wellbeing factors as 
health and education (Sen 1997; Neumayer 2003; Kenny 2005; Goesling and Baker 2008; Decanco et al 
2009; Eloundou- Enyegue and Rehman 2009).   
2
 The trends somewhat reversed recently with income inequality decreasing between nations and 
increasing within nations (Firebaugh 2003). 
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But, how much global inequality exists now? Income inequality is usually 
measured through four standard metrics: the Mean Logarithmic Deviation (MLD), the 
Theil Index, the Gini Coefficient, or the squared coefficient of variation.  These 
metrics (except for the squared coefficient of variation) are typically calibrated such 
that they range between zero (point of no inequality – everyone has the same income) 
to 1 (point of perfect inequality – a single individual controls all world resources).  
Firebaugh and Goesling (2004) estimate that in 1997 global inequality level stood at 
about 0.487 when measured by the Mean Logarithmic Deviation (MLD); 0.45 for 
Theil index and 0.479 for the Gini Coefficient. An earlier study (Sala-i-Martin 2002) 
derived estimates of 0.45 (MLD); 0.511 (Theil index) and 0.487 (Gini Coefficient). 
Should this level of global inequality be considered high, medium or low?  I submit 
that the answer to this question largely depends on one‘s perspective. For instance, 
Milanovic (2006: 8) provides a summary of ten studies that estimated the level of 
global income inequality in the 1990s and figures generally ranged between a Gini 
value of 63 and 66. This level of global income inequality, he argues, is larger than 
that which is found in any single country, including South Africa and Brazil, two of 
the most unequal countries in the world whose Ginis are usually in the upper 50s or 
lower 60s.
3
 Presently, the debate on the levels and trends in global income inequality 
has largely been resolved.  What remains contested are the potential drivers of 
observed trends in global inequality (Firebaugh and Goesling 2004; Eloundou-
Enyegue and Kandiwa forthcoming). 
 
                                                             
3
 On the same note, using the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) data, Korzeniewicz and Moran 
(2005:290) estimate that between 1970 and 2000 the income inequality within the United Kingdom 
increased from about 0.25 to around 0.35 while that within the United States increased from between 
0.3 and 0.4. 
 
21 
3.2.3  Trends in Global Income Inequality 
Given the observed levels in global income inequality, the next question is 
whether these levels declined, increased, or remained constant over time?   
With the exception of Maddison (2001), longitudinal data on trends largely 
remained scant up till the 1970s.  An economic historian, Maddison estimated trends 
in global inequality going back to the pre-industrial period.  He argues that all 
countries started out poor but some are now rich (Kenny 2005).  If the historical data 
are to be believed, Maddison (2001) estimates that in 1000 AD both Western Europe 
and Africa had similar per capita income (around $450). However, between 1800 and 
about mid 1950s, Western countries changed from being about four times richer than 
poor countries to almost 30 to 50 times greater (Maddison 2001).  In other words, this 
period marked a change in the composition of global income inequality.  If within 
country inequality is eliminated (all incomes for individuals within countries are set at 
their national means), most of the global income inequality will remain because it is 
the difference between national means that is greatest. Overall, while the actual 
quantum of preindustrial and industrial global inequality may be debatable, it is 
generally agreed that the levels were low compared to those observed today. 
The sheer gap in average incomes and annual growth rates between rich and 
poor nations revealed by historical data (Maddison 2001) led other scholars to raise 
alarm on ―Divergence, Big Time‖ (Pritchett 1997).  Additionally, the availability of 
datasets such as Maddison 2001, the World Income Inequality Database (WIID),
4
 
Penn World Tables, and the World Bank‘s World Development Indicators made it 
possible for scholars to carry out cross country comparisons in global income 
inequality.  A growing number of studies that examined the levels and changes in 
global income inequality within the last two decades yielded inconclusive results. 
                                                             
4
 See Mukhopadhaya 2004 for an expanded discussion of the WIID database 
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Some studies observed divergence (Korzeniewicz, and Moran 1997; Bourguignon and 
Morrison 2002; Milanovic 2002) or convergence (Berry et al 1983; Radetzki and 
Johnsson 2001; Sala-i-Martin 2002; Firebaugh 1999; Firebaugh and Goesling 2004).  
Still others observed divergence followed by convergence (Boltho and Tiono 1999) or 
failed to discern any trend in inequality (Schultz 1998; Melchior and Telle 2001).   
Recent meta-analyses reveal that the root of these diverse outcomes lies in the 
methodological approaches taken (Firebaugh and Goesling 1999; Svedberg 2004).  
They concur that measurement of global income inequality requires (i) the use of 
income that is adjusted for purchasing power to allow for cross national comparisons 
(ii) that since global income inequality is concerned with the distribution of income 
across individual people (rather than countries); income data should be weighted by 
population size.  In essence, studies that relied on income ratios (which do not weight 
for the shape of the distribution) (see for instance Pritchett 1997; UNDP 1999; World 
Bank 2000/1) and those that used foreign exchange based income data rather than 
purchasing power parity adjusted data (see for instance Korzeniewicz and Moran 
1997) invariably observed divergence.  
 Below, I present the evidence on trends in global income inequality.  Two key 
messages emerge. First, global income inequality gradually declined over time 
regardless of inequality metric applied. Second, observed declining trends are robust 
across studies.  Firebaugh and Goesling (2004) estimate the trends in global income 
inequality across four inequality measures (Figure 3.1).  Their study reveals that the 
MLD started off at 0.67 in 1980, declining to 0.59 in 1985 before it peaked slightly at 
0.61 in 1989 before steadily declining to 0.49 in 1997.  The Gini and Theil indices 
mirror the MLD trends.  The former starts off at 0.49 in 1980 and it decline to 0.48 in 
1985. Thereafter, the Gini slightly increases to 0.48 in 1989 before steadily falling to 
0.45 in 1997.  The Theil index stood at 0.58 in 1980 and slowly declines to 0.54 in 
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1985.  Like the Gini and the MLD, the Theil index also takes a slight peak around 
1989 to 0.57 before gradually declining to 0.48 by 1997.  Evidently, the trends are 
robust across various measures.  In essence, global income inequality has declined 
over time, regardless of the inequality metric applied. 
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FIGURE 3.1. Trends in Global Income Inequality 
 
How robust are these results across different studies?  Figure 3.2 reflects 
comparative trends in global income inequality as observed by Sala-i-Martin (2002) 
and Firebaugh and Goesling (2004).  To compute trends in global income inequality, 
both of these studies draw on data from the Penn World Tables and both weight their 
data for population size as well as employ income data adjusted for purchasing power 
parity.  However, Sala-i-Martin also uses Deininger and Square (1996) as well as other 
household survey data to construct time series data sets that make it possible to 
compute trends in within country inequality.  The evidence shows a declining trend 
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regardless.  For instance, Firebaugh and Goesling (2004) observe a steady (24%) 
decline of global income inequality from about 0.667 in 1980 to about 0.487 in 1997.  
Similarly, Sala-i-Martin (2002) observes between 5 and 13% decline in global income 
inequality depending on which index one focuses on.  Both studies acknowledge the 
significant influence of China (in reducing inequality) and sub-Saharan Africa (in 
increasing inequality). 
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FIGURE 3.2. Comparative Trends in Global Income Inequality (1970-2008) 
Once again, it is important to restate that the debate on the levels and trends in 
global income inequality has largely been resolved.  However, what remains contested 
are the factors that drive these trends. 
 
3.2.4  Drivers of Global Income Inequality 
The above discussion synthesized how much global income inequality exists 
and how much the levels have changed over time.  While the levels and trends in 
global income inequality are generally agreed upon, what remains fairly debatable is 
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the relative importance of factors that drive these trends.  Few studies attempted to 
explain the drivers of observed global income inequality trends (Peacock et al 1988; 
Sala-i-Martin 2002; Bourguignon and Morrisson 2002; Firebaugh 1999; and 
Firebaugh and Goesling 2004). These studies, however, explain different aspects of 
the trends in global inequality.  Some focus on the relative importance of within and 
between group contributions to global inequality (Peacock et al 1988); relative 
importance of within and between country inequality (Sala-i-Martin 2002); on relative 
importance of within and between group as well as the effect of population change and 
income growth (Bourguignon and Morrisson 2002); the relative importance of 
demographic and economic factors (Firebaugh 1999; and Firebaugh and Goesling 
2004) or the relative importance of age structure rather than population size in driving 
trends in global income inequality (Eloundou-Enyegue and Kandiwa forthcoming). 
 Peacock et al (1988) draw on world systems theory to explore whether global 
trends are largely driven by within, or between zone inequality? They use purchasing 
power parity data from Heston and Summers for 1950-1980 for 53 countries to 
estimate and decompose the Theil index based on population and Real GDP per capita 
data.  After dividing these countries into core, periphery, and semi-periphery 
countries, their evidence suggests that between zone inequality increased over the 
study period.  They attribute this divergence to differential changes in population 
shares across zones as well as to India‘s slow growth.  Because this study uses such a 
small sample size for the global population (they exclude former socialist countries 
and do not list names of countries in their sample), their findings should be taken with 
caution. Moreover, apart from noting the importance of demographic factors, they do 
not go far enough to discuss how they may affect trends in global inequality. 
Bourguignon and Morrison (2002) decompose total inequality to reflect within 
group differences as well as capture the relative importance of population and income 
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dynamics.  This is the only study that uses Maddison 1995 data to study trends and 
drivers of inequality from 1820 to 1992.  They divide their time periods into four sub-
periods (1820-1870); (1870-1910); (1910-1950); and 1950-1992.  Further, they 
examine inequality between countries clustered in six subgroups; Africa; Asia; Japan, 
Korea and Taiwan; Latin America; Eastern Europe; and finally Europe and European 
Settlements.  While noting that European countries became more similar within the 
first half of the 20
th
 century (reducing global inequality), they also note that between 
countries inequality became the more potent component of global inequality.  To the 
extent that findings are as good as the data from which they are derived, some aspects 
of this study require some level of faith due to how far back data is extrapolated.  
Moreover, with regards to population and income dynamics, it only reports changes in 
income and population growth compared to world average. 
Sala-i-Martin (2002) uses data from the Penn World Tables from 1970-1998 
for 125 countries representing 90% of the global population.  The study estimates 
seven inequality indices for this time period and further decomposes the total global 
inequality into within and between country inequality.  To derive within country 
income inequality, Sala-i-Martin relies on data from national surveys as well as data 
from Deininger and Squire (1996).  Notwithstanding the limitations of within country 
income data
5
, Sala-i-Martin‘s study adds to the literature which argues that between 
country inequality accounts for the larger share of global income inequality (about 
70%) compared to within country inequality. Additionally, this study points to the 
exceptionalism of China‘s above average economic growth. 
Like Bourguignon and Morrisson (2002) and Sala-i-Martin (2002), three other 
studies (Firebaugh 1999; Firebaugh and Goesling 2004; Edward 2006) highlight the 
                                                             
5
 Milanovic (2006) and Wade (2004) question the reliability of income distribution data for within 
countries.  Its major limitation is that it most likely fails to capture the levels of income at the top of the 
distribution and is prone to measurement errors consistent with survey data. 
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exceptionalism of China with its huge population as well as the disequalizing effects 
of sub Saharan Africa.  Additionally, these studies are the only ones that decompose 
the changes in global economic inequality (MLD) into its economic and demographic 
components.  Their findings suggest that economic factors (mainly above average 
growth in China and below average growth in sub Saharan Africa) accounted for the 
greatest share of the change in global income inequality.
6
  Still, scientists continue to 
debate the direction of the global inequality trend since it is driven by two opposing 
forces; changes within and between nations. Firebaugh (2003) believes that the decline 
in global income inequality is driven by greater declines in between country inequality 
compared to observed increases in within country inequality.  Still, this perspective is 
contested (see Edward 2006).   
In an attempt to account for the changes in trends of global income inequality, 
Firebaugh and Goesling (2004) apply standard decomposition techniques to apportion 
the change into two components: that which is driven by changes in population shares; 
and that which is driven by economic transformations.  They conclude that income 
accounts for almost all (98%) of the change in global income inequality.  However, a 
recent study (Eloundou-Enyegue and Kandiwa forthcoming) questions the basis and 
scope of the relative importance of demographic and economic factors.   
Eloundou-Enyegue and Kandiwa argue that it is not population size that 
matters in driving changes in global income inequality.  Rather, it is the population 
structure, i.e. age dependency that matters more than the relatively stable population 
shares.  Second, this study also highlights that instead of focusing on income changes; 
standard development theory suggests that it is labor productivity that has material 
implications for driving changes in global income inequality.  As such, moving away 
                                                             
6
 They also note that demographic factors such as differential age structures may have affected trends in 
global inequality in as much as it shapes working age dependency ratios. 
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from the Population-Income (PI) decomposition, Eloundou-Enyegue and Kandiwa 
(forthcoming) propose a more nuanced decomposition technique that apportions 
changes in global inequality into their Population - Age structure - Labor Productivity 
(PAL) effects. The PAL decomposition makes it possible to capture the economic 
contributions of poorer nations who typically exhibit higher fertility levels. The 
expanded (PAL) decomposition shows that even if the ―economic factor‖ remains the 
dominant driver, it is not as overpowering as in the simpler PI decomposition. For the 
entire study period (1980-2000), productivity accounts for 85% (as against 98.5%) of 
the total change. Indeed, there are periods when demographic variables account for a 
full quarter (1995-2000) or even a third (1985-90) of the total change. Just as 
important, of the two demographic variables, age structure (not population size) has 
the larger influence. At no point during the study period (except 1980-85 when the two 
influences were virtually identical) did the effects of population size exceed those of 
age structure. In addition, the effect of age structure was steadier, and worked to 
reduce global income inequality throughout the study period. In short, the practice of 
reducing population to its size ignores the more important component. By 
incorporating age structure in the analysis, one gains a fuller understanding of the total 
influences of population. One also develops a finer understanding of economic 
contributions. Instead of income per capita (a mere indicator of development), the 
analyses focus on productivity (a less proximate indicator of development).   
The foregoing sections defined global inequality and described the levels, 
trends, and drivers of global income inequality.  The question that arises is to what 
extent do these global trends mirror the reality in other world regions?  In other words, 
given that global trends in inequality are declining, can the same be said of sub 
Saharan Africa? 
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3.3 Global versus Regional Trends in Income inequality 
While global income inequality trends converged over time, the opposite is 
true for other world regions such as sub Saharan Africa.  Figure 3.3 shows 
comparative ratios of global versus sub Saharan African trends.  Global inequality as 
measured by the MLD was more than twice that in sub-Saharan Africa in 1980.  
However, the gap sharply dropped between 1980 and 1985.  Between 1985 and 1995, 
global inequality was about 1.5 times higher than that observed in sub-Saharan Africa.  
However, the 1990 were a critical time for the convergence of global and sub-Saharan 
Africa regional income inequality as the global level dropped to almost equalize what 
was happening on the African subcontinent.   
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Source: sub-Saharan Africa data is Kandiwa 2006.  World data from Firebaugh and Goesling (2004). 
 
FIGURE 3.3. Comparative Trends in Global versus sub Saharan African Trends 
in Between Country Income Inequality 
 
It is also important to stress that the convergence of global and regional income 
inequality does not mean a reduction in the levels of inequality.  On the contrary, 
income inequality in sub-Saharan African never showed signs of decline in the four 
decades starting 1960.  Therefore, if global and sub Saharan African income inequality 
is converging, it is doing so at higher levels of all inequality measures. 
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The foregoing discussion focused on global and regional trends in inequality.  
But, they possibly mask emerging trends among particular population groups.  In other 
words, to what extent do global trends in inequality reflect global trends in inequality 
among children? 
 
3.4 Global Trends in Inequality Among Children 
Most previous studies on inequality in the distribution of resource and 
wellbeing of children largely focus on intra country dynamics and to a lesser extent on 
regional and global inequality. This omission is surprising given the growing emphasis 
on globalization, a process that it implies not only increased global connectedness, but 
also, elevated levels of consciousness (Schafer 2005). Besides, global conventions 
such as the Convention on the Rights of Children and subsequent Millennium 
Development Goals symbolize the globalization of standards by which children‘s 
experience are to be measured (UNICEF 1989; United Nations 2000).  Moreover, 
Eloundou-Enyegue and Rehman (2009) submit that it is imperative to trace the 
changing patterns of distribution in resources (access to opportunity) as well as in the 
wellbeing (outcomes) for children at a global scale.  They posit the intrinsic and 
extrinsic value of studies on global inequality among children.   First, it may be 
important to constantly assess if the ongoing cultural convergence is mirrored by 
similar convergence in economic and other resources available to children?  Second, 
the authors suggest other extrinsic reasons why global inequality among children 
might be important.  On the one hand, it is unclear whether the declining global trends 
in income inequality suggest similar outcomes for children? Moreover inequality 
among children is a potent harbinger of trends in future inequality 
 Yet, to date few studies examined inequality among children at global level 
and they do so by focusing on different aspects of inequality while applying different 
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metrics in examining these issues.  Studies range from those that explore trends in 
mortality differentials (Minujin and Delamonica (2003), examine the link between 
income inequality and health outcomes (Beckfield 2004; Ruger and Kim 2006), 
discuss the contradiction between  globalization, cultural convergence and children‘s 
wellbeing (Schafer 2005), investigate  trends in multidimensional inequality (Decanco 
et al 2009), or track historical changes in global resource and health inequality among 
children (Eloundou-Enyegue and Rehman 2009);  Below, I provide a synopsis of these 
studies, their theoretical and methodological approaches, as well as their substantive 
findings. 
Minujin and Delamonica (2003) evaluate the extent of differentials in under 
five mortality and how those gaps have changed over time.  They employ World Bank 
cross sectional data for 43 countries to highlight the gaps in child mortality across 
wealth quintiles.  Further, they use DHS data for 23 countries for which they could 
find two waves of surveys, including 14 from sub Saharan Africa (Burkina Faso, 
Cameroon, Egypt, Ghana, Kenya, Mali, Morocco, Niger, Senegal, Tanzania, Togo, 
Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe); seven from Latin America (Bolivia, Brazil, 
Northeast Brazil, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Guatemala, and Peru); and lastly 
others from Asia (Bangladesh, Indonesia, Kazakhstan and Philippines).  They note 
that averages, as well as changes in averages over time, hide the dynamics of what is 
driving the changes.  Observed gains in infant mortality could be driven by gains 
among the wealthier groups more than it could be from the lower quintiles.  In fact, 
they find evidence that the relative gap (ration between the under 5 mortality rate 
between the top and bottom quintiles) are huge, and significant.  On average, children 
from the lowest quintile have twice the likelihood of dying before their fifth birthday 
than those from the upper quintile.  Because the lower quintile contains more children, 
these ratios imply that for every seven children that die among the lower quintile, only 
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two die from the top tier. They interpret these results as a clear ‗measure of 
discrimination in the most basic right, the right to survive‘.  Interestingly, part of their 
analysis shows that the relative gaps in under five mortality are highest within 
countries that have lowest mortality rates (those with mortality rates of between 50 
and 150 per thousand live births) compared to those for countries with mortality rates 
higher than 150 per thousand live births. Out of the 24 countries for which they have 
two waves of DHS data, their analysis shows that the gains in mortality were 
accompanied with reductions in the relative gaps across wealth profiles.  For instance, 
if one takes the countries for which gains in under five mortality are positive, only 
Guatemala has experienced a narrowing in the relative gap; while five countries 
(Egypt, Mali, Morocco, Peru, and Senegal) maintained the same relative gap over 
time; and seven countries experienced worsening outcomes in terms of relative gap 
even as mortality came down (Bangladesh, Bolivia, Colombia, Dominican Republic, 
Ghana, Indonesia, and Uganda).   
Second, for the countries that did not experience any mortality gains, only 
Togo and Zambia observed a narrowing gap between mortality across wealth profiles 
while four countries (Brazil, Burkina Faso, Cameroon and Niger) remained constant; 
and finally Philippines and Tanzania experienced a widening of gap in the face of 
static mortality changes.  On the other extreme are countries that experienced negative 
gains in under five mortality.  Of these, Kenya maintained its relative gap while 
Kazakhstan and Zimbabwe had worsening outcomes.  In short, out of the 24 countries, 
regardless of the level of absolute gains in mortality, most countries experienced 
constant relative gaps (10 countries) or worsening outcomes (11 countries).  Minujin 
and Delamonica (2003) then propose an egalitarian scenario where policy makers use 
benchmark improvement rate among the top quintiles to target policies across the 
board in ways that benefits everyone.  This study is helpful in demonstrating the 
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worsening gaps in wellbeing outcomes across wealth profiles.  However, the authors 
correctly highlight that their study focuses on differentials.  Therefore, this study 
suffers from the same limitations that befall relative gap derivations because they do 
not take account of relative size of groups.  
  Beckfield (2004) explores the relationship between income inequality and 
health outcomes.  He estimates ordinary least squares and fixed effects models to 
evaluate if income inequality significantly explains inferior health outcomes (life 
expectancy at birth, and under five mortality). Beckfield criticizes previous studies for 
using limited samples, failure to control for unobserved within group heterogeneity, 
and for using suspect income inequality data.  Drawing on a multitude of data sources 
(including the United Nations, World Health Organization, The Republic of China, 
U.S. Census Bureau, the World Bank, Deininger and Squire Inequality Data, and the 
Penn World Tables) he estimates fixed effects models to explain infant mortality rate.  
After controlling for several covariates, he fails to find a significant link between 
income inequality (as measured by the Gini coefficient) and income share controlled 
by the poorest quintile.  This result is robust even when he limits his sample to 
wealthier countries.  While accepting the intuitive appeal of the conventional 
inequality-health relationship, Beckfield attributes his results to his use of superior 
methodological approaches, as well as use of appropriate data.  Even if he fails to find 
a significant association between income inequality and health, he argues that it could 
be due to several factors.  First, inequality, and not income inequality could be what 
harms health.  As such, he hypothesizes that several sources could account for the 
divergent outcomes including; globalization and neoliberal policies, class relations, 
health related welfare state policies, labor processes, racial health inequities, gendered 
health behaviors, and environmental changes.  Overall, this article enriches the debate 
on whether inequality is bad for health convergence? 
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In a related study, (Ruger and Kim, 2006) explored global health inequalities 
among adults as well as among children.  They sought to find what social and 
economic variables explained disparities in infant mortality across wealth profiles?  
Using the World Bank‘s World Development Indicators, they use cluster analysis to 
classify 207 countries into three ‗mortality groups‘; better off, worse off, and mid 
level.  In doing so, this approach helps minimizes differences within groups and 
maximize variability between groups.  They estimate multinomial logistic regressions 
explaining under child mortality, (as well as adult mortality) with the groups as the 
dependent variables.  Their covariates include indicators for income (GNI per capita 
adjusted for purchasing power parity), education (adult illiteracy rates for women and 
men), health (health expenditure per capita and public health expenditure), 
environment (water source and sanitation), and health condition (TB Incidence and 
HIV Prevalence).  Not surprisingly, they find evidence that health expenditure and 
HIV/AIDS prevalence explained the differentials in health outcomes between worse 
off and better off groups.  The article succeeded in reinforcing the link between health 
expenditures and health outcomes and highlighted the growing disparities in health 
outcomes between better off and worse off countries.  But, the analysis speaks more to 
differentials than they do for inequality per se because they do not weight for group 
composition. 
 Schafer (2005) highlights the growing trend towards global cultural 
homogenization or Westernization.  His analysis of United Nations data shows huge 
differentials in survival (under five mortality and life expectancy) across space.  In 
particular, he illustrates the poor performance of sub Saharan Africa compared to other 
regions.  Also, he argues that rapid urbanization exacerbates poverty and inequality.  
But, he provides scant evidence to show the link between urbanization and poverty 
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and inequality.
7
  Overall, this study sheds light on the contradictions of globalization 
where cultural convergence is matched with wellbeing divergence.  Yet, by using 
differentials, the study fails to account for the global distribution of the burden of child 
rearing.  Rather, differentials tend to focus on the extreme ends of the distribution 
ignoring the size of the entire distribution in ways that provide only a partial glimpse 
on the dynamics of inequality. 
 Further, a recent study (Decanco et al 2009) explores the salience of using 
multidimensional measures of inequality.  They draw on World Bank data (from 1975 
to 2000) for 97 countries including about 28 African countries for variables such as 
gross secondary school enrollment, life expectancy, and GDP per capita to derive 
normative inequality indices (Atkinson Index) and they find modest declines in 
wellbeing inequality.  While they present a novel methodological approach, I question 
the choice of their indicator variables (especially gross secondary school enrollment 
ratio) because it says nothing about actual educational attainment. Nevertheless, this 
study highlights the usual problems of trying to conduct studies on global inequality, 
especially for trend analysis because the data are simply not there and the omitted 
countries are not random, introducing some serious bias in the results (for some 
innovative ways of aggregating data from surveys from different countries see Breen 
et al (2009). 
 Last, Eloundou-Enyegue and Rehman (2009) explore trends in global 
inequality among children and how these changed over time. They present a 
conceptual model and empirically estimate the trends in global inequality among 
children.  Using World Bank data, they estimate trends in global inequality in 
opportunity (resources available to children) as well as trends in social outcomes 
                                                             
7
 In that regard, Schafer (2005) cites only the UN report on Water and Sanitation in the World Cities 
which estimated that up to 2.2 million people die of water and sanitation related diseases each year.   
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(health).  First, they estimate a Lorenz curve that illustrates the uneven contours of the 
global burden of child rearing where the locus of resources fails to coincide with the 
greatest burden of needy children.  Second, using three measures of inequality (the 
Mean Logarithmic Deviation, the Squared Coefficient of Variation, and the Theil 
index) the study reveals that resource inequality among children declined over time, 
similar to global income inequality trends (see Figure 3.4).  However, even though the 
trends is downward, the absolute values for children are higher that overall global 
trends.  For instance, between 1980 and 2005, global inequality among children 
(MLD) declined by 24% from 1.54 to 1.24 compared to global income inequality that 
declined by 27% from 1.34 to 0.98.  In addition, they reveal that while levels of 
resource inequality declined, the opposite is true to social inequality (health) among 
children (Figure 3.4, lower panel). 
Eloundou-Enyegue and Rehman‘s decomposition analysis further showed that 
the two regions of sub Saharan Africa and Asia accounted for most of the observed 
changes in inequality.  Within sub Saharan Africa, demographic factors such as 
population size and age dependency contributed to divergence in global trends in 
inequality. On the other hand faster than average economic growth in Asia fostered 
convergence of observed global trends.  Last and most notably, while the trends in 
resources signal a somewhat positive picture, the opposite obtains with regards 
inequality in wellbeing 
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Source:  Eloundou-Enyegue and Rehman (2009). 
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Source:  Eloundou-Enyegue and Rehman (2009). 
FIGURE 3.4. Trends in Global Inequality Among Children: Resources versus 
Social Outcomes.  
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indicators among children.  Regardless of inequality measure, this study finds a steady 
growth in global inequality in health outcomes for children.  For instance, the MLD 
values for infant mortality rate rose by about 53% from 0.20 in 1980 to 0.30 in 2005. 
This trend is consistent across alternative measures of inequality, and over time (the 
Theil index rises by 44 from 0.18 to 0.26 while the CV rises by 29% from 0.55 to 
0.71).  In other words, this study illustrates how global measures of inequality may 
mask disparities in inequality trends within particular subgroups, in this case children. 
 Overall, fewer previous studies examined inequality among children compared 
to those that address overall trends in global inequality.  While they provide useful 
insights, studies that fail to focus on children as a distinctive population subgroup 
provide a partial picture on the dynamics of inequality trends.  As the Eloundou-
Enyegue and Rehman (2009) illustrates, sometimes inequality trends among children 
mirror those of adults (for instance in resources), but, they may also go in the opposite 
direction for other social outcomes (in their case health).  It is therefore imperative for 
research to focus on children as a distinctive demographic group whose experiences 
often differ from those of the larger population. 
 
3.5 Levels and Trends in Inequality within World Regions  
Even though fewer studies examine the nature and changes in global inequality 
among children, a rich body of literature does so at a smaller scope – either regional, 
or within country inequality.  Below, I describe some of the key theoretical and 
empirical perspectives in inequality among children in Europe, in the United States, as 
well as in sub-Saharan Africa. 
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3.5.1 Inequality Within the Europe, Latin America, the United States, and 
sub Saharan Africa 
Notable studies on inequality among child cohorts in Europe include those that 
explore the relationship between social class and educational attainment.  For instance, 
a meta analysis by Shavit and Blossfeld (1993) suggests divergence in social outcomes 
among children over time.  However, more recent evidence suggests that in fact social 
and economic opportunities among children in Europe converged over time (Breen et 
al 2009).  
In a recent study (Sahn and Younger 2005) uses Demographic and Health 
Survey (DHS) data (22 surveys in total) from seven Latin American countries to 
examine levels and changes in health inequality among children.  Specifically, they 
derive Gini coefficients for standardized heights of 24 months old children.  They find 
significant declines in inequality in health inequalities in Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, 
Dominican Republic, Guatemala, and Peru and increases in Nicaragua.  However, 
their methodology involves within country changes in inequality.  In other words, they 
did not pool the data for all the children to evaluate how the heights of each child in 
Latin America compared to the regional mean—which is the value of between country 
evaluations. Some studies focus on inequality among children within individual 
countries in Latin America.  For instance, Wood and Lovell (1992) document the 
continuing significance of race in explaining inequality in child mortality in Brazil.   
Inequality among American children escaped scholarly debate until about 15 
years ago (Lichter and Eggebeen 1993).  Before then, most scholars were concerned 
with understanding the levels and determinants of poverty at the bottom of the 
distribution.  While helpful, these studies focused on a particular section of the 
children‘s population and failed to capture the changes across the entire distribution, 
and over time.  
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Lichter and Eggebeen (1993) examine the levels and trends in income 
inequality among children.  Further, they explore the role of family structure in 
influencing the observed changes in inequality.  Methodologically, they use the Public 
Use Microdata Samples of US population (1960, 1970 and 1980), to divide children 
into five income categories and derive income to poverty ratios, indices of 
dissimilarity, as well as coefficient of variation measures.  They find a growing level 
of inequality among children and worsening outcomes for African American children.  
They attribute the latter to changes in family structure where a growing number of 
African American children were growing up in poor, single parent households.  
Additionally, they partially attribute the growth in income inequality to labor force 
participation of women in dual earner couples.  Given that economic wellbeing is 
often judged relative to consumption standards of society more generally (Jencks 
1987), Lichter and Eggebeen (1993) conclude that the world of American children is 
becoming more and more bifurcated.  On the one hand lies the affluent children who 
partake of the material culture of the middle and upper class, and on the other extreme 
poor children remain isolated from this mainstream lifestyle.  They find this scenario 
very grim.  This study is extremely important in setting the groundwork for the 
analysis of inequality among children in America.  However, it was based on data for 
three decades up to 1980.  It would be helpful to replicate this study with more recent 
data, and examine trends in inequality across a variety of inequality measures to check 
if the results are sensitive to the type of measure derived.  This call for more research 
in this area is particularly pertinent given the recent changes in economic booms and 
busts in the United States, and well as the continuing changes in family structure as 
more children are growing up among single or cohabiting couples (Oppenheimer 
1988; Ellwood and Jencks 2004). 
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 Lichter (1997) synthesizes key theoretical arguments and empirical findings on 
children‘s poverty and inequality in America and compares these to other Western 
countries.  He notes that changes in the institutions of schools, families and 
governments shaped the etiology of poverty in America.  In fact, in spite of the 
weaknesses of income poverty, levels and trends in child poverty in America are much 
higher (20.3%) than those in other countries such as Germany (4.9%), Sweden (3.5%) 
and 4% for the Netherlands (Coder et al 2001).  While it is tempting to blame the 
American child poverty rates to single family households, he points to evidence that 
shows that poverty rates among children in female headed household in America are 
about 3 times those in France and the United Kingdom and almost 6 times those in the 
Netherlands.   
Further, Lichter (1997) notes that children are the poorest of all demographic 
groups in America, almost double the elderly rates.  On inequality, Lichter (1997) 
singles out changes in family structure, employment patterns, as well as public 
assistance as the main drivers of changes in inequality among children.  Among other 
things, he emphasizes the growth in trends of the working poor where low income 
wage earners earn marginally more than welfare recipients at a time when the value of 
welfare checks has declined precipitously. Moreover, Lichter  (1997) highlights that 
the extent to which the state enacts legislation that benefits poor children and all 
children more generally depends on whether society feels that children are a public 
good? 
 Two other studies (Ozawa and Lum 1996; Ozawa and Kim 2000) address 
inequality among children from a social policy perspective.  These two studies 
disaggregate trends and dynamic responses of inequality within three groups; children, 
the elderly, and adults.  The major innovation in their methodological approach is that 
they do not infer inequality among children from those of adults.  Rather, they study 
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levels and trends of inequality among children as a distinct population.  Ozawa and 
Lum (1996) evaluate the effects of alternative social transfer programs on income 
inequality among children.  Drawing from the Survey of Income and Program 
Participation, they focus on three distinct groups, children, elderly, and adults.  Their 
analysis shows a very high inequality level among children (Gini =.581) which reduce 
to .198 after social transfers.  They conclude that welfare payments are more effective 
than social insurance benefits in reducing the Gini coefficient for children.  
In a subsequent study, Ozawa and Kim (2000) evaluates the changes in income 
inequality among children from 1969 to 1979, 1979 to 1989 and finally between 1969 
and 1989. They use data from the Current Population Survey to estimate inequality 
among three subgroups; children, adults and the elderly (disaggregated by race).  They 
estimate Gini coefficients before and after social transfers and determine the 
ameliorative effectiveness of social transfer payments.  Their findings suggest that 
children lost ground in the three decades between 1969 and 1989.  For instance, after 
accounting for social insurance benefits and welfare payments, the Gini coefficient for 
children increased 11% between 1969 and 1979, followed by a 10.2% increase 
between 1979 and 1989.  Within the two decades between 1969 and 1989, income 
inequality among children increased by 22.4%.  They also find a gradient among racial 
groups with income inequality among Hispanic children increasing at a faster rate than 
among any other racial group between 1979 and 1989. 
More recently, Mayer (2001) argues that at national level, economic inequality 
may affect educational attainment through several channels (1) incentives provided by 
higher education (2) declining utility of family income (3) subjective feelings of 
relative deprivation or gratification (4) changes in political processes that shape 
educational opportunities and (5) changes in economic segregation.  While Mayer‘s 
work demonstrated that economic inequality in the United States accounted for higher 
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educational attainment over time, it also showed that the positive shift was driven by 
gains among children of the rich while the poor lost ground.  In short, Mayer‘s 
theoretical framework lays a solid background for theory building with regards causes 
and consequences of global inequality among children. 
Literature on inequality, especially inequality among children within sub 
Saharan Africa is scant.  The exception is a recent study by Moradi and Batten (2005).  
This study explains the levels and determinants of health inequality (height) among 
five cohorts of adults in 28 countries starting the 1950s to the 1980s. Specifically, they 
estimate Gini coefficients and derive coefficient of variation in heights among the 
study subjects.  They find that regions with monoculture tend to increase inequality 
while those with diversified agricultural systems reduced overall inequality. 
In spite of the paucity of studies on inequality among children in sub Saharan 
Africa, the current study benefits from a rich literature that emerged in the United 
States in the last two decades.  Overall, the literature on economic inequality among 
children in the United States is expansive and much less so for other world regions 
such as Europe, Asia, or Latin America.  Most studies focus on inequality patterns 
along class, racial, and gender categories.   The United States literature is helpful in 
two important ways.  First, it advanced methodological and theoretical approaches to 
the study of inequality among children.  Second, it makes it clear that children are an 
important and distinctive sub group within society.  As such, poverty and inequality 
dynamics among children should not be inferred from adult trends.  Indeed, Eloundou-
Enyegue and Rehman (2009) also reinforces the salience of focusing on children as a 
distinctive demographic group. 
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3.6 Why Study Inequality 
Why is it important to track levels and trends in inequality within society?  
Many studies that examine inequality seldom state why society should care about 
inequality (Kaplow 2005).  Below, I provide some of the theoretical and empirical 
arguments that suggest that inequality should not be a concern, as well as counter 
arguments that submit that inequality is a key social problem that needs to be 
understood and addressed. 
 
3.6.1 Why Inequality Should Not Matter 
First, the perspective that views inequality as unimportant point to four key 
ideas namely (i)  inequality serves a functional purpose in society (ii) poverty is a 
much greater evil than inequality (iii) a tradeoff exists between poverty and inequality, 
and finally (iv) inequality is an inevitable outcome of long term economic growth 
trends.  Krueger (2007) argues that inequality serves a functional purpose in society in 
ways that efficiently channel scarce resources to the most deserving in society.  The 
logic is that inequality itself is not bad as long as society is getting richer, a safety net 
exists for the poor, and there is an opportunity to climb up the ladder (The Economist, 
2006).  Perhaps also, inequality could become bad when you have too much of it.  
Second, Krueger (2002) suggests that poverty is perhaps a greater evil that warrants 
research attention more than inequality does.  Indeed, Ravallion (2005) uses data for 
70 transition countries, to argue that a trade off exists between poverty and inequality.  
The study finds no evidence between absolute poverty and relative inequality but finds 
significant evidence of a tradeoff between absolute poverty and relative inequality.  In 
other words, individuals who want smaller absolute income gaps between the rich and 
the poor should be content with more poverty and vice versa.  In a seminal study 
Kuznets (1955) presented the idea that growth in income inequality is to be expected 
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when countries grow their economies.  Coining the theory of inverted U-curve, 
Kuznets‘ theory suggests that income inequality is expected to grow in a country‘s 
early stages of growth, peaking at some level, and then falling thereafter
8
.  Since 
inequality is an inevitable outcome of economic growth and improvements in human 
wellbeing, people need not worry about inequality as they should about poverty and 
static economies.  While earlier empirical work somewhat supported Kuznets‘s thesis 
(Houthaker 1961; Kelly and Williamson 1968) a growing body of recent studies 
dispute the conventional wisdom on the relationship between growth and inequality.  
For instance, using both panel and cross sectional data, Schmidt-Hebbel and Serven 
(2000) find inconclusive evidence on the relationship between growth and inequality.  
Moreover, other studies have found a negative association between inequality and 
growth (Barro 1999) or that in fact initial inequality is negatively correlated with long 
run growth.  Further, Bruno et al (1998) using longitudinal on India analyzed the 
relationship between growth and inequality and found that growth was not inequality 
enhancing.  Overall, the Kuznet‘s inverted U theory has not found empirical support. 
Nevertheless, it is valued for bringing inequality scholarship into the center of social 
science research. In fact, because evidence to support the Kuznets thesis has proven 
not to be robust to econometric specifications, sample composition, and period of 
observation, some argue that it is better to just focus on policies that foster growth and 
positive distributional outcomes than rely on aggregative reduced form relationships 
between per capita income and inequality (Kanbur 2000). 
 
                                                             
8
 In his Presidential Address, Kuznet‘s made a plea to the members of the American Economic 
Association which inspired a long research tradition on inequality. 
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3.6.2 Why Inequality Matters 
A growing number of scholars, policy makers, and civic society submit that 
inequality is arguably one of the greatest social problems of our time and therefore 
needs timely and sustained attention. What is distinctive about the current historical 
moment is that inequality research gathered pace across disciplines such as religion, 
ethics, law, economics, sociology, demography, geography and psychology.  
 Why do people care about inequality within and across societies?  After all, 
inequality is ubiquitous in both poor and rich nations (Gilbert 2007) and has shaped 
human experience across generations.  Proponents of inequality draw their inspiration 
from (i) perceptions of fairness and social justice (ii) inequality‘s relationship to other 
social outcomes such as political stability, crime, health, education, and happiness (iii) 
the growing scope and self reinforcing nature of inequality. 
 Let us assume for a moment that a socially just society is a goal as well as an 
end in itself within and across context.  What would that goal or society look like?   
Rawls (1971) provides us with a simple yardstick against which each society can 
measure itself.  The simple Rawls test asks: ―would the best off accept the current 
arrangements if they believed for a moment they might find themselves in the place of 
the worst off?‖ If a society answers this question in the affirmative, then it may 
consider itself just. Sadly, I cannot think of any society today where this response can 
be honestly asserted because of the wide differentials in life chances between those 
who have and those who have little. 
As such, people use inequalities to judge the quality of society in which they 
live (Kolm 1999).  Indeed, some people die in revolutions fighting existing 
inequalities.  He notes that inequality invokes notions of: 
 
― …social ethics through distributive justice, judgments about social 
structures and social sentiments, to the sociology of classes, 
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hierarchies, concentration, differentiation, spreading, stratification, 
isolation, polarization, and to psychology as regards the sense of  
justice, norms, envy, jealousy, sentiments of inferiority and of 
superiority..‖ 
 
In other words, perceptions of inequality are integral to the understanding of the very 
essence of human welfare because in most circumstances, relative distribution matters 
equally or even more than absolute distribution. Most people may not care about 
inequality, especially economic inequality in society.  However, they begin to be 
concerned if inequality (in whatever form) is perceived to be an outcome of 
inequitable distribution of opportunity in society.  Indeed, Seers (1972) submits that 
equality should be an objective goal on its own because the social barriers and 
inhibitions of an unequal society distort the personalities of both those who have more 
and those who have little.  To Seers, trivial differences such as accent, language, dress, 
customs breed contempt and social disharmony. 
 Within the sociological tradition inequality has always been a major 
motivation factor that drives theory and empirical studies on fairness and social 
justice.  Notably, the core work of classical sociologists such as Karl Marx, Emile 
Durkheim, and Max Weber was anchored in understanding the nature and changes in 
societal stratification.  In the opening statement of ‗The Communist Manifesto‖, Karl 
Marx (1848), notes that: 
 
―The history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class 
struggles.‖ 
 
Indeed, Marx‘s theory of historical materialism suggests that the poverty dynamics of 
19
th
 century Europe were best understood within the context of emerging economic 
and power relations associated with industrialization.  Weber, on the other hand 
proposed theories on the nature of social classes, social status and the processes that 
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shape these categories. His multidimensional views on inequality laid the platform for 
subsequent stratification literature that investigates disparities in life chances 
(Dahrendorf 1979). In the Division of Labor, Durkheim (1984) advances the concept 
of mechanical solidarity that stems from shared norms and values among social 
groupings.  This proposition implicitly acknowledges the existence of distinct social 
classes. Among these theorists, it is Karl Marx who was explicit in linking poor social 
outcomes (poverty and inequality) to unfair patterns of unequal social relations in 
society. 
  Second, inequality is important especially when one examines its relationship 
to other social outcomes such as political stability and crime (see Thorbecke and 
Charumilind 2002; Dallmayr 2002; Wade 2004; Milanovic 2006; Gilbert 2007).  
Thorbecke and Charumilind (2002) propose a framework that captures the relationship 
between political instability and inequality.  They argue that high income inequality 
may lead to social tensions and political instability, leading to uncertainty, lower 
investment and ultimately lower economic growth. In other words, inequality 
undermines social cohesion and the democratic process as those with economic power 
are likely to wield political influence as well.
9
  Indeed, some recent studies found a 
negative association between inequality and political stability (Alesina and Rodrick 
1994 & 1996) while others have found a positive association between inequality and 
violent crime as well as a positive association between poverty and property crime 
(Kelly 2000).  
Many economics scholars question the narrow focus on income or wealth 
inequality in favor of broader assessments of the ‗things‘ that matter for overall human 
wellbeing (see especially Sen 1982, 1985, 1997, 1999; Neumayer 2003; Kenny 2005).  
                                                             
9
  In his book ‗Power and Powerlessness‘ Gaventa (1982) outlines the relationship between economic 
power and political participation. He argues that the rich are more likely to set the agenda, advocate 
policies that work to their advantage (e.g., taxation) and ultimately shape the aspirations of the poor. 
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Indeed, a recent study (Graham and Felton 2006) provides fresh perspectives on the 
relationship between inequality and happiness. They argue that classical economics‘ 
focus on Pareto Optimality fails to shed adequate light on the relationship between 
inequality and individual welfare because it is preoccupied with maintaining the status 
core (not making one better off by making another worse off).
10
  Using survey data 
from 18 countries in Latin America, they find evidence of a negative effect of 
inequality on happiness in Latin America where it is considered a sign of persistent 
unfairness.  They recommend improvements in access to education and opportunity 
towards disadvantaged groups. But still, evaluation of income inequality is still salient 
because in many circumstances, inequality in income is associated with inequalities in 
other realms such as political power, education and others, which in turn become self 
reinforcing. 
Studies from several disciplines explain the long arm of poverty children‘s 
wellbeing and life course outcomes (for instance see Duncan and Brooks-Gunn 1997; 
McLeod and Shanahan 1993 & 1996).  They submit that poverty affects long term 
cognitive development and socio-emotional wellbeing of children (Hill and Sandcroft 
1995); has a negative impact on quality of parenting (McLanahan and Sandefur 1994); 
and that childhood poverty has a negative impact on adult productivity and often leads 
to dependency on welfare (McLanahan and Sandefur 1994; Duncan et al 1994).  
However, little is known about the impacts of inequality, rather than poverty, on 
children‘s wellbeing.  For instance, what can we say about the lived experiences, and 
general wellbeing of non poor children who grow up in a world with increasing 
inequality?  How does inequality shape their aspirations?   
                                                             
10
 The preoccupation with Pareto optimality obscures practical solutions to redistributive justice or 
taxation strategies.   
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Fortunately, a small but growing body of literature explores the link between 
inequality and human capital development.  The general idea is straightforward – the 
rich have more resources to invest in the education and health of their children.  
Therefore, in the absence of effective and equitable social safety nets, one would 
expect to observe a distinctive gradient in welfare outcomes depending on the level of 
private family income and or wealth.  The evidence for this thesis is non disputable.  
For instance, the rising trends in shadow schooling are without historical precedent 
(Buchmann 1999; Baker et al 2001; Kim 2004; Dang and Rogers 2008; Kozol 1996) 
or concerted cultivation of children (Lareau 2002).  This body of literature illuminates 
the extent to which economic inequality in society drives social outcomes among the 
future generation. 
The evidence to support the relationship between health and inequality is 
contested, partly because of the idea that poverty and deprivation affects health 
outcomes than inequality per se.  Still, theoretically, Deaton (2001) suggests that 
income inequality may affect health outcomes indirectly in as much as the political 
process and provision of public goods often favors the wealthy.  Further, Wilkinson 
and Pickett (2006) submit that income inequality directly affects health through 
causing psycho-social stress (depression, isolation, insecurity, and elevated levels of 
anxiety). 
Apart from the concern about inequality and social justice, or inequality‘s 
relationship to other social outcomes, research on inequality is critical given the sheer 
scope, and the self reinforcing nature of inequality patterns in societies.  Assuming 
limited public intervention, studies on intergenerational inequality lead us to expect 
inequality patterns among children to be self reinforcing (Bowles and Gintis 2002; 
Mare and Maralani 2006).  In other words, differential access to education and health 
outcomes among children partly breed future wellbeing divergence within a cohort.  In 
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particular, inequalities experienced during childhood manifests through assortative 
mating and differential fertility in adulthood.  Children who have less are more likely 
to become less educated adults, marry partners of similar circumstances, and have 
fewer resources to raise strong families. Additionally, recent changes in family 
structure could have a bearing on resource distribution among children (Iceland 2003; 
Martin 2006; McLanahan and Percheski 2008) which subsequently signals particular 
patterns of intergenerational transmission of inequality (Bowles and Gintis 2001; Mare 
and Maralani 2006).  In sub Saharan African, differential fertility patterns as well as 
major shifts in family structure spurred by HIV related mortality patterns among the 
adult population have raised questions about the effectiveness of the cultural practice 
of child fosterage, a key institutional arrangement that traditionally buffered inequality 
among children (Madhavan 2004; Case and Ardington 2006). Overall, the cyclical 
nature of inequality patterns suggests that a redirection of research efforts to the study 
of inequality dynamics among children may be useful.   
Over and above issues of fairness and social justice, intergenerational 
transmission of poverty and inequality or the relationship between inequality and other 
social outcomes, some question the usefulness of estimates of global inequality.  They 
argue that there is no global government, nor is there a global civil society that could 
can develop public policies nor foster private strategies that can address the situation 
(see for instance Bhagwati 2004).  On the contrary, others submit that global 
inequality is important because globalization increases awareness of other people‘s 
income, and shapes perceptions and aspirations even of those in poor countries 
(Milanovic, 2006).  In essence, the particular form of globalization that is sweeping 
across nations is one where cultural convergence fails to coincide with the economic 
convergence (Eloundou-Enyegue et al 2004).  In other words, the locus of elevated 
aspirations (among people of the global South) has not coincided with the locus of 
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growing wealth (in the West).  Therefore, Milanovic (2006) contends that a focus on 
inequality is not only a matter of moral and ethical justice but, it is also critical for 
pragmatic reasons as it has implications for political tensions. 
 
3.7 Conclusion 
This chapter presented previous studies on levels and trends in global 
inequality and articulated the factors that drive and mitigate these trends.  Second, it 
synthesized the literature on inequality among children as global, regional, and 
national levels.  Third, it critically examines the arguments on whether we should or 
should not worry about inequality? 
 The 21
st
 century inherited a world that is distinctively different from that of a 
hundred years ago.  We seem to have more of everything.  The world economy and 
food production grew rapidly in ways that put to rest Malthusian concerns about 
population growth (Boserup 1987; Tiffen 1993), experienced positive gains in child 
survival and longevity (Wilson 2001) became more educated (Schofer and Meyer 
2005).  Yet, the greatest challenge is not whether the world has enough, but, whether 
the world distributes its valued resources equitable across its people over generations 
and what difference our collective choices have on human wellbeing?  Nowhere are 
the issues of access and exclusion more pertinent than among the most vulnerable 
members of society – children and the elderly.  In fact, the moral litmus test for 
society is how it treats the neediest.   Lichter (1997) stated that, ―A disproportionate 
share of today‘s poor children will become tomorrow‘s poor adults‘ and in all 
likelihood it is true that if ―children are the future,‖ then ―inequality among children is 
the future of inequality.‖ Fortunately, the world of science has moved beyond its 
preoccupation with issues of poverty to addressing inequality more generally.  
Research on poverty is still extremely important, yet, it only focuses on the lower part 
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of the distribution.  It therefore needs to be complemented by equally rigorous and 
persistent studies of inequality. Clearly, our understanding of inequality patterns is 
incomplete without a solid appreciation of children‘s lived experiences at local, 
national and global levels.  After all, the world expects these children to grow up 
global at a time when we are unclear about how present circumstances shape future 
performances and outcomes. 
Two major signals that inequality issues are finding their way to the center of 
global debates include the publication of the 2006 World Development Report that 
primarily focused on inequality.  Second, while previous research on economic 
inequality could be found in a number of journals including World Development 
Report; American Journal of Sociology, American Sociological Review etc, in 2003 a 
Journal of Economic Inequality was founded and it promises to consider perspectives 
from across the social sciences including Economics, Demography and Sociology.   
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CHAPTER 4 
PREVIOUS STUDIES ON CHILD FOSTERAGE WITHIN THE AFRICAN 
EXTENDED FAMILY SYSTEM 
 
4.1 Introduction 
Formal social safety nets such as targeted cash transfers or vouchers can 
potentially help buffer inequality in resource distribution among children.  However, 
because these public strategies are often weak or missing, African countries often rely 
on informal networks of family solidarity to care for and educate children. This 
chapter reviews the literature on this informal practice of child fosterage.  First, it 
presents the seminal work on child fosterage that estimated the prevalence of the 
practice.  Second, it presents subsequent literature that documents microlevel effects 
of fosterage.  Last, it argues that at national level the effectiveness of child fosterage 
depends not only on its prevalence and microlevel effects, but also on the 
directionality of flows.    Yet, most previous studies focused only on the prevalence 
and microlevel effects.  The current dissertation provides insights on the third 
dimension; directionality of flows. 
 
4.2 Child Fosterage in the African Context 
Child fosterage is the practice where children are raised by relatives and kin, 
away from their biological parents (Isiugo Abanihe 1985).  This practice often 
involves the physical relocation of children from their birth homes to a different 
village, to urban areas or vice versa.  In some cases, however, the child does not travel 
any distance, but rather, is born and raised in a different household away from its 
biological parents.  This is the case when for instance a pregnant woman goes to her 
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maternal home, gives birth to child, and then leaves that child in the care of its 
grandmother or other relatives while she returns to join her husband.  Either way, the 
practice involves the transfer of guardianship of the child to another individual of 
family (Eloundou-Enyegue and Stokes 2002) and is deeply rooted in the African 
extended family system where the essence of home and belonging transcend the 
boundaries of the nuclear family. 
 Child fosterage in the African context is distinct from the Western notions of 
adoption where legal rights and obligations are often permanently transferred from the 
biological to the foster family.
1
  In the former, the transfer is temporary in nature, 
embedded in social networks and norms of reciprocity as well as mutual consent.  
Children are relocated with the understanding that they can be retrieved at any time at 
the prerogative of the host or biological parents (Bledsoe and Brandon 1992) of if any 
of the parties get dissatisfied with the arrangement (Eloundou-Enyegue and Stokes 
2002).   The burden of rearing the child is often shared between the host and biological 
parents with the later occasionally contributing towards food as well as schooling and 
health expenses (ibid).   Anthropologists documented this practice especially in West 
Africa since the early 1970s (Goody 1973 & 1982).  But, how many African children 
are fostered?  
 
4.3 Prevalence of child fosterage in sub Saharan Africa 
This section synthesizes the literature on prevalence of child fosterage in sub 
Saharan Africa.  Child fosterage in sub-Saharan Africa remains a central focus of 
research across a diverse set of disciplines, including anthropology, sociology, and 
                                                             
1
 Informal child fosterage has historically been present also in western societies, especially among 
African Americans (Miller 1998).  At the turn of 20
th
 the century, it was found to be associated with 
lower educational outcomes for children (Moehling 2003); Also, transnational networks of care have 
been observed among Angolan children raised in Lison, Portugal (ien 2006). 
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economics. Its appeal lies in its ubiquity -- nearly 100 million (one in three) African 
children are reared and educated by adults other than their biological parents 
(Caldwell 1987).
2
  Key factors characterize child fosterage in SSA are that (1) it varies 
widely across and within countries (2) it varies with age and gender of child (3) 
empirical estimates are sensitive to data source.    
Prevalence of child fosterage is reported in two ways.  First, some studies 
report statistics on the likelihood that a household fosters in or out?  Second, some 
studies document actual numbers of children who are fostered. Regardless of what 
measure is adopted, however, it is clear that the informal practice of child fosterage 
accounts for the wellbeing of a large proportion of African children.  Historical 
estimates based on Ghanaian census data show that a fifth of all children aged 10 and 
younger were not living with their parents in 1970 while in Liberia, forty percent of all 
mothers aged between 15-34 years reported to have fostered a child.    Sierra Leone 
showed even higher child fosterage rates for 1974 ranging between 29 and 46 percent 
depending on the age group and ethnicity of the mother. 
Similar historical trends of high prevalence were reported in Southern Africa.  
For example, a sample survey carried out in the mining town of Kitwe in Zambia in 
1986 showed prevalence rates of 23% among primary school children aged between 5-
9 and an even higher rate of up to 46% among young adolescence aged 10-14.  
Fosterage, in the Zambian context, was also shown to begin at an early age with about 
16% reported to be under the age of one. This is in contrast to lower rates of younger 
children reported for Burkina Faso where 1% of children under 5 fostered (Akresh 
2004).  The Zambian case also illustrates the extent of ethnic variation in the practice 
of child fosterage.  About 84% of out fostered children belonged to the matrilineal 
                                                             
2
 The World Bank estimates the population of the subregion for 2005 at 752,631,532 of which 44% are 
children below the age of 14. 
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groups consisting of the Bemba, Lunda, Chewa, Bisa, Kaonde, Aushi, Nsenga, and 
Tumbuka; 10% to the patrilineal groups of the Ngoni, Nmuanga, Mubwe and Lungu 
and about 6% belonging to bilateral ethnic groups.    This ethnic factor which is also 
documented for many countries in West Africa including Nigeria, Sierra Leone and 
Ghana underscores that the practices is deeply rooted in culture more than being an 
adaptation to economic hardships of the time.  The question remains though whether 
the prevalence of fosterage changed over time?  
 While historical estimates were either based on ethnographic data or decennial 
census data, several data sets have now become available to allow for trends analysis.  
Among the most used are Demographic and Health Surveys.  These nationally 
representative surveys are carried out in more than twenty sub-Saharan African 
countries usually every five years starting in the mid 1980s.  Most countries now have 
at least two surveys that allows for comparison over time.  For example, Mensch 
(1999) observed prevalence rates of between 11 and 42% across 18 sub Saharan 
African countries in the late 1990‘s for children aged between 12 and 14 years. Low 
fosterage countries include Mali (18%), Kenya (19%), Burkina Faso and Senegal 
(each with 21%) while countries with high fosterage rates include Uganda (31%), 
Benin (33%), Cote d‘Ivoire (36%) and Namibia (42%).  Countries that fall within the 
middle range (22-30%) include Cameroon, Central African Republic, Comoros, 
Ghana, Madagascar, Niger, Nigeria, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe.
3
  Notably, 
more girls than boys were in foster homes across all the reported countries with the 
most extreme difference observed in Benin (19% of all boys compared to 33% of all 
girls) followed by Ghana and Niger (20% of all boys compared to 30% of all girls; and 
16% of all boys compared to 26% of girls respectively). 
                                                             
3
 Note that while Mensch  (1999) reports prevalence rates for both girls and boys, my commentary is 
based on the girls‘ rates which are higher than those of boys across all countries.  
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 Last, it is important to explain a common misconception; that child fosterage is 
most common among poor rural households who send their children to urban kin.  
While many are tempted to use the myth of rural/urban infrastructural disequilibrium 
to suggest that child fosterage is predominantly practiced by the poor large households 
in rural areas with children moving from rural to urban environments, available 
evidence does not lend itself to this theory. Rather, child fosterage in SSA is a 
dynamic process which is neither unidirectional nor limited to the poor single mothers, 
but rather, it is common in all family types (Afaq 1996). 
Additionally, the prevalence of child fosterage among rural and urban 
households varies across contexts.  For example, Isiugo-Abanihe (1985) reports that 
more urban than rural Ghanaian mothers who were aged between 15 and 34 years out 
fostered their children (23 and 17% respectively).  He concludes that these trends may 
be due to poverty levels and general urban problems as well as the need for younger 
women to participate in the labor market.  A more recent study that uses Ghana DHS 
data finds that this trends continues to obtain where women with high education and 
those in professional jobs were more likely to out foster their children (Klomegah 
1997), although this too varies across national contexts.  For example, a recent study 
based on Cameroon found the reverse trend.  Within rural households, children at 
secondary school age were six times more likely to be out fostered than their younger 
siblings (Eloundou-Enyegue and Stokes 2002).  In the same study the authors also find 
that while a fifth (20.9%) of rural mothers had ever out-fostered a child, only a tenth 
of their urban counterparts had (9.4%).  Another recent study showed that most 
movements of children are either from rural to rural or from urban to urban areas 
(Akresh 2004).  This study found that about two thirds of the households that 
exchanged children lived within 25 mile radius of each other, a quarter were located in 
the city of Ouagadougou, about a 50 mile radius away, 6% were in other provinces 
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about 150 miles away and about 9% were in Cote d‘Ivoire which was about eight 
hundred miles away.  In sum, the majority of children circulate within short distances 
relative to their original biological households.  Destinations differ according to 
context but based on the few empirical studies reviewed here, small proportions of 
children circulate from rural to urban areas and even fewer children move from urban 
to rural households. 
 While the rural to rural, rural to urban, urban to urban, and urban to rural 
categories are useful as heuristic devices, it is important to note in reality, a single 
child may experience passage through more than one of these.  For example, a young 
child may be weaned with a grandmother, and later moved to an aunt or uncle in the 
neighboring village to complete primary school.  Upon entry to secondary level, or in 
response to sudden shocks such as death, the same child may migrate to the city to live 
with other relatives.  As such, fosterage ought to be viewed as a dynamic process that 
changes over one‘s life course. Also, available evidence suggests that characterization 
of child fosterage as a social safety net for the rural poor are both erroneous and 
misleading. 
 
4.4 Motivations for Child Fosterage 
What motivates individuals to foster children?  This section describes the 
literature on the factors that drive fosterage trends.  It also summarizes the literature on 
the agency of the fostered child.  Child fosterage serves a variety of economic, cultural 
and social functions.  Three key seminal studies (Goody 1982; Isiugo-Abanihe 1985; 
and Caldwell and Caldwell 1987) provided insights on factors that drive families and 
individuals to foster children.   
Goody (1982) views child fosterage as a functional institution designed to help 
social reproduction while Caldwell and Caldwell (1987) underscores its centrality to 
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biological reproduction where fosterage subsidized the cost of childrearing among 
poor families and thus supported continued high fertility in Africa.
4
  Isiugo–Abanihe 
(1985) develops a typology of fosterage motivations.  He observes five main 
motivations of fosterage; kinship, crisis, apprenticeship, domestic, and educational
5
.  
First, kinship fosterage strengthens kin ties through the transfer of young children to 
their grandparents, facilitating the weaning process and providing parents an 
opportunity to resume sexual relations.  Second, crisis fosterage involves the transfer 
of a child in the event of a traumatic event such as death, sickness, divorce of parents 
or when a child is born out of wedlock.  Third, apprentice fosterage involves instances 
where children are relocated among kin in order to gain important life skills in 
particular trades and fourth, under domestic fosterage, children are accepted solely to 
provide household labor.  Fifth, and most pertinent for my scholarship, is educational 
fosterage, where children are relocated to stay with other relatives, especially as they 
progress to secondary school or when they seek higher religious studies such as among 
Muslims.    This foregoing typology continues to suffice today because it is 
comprehensive enough to capture the motivations fosterage even though the relative 
importance of each of these five has changed over time.  In fact, Ainsworth (1996) 
argues that child fosterage has adapted in ways that it is serving more economic rather 
than cultural purposes of socialization.    To my knowledge, however, no one has 
attempted to empirically estimate the relative proportion of children fostered based on 
the various motivational factors.  Perhaps this is partly because of the overlap in 
individual decision making by households. 
 
                                                             
4
 This informal subsidization partly explains why contrary to expectations, some studies failed to find a 
negative association between family size and schooling (Gomes 1984).   
5
 These motivations also vary depending on the age of a child (Akresh 2004) as younger children may 
be fostered for reasons other than education. 
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4.4.1 Decision Making on Child Fosterage  
How do households or individuals decide when to foster, which child to foster, 
from whom to foster, and for how long?  Even with the above motivations, decision 
making at individual or household level vary on many dimensions including the 
factors that motivate sending and receiving households and the agency of the fostered 
child.  In many ways, the motivations ultimately inform the selection and the 
destination.  Viewed from the supply side, sending households‘ motivations may fall 
within the Isiugo-Abanihe (1985) characterization which include; strengthening of 
kinship ties through collective socialization of the child, crisis fosterage after death, 
divorce or extra marital conception, apprenticeship in various trade, education, and to 
smooth domestic labor supply.  In addition, work by Akresh (2004) shows that 
households use fosterage as a risk coping mechanism for adjusting household size and 
composition after external income shocks.  Akresh‘s data also shows that access to 
good social networks and number of older girls increases the probability that a 
household would out foster a child. 
From the demand side, the motivations are also variable.   Receiving 
households may demand to foster in for companionship or for labor smoothing.  For 
those who foster in with the intent of improving the outcomes for the child, the 
motivations may be twofold.  First, some may do so for altruistic reasons, the simple 
desire to do good unto others even at the expense of foregoing personal consumption, 
(Kolm 2000, Maheiu 1989).  However others may accept to foster not because they 
seek to do good, but because society obliges them to do so.  This is the case for 
example when one is fostered or helped within the extended family networks and is 
expected to reciprocate.  Second, some individuals are never consulted before a 
fosterage move occurs.  For instance Eloundou-Enyegue and Stokes (2002) note that 
some relatives may simply arrive, and over time, they blend into the family regardless 
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of the opinion of the receiving household.  In such a case, fosterage occurs as an 
imposition from without.  Obviously, outcomes for the fostered child depend on the 
dynamic dialectic relationship between the motivations of both sending and receiving 
sides, as well as the agency of the individual child. Indeed while I have focused on the 
motivations of adult family members, it is the case that some older children are able to 
negotiate their way into fosterage relationships and yet these may be harder to 
empirically demonstrate. 
 
Choice of Child and Destination 
Does age, birth order, gender or other characteristics of the households or 
individual child matter?  Studies show that selection of the fostered child is not a 
random process, but rather, a well articulated outcome of the motivations of involved 
actors.   What appears most straightforward is fosterage under crisis of death, or 
divorce of the child‘s parents.  In this case the goal would be to place all children in 
households that maximize their chances of survival and perhaps they future economic 
wellbeing as well.  Younger children are often fostered out to grandparents for their 
companionship as well as to allow parents to resume sexual relations while freeing up 
time for the mother to invest in other activities that enhance the family‘s wellbeing.   
For example, parents often have to make simultaneous decisions on whether to send a 
child to school or into the labor force and this simultaneity works negatively on girls 
education (Gage, 2005). Family size and birth order has not been shown to determine 
likelihood that a child would be fostered but rather, performance in school. The latter 
varied between urban and rural households.  Urban households were more likely to out 
foster children who were poorly performing in school while in rural areas, well 
performing children.    
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Fosterage flow destination are often complex but its generally agreed that most 
are imbedded in the social networks of sending and receiving households.  Eloundou-
Enyegue and Stokes (2002) found that rural Cameroonian children with a sibling 
living in urban areas were 1.5 times more likely to be out fostered than those without 
such close familial links.  In another study, Eloundou-Enyegue and Shapiro (2005) 
inferred that social networks may be critical in determine the likelihood for fosterage.  
One would expect that if fosterage decisions (both sending and receiving) based on 
need, then children from the poorest households would be the most likely to be out 
fostered. But, on the contrary, evidence from Cameroon showed that after ranking 
sending households by wealth, households in the second quintile  were most likely to 
send children out that those in the poorest quintile.   The authors infer that perhaps this 
outcome is due fact that the poor possibly have poor network quality and are therefore 
not as likely to find viable options for out fostering their children.  
 
4.5 Sustainability of the African extended system under exogenous macro level 
shocks 
To what extent has the African extended family system responded to recent 
macro level exogenous shocks such as the HIV/AIDS disease burden, or the economic 
downturns of the late 1980s and 1990s?   
 
4.5.1 The Sustainability of African Extended Family under  HIV/AIDS 
Recently public and academic lens focused on examining to what extent the 
extended family remained an effective social safety net in the face of increased 
volumes of orphaned children.  Complex sets of issues arise with regards the impact of 
the orphan crisis on the extended family.  Among them is the extent to which the 
crisis: 
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1)  Exacerbated the absolute number as well as proportion of children fostered? 
2) Altered the relative distribution of children fostered under crisis? 
3) Affected the direction of flows of fostered children 
4) Led to unwillingness of households to receive foster children?   
 
A recent study in Uganda based on a panel household survey data set showed 
between 1992 and 1999 foster children who were less than 14 years of age increased 
from 17 to 28% and children less than 6 years of age doubled from 10 to 20% 
(Deininger et al 2005) . Other studies show that parental death is a significant 
determinant of child fosterage.  Aids orphans were significantly more likely to move 
than nonorphans but orphans whose parents died of other causes were more likely to 
move compared to AIDS orphans (Ford and Hosegood 2005). Fosterage forms have 
shifted from voluntary to crisis-led fosterage (Madhavan 2004, Oleke et al 2005) and 
orphans are more likely to be raised in households headed by the elderly (Drew et al, 
1998, Guest 2001).  Additionally, the HIV/AIDS pandemic has triggered the 
emergence of new forms of social ties such as through non-governmental 
organizations or various types of voluntary community-based organizations that are 
unlike traditional networks of kinship solidarity.  Essentially, the pandemic has 
exacerbated the volumes of fostered children, particularly those fostered under crisis.  
It has also changed the nature of kinship structure that orphaned children can rely 
upon for effective fosterage.   
 The most heated debate in the literature is whether orphans are at a greater 
educational disadvantage than are poor non orphans. Some studies found no evidence 
of orphan disadvantage (Lloyd and Blanc 1996) or find this disadvantage to be smaller 
than that associated with poverty (Ainsworth and Filmer 2007).  Yet the bulk of the 
literature shows evidence of profound disadvantages (Case, et al 2004; Kendall 2007; 
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Case and Ardington 2006; Evans and Miguel 2007). Kendall and O‘Gara (2007) find 
Malawi orphans to be at a particular disadvantage because of absenteeism before and 
after parental death. The use of longitudinal datasets has helped isolate the impacts of 
parental death events on orphans‘ school access, persistence and achievement (Case 
and Ardington 2006; Evans and Miguel 2007). Case and Ardington (2006)‘s study 
from KwaZulu Natal found no significant differences in enrollment odds between 
orphans and non-orphans but detected profound divergence in educational attainment 
and school quality. Maternal orphans were thus 0.12 of a year behind in their 
schooling and had 7 percent less spent on their education.  This was true of orphans in 
poor, as well as wealthy, households. Overall, this study clearly shows that parental 
death causes inferior educational outcomes for children, including those fostered into 
better endowed households.  These results were supported by Evans and Miguel‘s 
analysis of a five year panel dataset of 20, 000 children from Kigera in Kenya, where 
parental death reduced children‘s participation in school.   
 Overall, longitudinal studies confirm that orphans face inferior educational 
outcomes than do non orphans.  Even where differences in basic school enrollment are 
not striking, there is evidence of disadvantage on subtler aspects of wellbeing such as 
school quality, emotional nurturing, or social networks (Rehman and Eloundou 2007). 
 
4.5.2 Sustainability of the African Extended Family System During  
Economic Downturns 
To what extent has the extended family system adapted to periods of economic 
hardships?  Eloundou-Enyegue and Stokes (2002) provides insights that address this 
question.  This study uses a rich retrospective demographic dataset comprising 812 
randomly selected households in 1995 (520 rural and 292 urban).  The data yielded 2, 
257 children who had entered school, recorded over many years providing 17, 208 
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records.  These data made it possible for the tracking three types of trends; the long 
term trends in child fosterage that would have happened naturally due to urbanization 
and other slow processes, changes in fosterage practices during crisis years (dummy 
variables for years), and possible intergenerational changes (data was from women 
aged 15-65+ and these were separated into two cohorts).  They estimate three logistic 
regression models for all children, rural, and urban children.  Their results are telling; 
(1)  Child fosterage patterns increased over time (2) fosterage patterns did not change 
across successive generations of Cameroonian women and (3) child fosterage 
significantly declined during all crisis years with the odds of being out fostered being 
as much as 25% lower than previous non-crisis years.  Evidence from focus group 
discussion also seemed to suggest a decline in fosterage during crisis years.  Overall 
however, the authors do not infer a causal relationship between structural adjustment 
programs and the decline in fosterage in Cameroon because of various other factors 
not covered within the realm of their control variables. 
 
4.6   Evaluating the effectiveness of fosterage systems 
The effectiveness of child fosterage systems on ensuring child wellbeing 
depends on three things; the volumes of fostered children, the direction of the flows, 
and the treatments and outcomes for those children in the households into which they 
are fostered (Eloundou-Enyegue and Shapiro 2005).  Each of these areas is essential, 
but individually only provide a partial view.  As shown above, the literature on the 
prevalence and motivations of fosterage are well developed. In addition, a growing 
number of studies examined micro-level outcomes for children in the areas of health, 
education, and labor.  As well, some studies have addressed not only the direct 
outcomes for children, but also the outcomes for sending and receiving households in 
terms of labor allocation (optimization), consumption, and dynamic educational 
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outcomes for siblings of the children who are fostered (Isiugo Abanihe 1985; and 
Akresh 2004).   
 
4.6.1  Microlevel Studies on Child Fosterage and Social Outcomes for 
Children 
Studies that emerged in the 1990s sought to evaluate the relationship between 
the fosterage event, and social outcomes for the child including health and education 
as well as for household consumption.  Whether the health of fostered children 
improves or is maintained after the transfer is not clear, but rather, these outcomes are 
be predicted by the degree of voluntariness of the fosterage arrangement (Castle 
1996).  Evaluating Malian children, Castle concluded that voluntarily fostered children 
did not have inferior nutritional outcomes compared to biological children.  
Contrastingly, Bledsoe, et al (1988) found that fostered children were more likely to 
fall sick than biological children and they attributed this outcome partly to the 
tendency of fostered children to grow up with elderly grandparents who have limited 
knowledge on modern medical advances and opportunities for treatment or preventive 
care.  Similarly, Bledsoe et al (1992) argued that fostered children were at a greater 
risk of death than were other children.  Deininger et al (2005) showed that fostered 
children had significantly lower access to three health related indicators; vitamin A 
capsules, and vaccination against measles and diphtheria.  
Studies focusing on schooling outcomes reached similarly divergent 
conclusions.  More studies focused on educational outcomes for fostered children 
more generally, and orphans in particular.   For example, Akresh (2004) carried out an 
extended study of 300 paired sending and receiving households in Bageza province of 
Burkina Faso for a period of 3 years (1998-2000).  He sought to explain the 
educational outcomes of fostered children (in terms of school enrollment) compared to 
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their siblings who were not fostered, to biological children with whom they live, and 
also to other children from non fostering households.  Akresh concluded that the 
practice of child fosterage results in Pareto efficient outcomes.  His data revealed that 
compared to the children from non-fostering households, siblings of the fostered child, 
biological children of the host household, and the fostered children all experience 
increased enrollment after the fostering exchange.   Specifically, he showed that 
fostered children were 3.6% more likely to be enrolled after the fostering event, than 
their biological siblings.  His data, however showed gendered outcomes where boys 
were 2.8% more likely to be enrolled than were girls. 
On the other hand, other studies have argued the strength of relational ties is 
significantly affects the enrollment of the fostered child (Case et al 2004).  They argue 
that the Hamilton Rule prevails where enrollments are best for children who live with 
their parents, followed by those who live with grandparents, other relatives and the 
worst being those who live with non-relative.  Indeed, grandmothers are perceived as 
being able to provide more nurturing for their grandchildren without bias or prejudice 
(Madhavan 2004). Similarly Ksoll (2007) found evidence that illustrated that 
placement of orphans in the family network, compared to a random placement, has 
positive consequences for their education.  His analysis showed that orphans receive 
approximately one year of education more in caretaking households than is they were 
placed with a random household.  In another study, Kobiané et al (2005) found that 
overall, a child raised by parents in association with a sibling or uncles and aunts had 
by far the greatest chances to be in school compared to those raised by parents, 
especially in rural areas. Children raised by ―other relatives‖ and non relatives had the 
least likelihood to be in school. 
The literature provides two possible reasons for the poor performance of 
fostered children.  First, either families derive domestic labor from fostered children 
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(Pilon 2003) or that fostered children are made to work harder with some resorting to 
crime and prostitution (Van de Waal 1996).  Pilon (2003) argues that fosterage 
motivations differ between urban and rural households. In a 1981study based on 
census data for Togo, he found that female headed households fostered almost twice 
as high proportions of children than male headed households (29.5 and 15.8% 
respectively).  These urban female households also tended to host a disproportionate 
number of girls.  Using 1996 census data from Ougadougou,  Pilon (2003) found that 
wealth in urban areas was negatively associated with enrollment of fostered children.  
Middle class families tend to have dual earner spouses who often need house help to 
take care of domestic chores.  While some of these foster children may enroll in 
evening classes, their attendance is irregular, compromising their achievement.  
Studies that focus on orphans and educational attainment yielded mixed 
results.  In short, those that examined access (enrollments) using cross- sectional data 
find no orphan disadvantage (Lloyd and Blanc 1996) or conclude that the gap in 
school achievement between orphans and non-orphans is dwarfed by the gap between 
poorer and richer household (Ainsworth and Filmer 2007).  On the other hand, a 
growing number of studies that use longitudinal datasets reveal profound 
disadvantages between orphans and non orphans.  For instance, evidence demonstrates 
that while orphans may appear to be enrolled, they participate less and are likely to 
drop out earlier than non orphan (Case et al 2004; Kendall 2007; Case and Ardington 
2006; Evans and Miguel 2007). Kendall and O‘Gara (2007) find Malawi orphans to be 
at a particular disadvantage because of absenteeism before and after parental death. 
Longitudinal datasets isolated the impacts of parental death events on orphans‘ school 
access, persistence and achievement (Case and Ardington 2006; Evans and Miguel 
2007). Case and Ardington (2006)‘s study from KwaZulu Natal found no significant 
differences in enrollment odds between orphans and non-orphans but detected 
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profound divergence in educational attainment and school quality. Maternal orphans 
were thus 0.12 of a year behind in their schooling and had 7 percent less spent on their 
education.  This was true of orphans in poor, as well as wealthy, households. Overall, 
this study clearly shows that parental death causes inferior educational outcomes for 
children, including those fostered into better endowed households.  These results were 
supported by Evans and Miguel‘s analysis of a five year panel dataset of 20, 000 
children from Kigera in Kenya, where parental death reduced children‘s participation 
in school.  Overall, longitudinal studies confirm that orphans face inferior educational 
outcomes than do non orphans.  Even where differences in basic school enrollment are 
not striking, there is evidence of disadvantage on subtler aspects of wellbeing such as 
school quality, emotional nurturing, or social networks (Rehman and Eloundou 2007). 
Where striking disadvantages exist, they are usually tied to living arrangements.   
The evidence on the impact of child fosterage on household consumption is 
mixed.  For example, Case et al (2004) found no change in living standards for 
households that had fostered children.  Yet, Deininger et al (2005) showed that for 
Uganda, while the proportion of children who were orphaned increased, between 1992 
and 1999, the Universal Primary School policy improved school attendance for 
fostered children.  Results from their logistic regression models with household fixed 
effects reveal that households which in-foster children experience significant reduction 
in consumption, income and household investment.   
Overall, the above literature provides deep insights on micro-level effects of 
fosterage.  In other words, the literature reveals the dynamics of what happens within 
households in which children are fostered.  Even as this body of literature shows the 
role of the African extended system in shaping inequality patterns in social outcomes 
for children in sub Saharan Africa, it does so partially.  To be able to get a complete 
picture of the effectiveness of child fosterage, one needs to not only understand the 
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prevalence or micro-level dynamics, but also, the macro-level directionality of flows 
and how they change over time. 
 
4.7 Conclusion 
In the absence of formal social safety nets, African families and households 
depend on informal forms of solidarity such as child fosterage which makes it possible 
for the extended family to share the burden of child caring.  This chapter reviews the 
literature on the cultural practice of child fosterage in sub Saharan Africa.  It reveals 
that child fosterage is ubiquitous within the region where fostered children account for 
up to a third of the population of children below the age of fifteen.  Second, the 
chapter reveals the rich literature that tracks the micro level dynamics of fosterage 
including reasons for and decision making during fosterage, and the relationship 
between fosterage and wellbeing outcomes for children.  Other micro levels studies 
evaluated the sustainability of fosterage under macro levels shocks such as economic 
downturns as well as the HIV/AIDS disease burden and its accompanying orphan 
crisis. Last, and most importantly, the chapter argues that while the rich literature on 
prevalence and micro level effects is salient and insightful, it provides a partial lens 
through which one can evaluate the effectiveness of child fosterage in buffering 
inequality among children.  The extent to which the extended family system can be 
relied upon as a platform that equalizes opportunities between children depends also 
on the directionality of flows.  In other words, where fosterage is effectiveness or not 
depends on; (1) prevalence (how many children are fostered), (2) micro level effects 
(how fosterage translates into positive wellbeing outcomes such as health and nutrition 
or education), (3) directionality of flows (whether fosterage concentrates children in 
households that are better able to meet their socio-economic needs.  The current study 
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is concerned with the third aspect – evaluating the directionality of flows of fostered 
children in sub Saharan Africa.  
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CHAPTER 5 
THEORY OF INEQUALITY 
 
5.1 Introduction 
In order understand the dynamics of inequality among children in sub Saharan 
Africa, this study draws from theoretical perspectives across three main disciplines; 
economics, sociology, and demography.  This chapter provides a summary of the key 
theories on inequality.  First, the chapter discusses economic theories of inequality, 
specifically focusing on Kuznet‘s inverted U-curve theory as well as ideas on the 
relationship between poverty, economic growth, and inequality.  Sociologists have 
long been fascinated with social hierarchies within and across societies from the 
classical thinkers such as Karl Marx to contemporary theorists.  At the center of 
sociological enquiry lies the need to understand what social inequalities exist, why 
they exist, how they reproduce themselves, and the consequences of inequality.  As 
such, this chapter provides an overview of the ideas on inequality within the Marxist, 
dependency, world systems, functionalist as well as feminist perspectives.  These 
broad theoretical traditions are useful heuristic tools through which one can 
understand the dynamics of inequality among children in sub Saharan Africa.  The 
chapter ends with a synopsis of the role that demographic factors play in (re) 
producing inequalities within and across societies.  This discussion is centered on 
mortality and fertility transitions in sub Saharan Africa.   
 
5.2 Economic Theories of Inequality 
Economists have long been concerned with not only the levels of resources in 
society, but also, their distribution.  The current study especially benefits from the 
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theoretical perspectives and empirical findings on (1) the relationship between 
economic growth and inequality, and (2) the relationship between poverty and 
inequality. Below I discuss these in turn. 
 
 5.2.1 Economic Growth and Inequality 
Few papers generated as much interest among students of inequality as 
Kuznet‘s 1955 seminal article.  In it, he outlined his thesis on the relationship between 
economic growth and levels of income inequality within a country over time.  Using 
data from the United States, England, and Germany, Kuznets the inverted U-curve 
theory where inequality was observed to increase at an increasing rate, peak at some 
point, and then decrease at a later stage as economies expand.  Consistent with 
modernization theory, Kuznets observed that the initial increase in inequality stemmed 
from fundamental demographic shifts where large sectors of the population moved 
from the agricultural to the industrial sectors until a certain threshold was reached and 
then the trend would taper off and reverse.  During this demographic transition, levels 
of inequality would decrease because people would supposedly move from the low 
return agricultural sector to the high paying emerging industrial sector.  
 Another way to understand Kuznet‘s Inverted U-Curve theory is to look at how 
inequality becomes growth enhancing over time?  In essence, Kuznet‘s theory is 
closely linked to endogenous growth theories such as Solow‘s where inequality in 
society could theoretically lead to higher economic growth.  The pathway through 
which this occurs begins with an increase in aggregate savings among the rich who 
have a higher marginal propensity to save compared to the poor who are in perpetual 
poverty traps. Higher savings lead to higher capital accumulation within a country 
which eventually leads to economic growth. While some earlier studies found 
evidence that supports the positive link between savings and inequality (Houthaker 
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1961; Kelly and Williamson 1968), a growing number of scholars fail to find any 
consistent link between growth and the U-curve  (for instance see Galor 2000; 
Deininger and Squire 1996; Fei Ranis and Kuo 1979). 
 First, the relationship between income inequality and economic growth 
depends on the initial conditions or the starting point of each nation.  Galor (2000) 
submits that the link between income inequality and economic growth only obtains 
within contexts of low economic development.  At later stages of economic 
development, however, human capital accumulation is what leads to economic growth.  
Yet, if high levels of inequality exist within countries, it may lead to underinvestment 
in human capital due to credit market imperfections eventually leading to lower 
economic growth. Even then, Dollar and Kraay (2002) failed to find evidence to 
support the hypothesis that income inequality rises at low levels of development and 
tapers off for countries at higher levels of development. 
Related to the above, a study by Deininger and Squire (1996) reveals the 
different performance of low, middle, and high income countries over time.  They find 
that high income countries were experiencing higher levels of inequality; middle 
income countries were stable, while low income countries were experiencing declining 
levels of inequality.  So in essence, instead of countries moving along the inverted U-
curve over time, the entire curve itself was shifting.  
Second, Ranis and Kuo (1979) looking at the trends in income growth and 
inequality in South East Asia observe that a rapid increase in incomes was never 
accompanied by an initial growth in inequality.  Moreover, the growth in incomes in 
the East Asian countries was not associated with dramatic demographic shifts.  On the 
contrary, as Ranis and Kuo observed, the equity with growth was spurred more by the 
high growth rates within the agricultural sectors.    
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Third, a growing number of studies find evidence that suggests that high levels 
of inequality may in fact lead to lower economic performance within countries.  
Thorbecke and Charumilind (2002) summarize four main pathways through which 
inequality may be growth constraining. Income inequality may lead to high rent 
seeking behavior, less secure property rights and ultimately slow economic growth.  
Income inequality may also impact growth patterns through social tension, crime, and 
political instability which in turn may lead to uncertain investment environment.  In 
addition, it may also be the case that income inequality may result in a population 
where the median voter is poor.  In this context, the population may advocate for 
higher taxation and greater redistribution strategies in ways that reduce propensity to 
save or invest.  Last and even more significantly, income inequality may lead to lower 
economic performance through demographic processes.  In contexts of high income 
inequality, the poor (who account for the larger proportion of the population) may 
continue to have more children thereby increasing the aggregate age dependency ratio 
of the nation.  In essence, high fertility levels may require nations to carry a high 
burden of a young population that consumes more than it produces
1
. 
 In short, the Kuznets thesis came under attack for the mainly the following 
reasons.  First, the character and performance of countries in terms of income 
inequality trends is usually varied that it seldom falls neatly in the inverted U-curve 
pattern. Second, Kuznets problematized the transition from a traditional to a modern 
society in a unilinear, non reversal steady state of high incomes and low inequality.  
However, in reality many countries have experienced reversals and deindustrialization 
and subsequent rising inequality as stated above. Third, as illustrated above, high 
levels of inequality may in fact lead to lower economic growth because the 
                                                             
1
 This may not be the case in contexts where child labor is the norm – children actually contribute to the 
household and national economic growth. 
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relationship is mediated by rent seeking behavior, political tension, distorted taxation 
regimes, or through fertility transitions. 
 Still, the Kuznets thesis has been used to explain a wide array of outcomes 
from the relationship between inequality and economic dependency of nations  
(Weede 1980); to the relationship between inequality and social variables such as 
access to education (Eloundou-Enyegue 2004) and to explain the role of democratic 
leadership and institutions in promoting greater equality  (Weede 1980, Crenshaw 
1992),  as well as demographic shifts between agricultural and modern industrial 
sectors  (Kuznets 1963;  Robinson 1976).   
 
5.2.2 Economic Growth, Poverty and Inequality 
Key questions that are pertinent to the discussion on inequality are: is growth 
good for the poor and if so, under what circumstances.  Second, is there a tradeoff 
between poverty, and inequality?  
Dollar and Kraay (2002) use data from 92 countries to test several hypotheses, 
including whether economic growth is good for the poor? First, they find a very strong 
positive and linear relationship between per capita incomes of the poor and average 
incomes.  In other words, their evidence shows that within countries, incomes of the 
poor rise equiproportionately with average incomes.  As such, no systematic 
relationship exists between average incomes and the share of incomes that accrues to 
the poor.  In short, economic growth is good for everyone, including the poor.  
Further, this study tests whether policies and institutions that raise average incomes 
have systematic effects on the income shares accruing to the poor.  They find no 
evidence to support that openness to international trade, macro-economic stability, 
moderate size of government, financial development, and strong property rights and 
rule of law positively impact the share of income for the poor. In essence, if growth 
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benefits everyone, then, distribution is the only way that can equalize opportunities 
within societies.  In fact, Edward (2006) argues that not all growth is good for the 
poor.  Citing the exceptionalism of China, Edward argues that particular forms of 
approaches to growth, such as state interventionist strategy are good for the poor.   
 Next, is there a tradeoff between poverty and inequality in developing 
countries? Turns out that the answer depends on what type of inequality one considers; 
relative or absolute?  In a study based on data from 70 developing countries, Ravallion 
(2005) plots changes in the log of absolute poverty ($1.08/day) against changes in 
relative and absolute inequality.  They find a strong positive (0.31) correlation 
between poverty and relative inequality.   This relationship was even stronger for 
transition economies in Eastern Europe and Central Asia where for countries in which 
poverty rose the most, relative inequality also rose the most. However, when the 
analysis is repeated for absolute inequality, Ravallion finds strong evidence for a 
poverty- absolute inequality trade off (correlation coefficient of -0.35). In short, 
Ravalion‘s evidence suggests that those who desire to see a world with a lower 
absolute gap between the rich and the poor must also be willing to accept a world of 
lower absolute living standards for poor people. 
 
5.3 Sociological Theories of Inequality 
The study of social hierarchies is central to Sociology.  Below, I outline some 
of the key theories from which this study draws.  I begin with a synopsis of Karl 
Marx‘s classical ideas on capitalism and social inequality.  This is followed by two 
interrelated traditions that are grounded in Marxian philosophy: Dependency Theory 
and World Systems Theory.  This is followed an abridged critique of Structural 
Functionalism and Feminist Theories.  Together, these bodies of knowledge add much 
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to our understanding of the root causes, as well as possible solutions for social 
hierarchies of our time. 
 
5.3.1 Critical Theory: Marxist Perspectives 
Karl Marx (1818-83) was concerned with the historical basis of social 
inequality.  He was especially preoccupied with understanding the oppressiveness of 
capitalism and its potential for distilling distinct hierarchical social classes within 
society.  He therefore sought to develop a theory that not only explained the structural 
roots of social inequality, but one that also provides insights on how to radically 
change society (Calhoun et al 2003).  At the time he was writing, Europe was 
undergoing fundamental social transformations spurred by the industrialization. It is 
important to note that these social transformations did not create social inequality. 
Rather, they fundamentally changed the form and scope of inequality that existed in 
society.  In order to fully understand Marx‘s theory on capitalism and inequality, one 
needs to appreciate the history of development, inequality and social stratification.  
 Each historical epoch is characterized by some form of social inequality.  What 
differs is not the presence of inequality, but rather, its depth and form.  Take for 
instance eight ideal typical social systems (i) tribalism in hunting and gathering 
societies (ii) Asiatic mode (iii) feudalism (iv) Slavery (v) Caste Society (vi) class 
system in capitalist societies (vii) state socialism, and (viii) advanced industrialism 
(Grusky‘s 2001: 9).  Only in the tradition, tribal hunting and gathering society is there 
an absence in inequality, and an emphasis on meritocratic selection.  All the other 
social systems exhibit medium to high levels of inequality.  Another way to look at 
this historical fact is to go back to the feudal period in Europe (1400 to 1600s), power 
and status resided in land ownership where the nobility ruled and serfs were bound to 
lifelong servitude.  This general historical period also coincides with the inception and 
 
80 
consolidation of slavery in the Americas around 1526.  Between 1600 and 1700 lies 
the mercantile period marked by developments in transportation, especially ship 
building that fostered intercontinental exploratory and trade voyages.  In terms of 
political power, this period marked the rise of the monarchy across Europe after 
discontent with endless feudal wars.  Political power, therefore, resided in kings and 
queens.  Still, other social classes existed as well.  The nobility still had control over 
land and serfs.  Merchants held tremendous social and economic power over workers.  
In fact, Chase- Dunn (2001) argues that the phenomenon known as globalization today 
has its roots in the mercantile period because this is when transnational trade and 
political strategies consolidated.  Both the feudal and mercantile periods represented 
successive historical epochs marked by deep structural inequalities with limited 
opportunity for social mobility. 
 Industrialization occurred between the period 1700 and 1860.  This period was 
marked by deep social and economic transformations that were spurred by 
developments in agriculture, textiles, mining and transportation.  Key drivers of the 
industrial revolution include James Hargreaves‘ invention of the Spinning Jenny in 
1769, James Watt‘s design and manufacturing of the first steam engine in 1775, and 
subsequent development of iron in the 1780s. In order to understand Karl Marx‘s ideas 
on social inequality, one has to understand the profound transformations that were 
driven by these economic and engineering innovations.  Society still bore remnants of 
the nobility (landowners and serfs), and the monarchy (kings and queens), as well as 
the religious leadership.  Industrialization altered the power relations by creating a 
new class of industrialists (capitalists) who depended on cheap labor from the working 
class, otherwise known as proletariats.  It is also late in the 18
th
 century (1789 to 1799) 
that the French lower class revolted against the monarchy, advocating for citizenship 
unalienable rights.  While the French Revolution was driven by many causes, chief 
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among them was the discontent with the nobility and monarchy‘s conspicuous 
consumption at a time of sustained poverty, hunger, and malnutrition among the 
masses. In short, the late 18
th
 century helps us understand the social milieu in which 
Marx spawned his ideas on historical materialism.  In the Manifesto of the Communist 
Party Marx and Engels (1948; 1967) wrote: 
 
―The history of all hitherto society is a history of class struggles. 
Freeman and slave, patrician and plebeian, lord and serf, guild-master 
and journeyman, in a word, oppressor and oppressed stood in constant 
opposition to one another, carried on an uninterrupted, now hidden 
fight, a fight that each time ended, either in a revolutionary 
reconstitution of society at large, or in the common ruin of contending 
classes.  In earlier epochs of history we find almost everywhere a 
complicated arrangement of society into various orders, manifold 
gravitation of social rank. In ancient Rome we have patricians, knights, 
plebeians, slaves, in Middle Ages, feudal Lords, vassals, guild masters, 
journeyman, apprentices, serfs, in almost all of these classes, again, 
subordinate gradations‖  
 
It is not in doubt that Marx worried about the history of social inequalities.  But, he 
also cared about moving beyond academic rhetoric to developing viable solutions to 
change the status quo. 
 Marx‘s ideas on fundamental causes of, and solutions to inequality were rooted 
in Hegelian philosophy, especially the dialectical analysis which was not only a way 
of thinking, but also a way of viewing the world.  The dialectical analysis submits that 
social values cannot be separated from social facts and therefore values (including 
moral values) have a place at the center of social analysis.  Further, the dialectical 
method argued that the world is not made up of static things, but rather, complex 
relationships.  As such, it placed tremendous importance on understanding social 
relationships, dynamics, conflicts, as well as inherent contradictions within systems.  
While Hegel focused on ideas, Marx, on the other hand was not interested in abstract 
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theorizing.  On the contrary, he was concerned about the material basis of human 
existence.  He rejected the call for orderly change or social reform.  To Marx, the 
fundamental contradictions of capitalism could only be remedied by a revolution that 
overthrows the systems and replaces it with some form of egalitarian form of social 
organization. 
 Marx‘s developed his analysis of the contradictions of capitalism on the 
premise of his idea of human nature, its relationship to labor, and for alienation under 
capitalist mode of production.  Marx understood that there exists a fundamental human 
nature (or species being) that gets changed during each successive historical epoch. He 
believed that species beings are productive beings.  In order to be able to survive, 
species being need to work in and with nature to produce basic needs such as food, 
clothing, tools, shelter and other life‘s necessities.  The production process is not 
abstract.  Rather, it is a complex process that occurs for each individual in concert with 
other beings.  In other words, human beings are inherently social beings who are 
intricately linked to nature. Throughout history, this link between species beings and 
nature has been weakened and destabilized but capitalism present, by far, the most 
acute threat (Ritzer and Goodman 2004).  To Marx, capitalism is a complex series of 
structures and processes that erect formidable barriers between individuals and the 
production process.  Not only do individuals get alienated from the production 
process, but also, to each other.   
Marx viewed capitalism as an economic system that comprises of three 
distinctive social classes.  Social classes constituted common positions, were 
relational, and were rooted in the social organization of production (Wright and Peroni 
1977).  Marx observed the bourgeoisie capitalists, petty bourgeoisie, and proletariats 
classes.  The later were a multitude of overworked and underpaid workers toiling for 
the benefit of few industrialists or owners of means of production, the bourgeoisie 
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class.  As stated earlier, even if Marx appreciated the nature and scope of stratification 
systems in earlier historical epochs, he felt that the capitalist system was more massive 
and colossal.  In his labor theory of value, Marx argued that in capitalist societies the 
bourgeoisie class accumulated surplus by paying proletariats way less than the value 
of their labor.  Capitalism, in his opinion, was not only an economic system, but also a 
political one, a mode of exercising power, and a process of exploiting workers. Marx 
also believed that the capitalist system was not only destructive and exploitative, but 
also inherently unstable.  He predicted the tendency for capitalists to oversupply the 
market with commodities for which there were insufficient buyers leading to cycles of 
booms and busts.  Perhaps his most misplaced hope was his predictions for natural 
solidarity among the proletariats.  Marx assumed that the working class was a single 
class with shared values and identical experiences at the hands of the oppressors. He 
envisaged that the internal contradictions of the capitalist society would inevitably 
lead to sustained class struggles culminating in proletarian revolutions where human 
beings were free to engage in creative pursuits.  His ultimate dream was a world of 
human emancipation and self realization without the need for an all encompassing 
state. 
One of the greatest values of Marx‘s theory of historical materialism is that it 
was grounded in material facts of human existence.  He took an unequivocal stance 
again existing inequalities and offered a way to understand their genesis, and ultimate 
solutions.  At a time when most theorists advocated for reform, Marx‘s radical 
philosophy was a repudiation of existing society and a call to arms for a total 
revolution (Calhoun et al. 2003).  Over time, however, some of his propositions lost 
appeal because of the unexpected ability of the capitalists system to reinvent itself.  
For instance, at the time Marx was writing, he did not envisage that industrial jobs 
would fall in magnitude compared to the service industry as has occurred in most 
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western societies.  Second, most working class people of the 19
th
 century were much 
better off than societies that existed during mercantile and feudal periods.  Third, 
investment regimes that exist today make it possible for workers to also be owners of 
capital (through shares trade, etc.) blurring the boundaries between classical social 
classes that Marx observed during his time.  As Wright and Perroni (1977) submit, 
beyond the tripartite social classes that Marx observed during his time, modern 
Western Capitalism exhibits additional social classes such as managers and several 
other variants.  Marx also failed to predict the potency of organized labor as a tool for 
advocacy towards improved working standards and political rights.    Yet, even in 
spite of these shortcomings, the reality of today‘s world vindicates some of Marxian 
concerns.  For instance, the growth in income and other form of inequality within and 
across societies, commodity fetishism, conspicuous consumptions of the wealthy and 
ruling classes all point to the fundamental stratification of society that Marx loathed. 
 
5.3.2 Dependency Theories 
Cast within the Marxist philosophical and theoretical tradition, dependency 
theory emerged in the l930s and became popular after World War II.   Its most salient 
feature was its attempt to provide an alternative explanation for the global economic 
hierarchy of nations.  The basic premise of the dependency theory was to understand 
the wellbeing of individual nations within the global context.  Rather than looking 
inward, dependency theorists pointed to the role of external economic forces in 
shaping wellbeing of ‗underdeveloped nations.  They argued that underdevelopment 
was not an original state, but rather, an outcome of unequal economic and social 
relations between western (core) and southern (periphery) nations.  Dependency 
theorist argued that Europe‘s development cannot be understood outside of the 
external destruction, brutal conquest, colonial control, and the stripping of non western 
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nations of their people and resources (Frank 1966). This theory focused more on 
inequality across regions, flows, and spaces, rather than on class and other dimension 
of inequality.  Still, dependency theory was a politically radical perspective that saw in 
socialism, the only hope of overcoming the contradictions of monopoly capitalism. 
 It is important to note that the dependency school of thought was never a 
uniform doctrine.  Rather, two main schools of thought are credited with the 
intellectual evolution of ideas around dependency theory (Peet and Hartwick 1999).  
First is the neo Marxist tradition largely influenced by Paul Baran, Paul Sweezy at a 
time when they edited the socialist or left leaning North American magazine, Monthly 
Review.  This tradition was later popularized by the work of Andre Gunder Frank.  
The second tradition is the structuralist tradition which was spawn by Raul Prebisch 
and later popularized by Fernando Henrique Cardoso, Enzo Felatto, Peter Evans, 
Osvaldo Sunkel and Maria da Conceicao Tavares (see for instance Cardoso and 
Fellato 1979).  
 Paul Baran and Paul Sweezy‘s Monthly Review journal developed the theory 
of monopoly capitalism to describe the form of social organization that emerged in the 
twentieth century (see for instance Baran 1957).  That historical period was 
characterized by large corporations that outcompeted small businesses while 
accumulating excess surplus profit.  The consequence of mercantilism and imperialism 
was the unequal integration of periphery economies into the international market.  
Inequality among nations and economies resulted from imperialism‘s development 
because the system involved export of raw material by periphery nations and import of 
expensive finished products in ways that compromised the terms of trade of periphery 
nations.  Because of the very nature of this economic interconnectedness, it was not 
possible for peripheral states to develop their own dynamic industrial systems.  
Therefore, the (re) production of inequality between advanced economies and 
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dependent economies developed as a by-product of the very process of capitalist 
growth. At the same time, capitalist economies tended to experience under 
consumption and stagnation but economic crises were avoided through advertising and 
collective consumption through public spending in the military.  Baran and Sweezy 
considered this an irrational form of development.  Instead, nations could serve 
themselves well by withdrawing from the world system and reconstructing a socialist 
society. 
 Andre Gunder Frank popularized the neo-Marxist dependency theory through 
his most well known work ‗The Development of Underdevelopment‘ (Frank 1966).  
Frank argued that it was impossible to formulate adequate development theory for the 
people and nations that suffer from underdevelopment without an accurate 
understating of how past economic and social relations gave rise to the current 
‗underdevelopment‘.  Ignoring lessons from history invariably led to the assumption 
that the past and present states of ‗underdeveloped‘ nations resemble earlier stages of 
history of the now developed nations.  He rejected the dominant modernization and 
economics theories that explained attributed the state of nations‘ development to dual 
societies; traditional and modern.  He argued that attributing underdevelopment to 
feudalism or traditionalism was both a historical and political mistake because that 
understated the role of world capitalism in destroying existing social systems in 
‗underdeveloped‘ societies.  Therefore, underdevelopment is not an original state and 
the now developed nations were never underdeveloped, although they may have been 
undeveloped. Using evidence from Latin America, he argued that underdevelopment 
is not an original state but rather, an outcome of indiscriminate and exploitative 
extraction of economic and human resources from satellite (periphery) to metropole 
(center) societies.  Peripheral nations‘ ‗metropoles‘ such as Sao Paulo in Brazil or 
Buenos Aires in Argentina could only achieve a dependent form of industrialization 
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and development.  Real development required the de-coupling of center and periphery 
economic systems in order to retain local resources and surplus within local 
economies. To support this idea, Frank observed that peripheral nations of Latin 
America such as  Argentina, Brazil, Mexico and Chile grew most rapidly during 
World War I, the Great Depression, and during World War II, periods when economic 
and trade links with the core nations were weakest. 
At the time, the ideas of Paul Baran, Paul Sweezy, Andre Gunder Frank, and 
their followers was a radical departure from the economics tradition where Walter 
Rostow‘s 1961 work on ‗Stages of Economic Development‘ suggested that nations 
grew (in a path dependent way) through five distinctive stages from traditional society, 
preconditions for takeoff, take off, drive to maturity, and finally the age of high mass 
consumption.  Obviously, dependency theorists ridiculed this approach because of its 
ahistorical nature and its failure to acknowledge past injustices and realistic 
possibilities for advancement of peripheral nations. 
 On the other hand, the structuralist dependency theory tradition, especially 
found in the work of Raul Prebisch and Fernando Henrique Cardoso found Andre 
Gunder Frank‘s ideas inadequate in explaining the complexity of development 
patterns in peripheral nations.  Departing from Gunder Frank‘s universalism, Cardoso 
argued that in reality, it was possible it was possible for both development and 
underdevelopment to co-exist in individual nations.  He observed that multinational 
companies invested in modern industrialization while traditional (agricultural and 
mining sectors) operated in technically sophisticated ways – part of advanced but 
dependent capitalism.  Further, multinational companies had a vested interest in 
developing periphery nations because they were aware of the need to stimulate 
demand for their finished products.  Between 1935 and 1943, Raul Prebisch was the 
Director General of Banco Central in Argentina from, a country that was most 
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severely hit by the depression.  Prebisch felt that the inward directed development and 
industrialization was the most potent solution to the economic hardships within (see 
Prebisch 1981).  This idea of import substitution development came under strong 
critique because it produced and reinforced existing forms of internal inequality and 
domination where a modern industrial complex evolved (with state subsidization) at 
the expense of the majority poor people.  In other words, few capitalists enjoyed the 
benefits of public subsidies while developing a lifestyle of excess and conspicuous 
consumption when the majority of the population worked in crowded factories or 
farms for low wages. In essence, import substitution proved to be an inadequate 
solution to the processes that shape stratification within and between societies. 
 
5.3.3 World Systems Theories 
World Systems Theory (WST) is a radical and distinctive theoretical and 
epistemological approach to understanding the world, especially the deep inequalities 
that exist.   It emerged in the 1970s as an attempt to address three existing concerns 
with the way social research was carried out (i) unit of analysis (ii) social 
temporalities, and (iii) unrealistic barriers between different social science disciplines.
 WST is rooted in three intellectual and theoretical traditions namely, the 
French Annales School, the Marxist tradition, and the dependency school of thought. 
In scholarship spanning over three decades, Immanuel Wallerstein developed and 
expounded on the core essence of world systems theory.  From the Annales School, 
Wallerstein was most influenced by the work of Fernand Braudel, a French historian 
who was critical of the way history.  Braudel rejected event based or episodic history 
which typically took the nation states as the units of analysis. He considered this 
approach to writing history as ‗dust‘ because  of its tendency to focus on ephemeral 
phenomena, as well as its tendency to get into the eyes and blind scholars from seeing 
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the real underlying structures that shaped society and people‘s lived experiences.  
Second, he was critical of the manner in which existing social structure influenced the 
nature and content of historical accounts.  In his opinion, history captured only the 
reality from the point of view of the wealthy while voices and experiences of the poor 
were largely ignored.  Last, Braudel argued that a more complete understanding of the 
world required a long term view, as opposed to event based cross sectional analysis. 
This approach would make it possible to study cyclical processes within structures 
such as the contraction and expansion of world economies, or the changing link 
between civilizations and capitalism.   From Marxism, Wallerstein‘s ideas inherited 
the concern with inequality and social structure, especially the concern with 
capitalism, accumulation, and class struggle.  Last, Wallerstein‘s WST benefited from, 
and extended the core ideas of the dependency school of thought.  As outlined above, 
the dependency school was preoccupied with illuminating the disequalizing nature of 
global capitalism, especially the economic and political relations between core and 
periphery nations.  Below, I will outline how WST differs from dependency theory.  
 Wallerstein (2005) believes that a complete understanding of social reality 
requires an a-disciplinary approach.  Drawing on the history of the evolution of the 
social sciences, especially economics, sociology, political science, and anthropology, 
he argues that individually, these disciplines are an obstacle, rather than an aid to our 
understanding of the world.  Instead of delineating between the state, economy, and 
civil society, each of these realms provides only a partial view of the world.  As such, 
any serious attempt to understand the world needs to draw from within and across 
these artificial disciplinary boundaries. 
 The core premise of the WST is that the social reality in which we live is larger 
than nation states, it is a world system. WST is fundamentally a challenge to 
scientists‘ epistemological approach to understanding the world.  The world-system is 
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a social system that has defined boundaries, structures, member groups, rules of 
legitimation, and coherence. It comprises of a matrix of many institutions- states and 
interstate system, productive firms, households, classes, and multiple identity groups.  
This system is a social creation with a history that needs to be understood.   Three 
distinctive systems exist. First is the mini system which is characterized by tribes and 
hunter gatherer societies.  Second is a world empire that is controlled by a singular 
political system.  Third is the world economy with no singular political or military 
power.  The current epoch is a world economy. 
Essentially, the current world economy is integrated through the market, 
specifically, through the logic of modern western capitalism.  Capitalism, according to 
Wallerstein, is a system built on the desire for perpetual accumulation of capital.  
Within this system lies a multicultural and multi-territorial division of labor in which 
production of goods and services is central and necessary.  The division of labor is 
what divides production into core, semi periphery and periphery states.  Core 
production processes are located within core states that own advanced technologies, 
and generate scientific ideas through research funding within universities and think 
tanks.  Periphery states provides cheap resources and labor from which quasi 
monopolies extract surplus value representing the very basis for unequal exchange and 
the root of stratification of nations. Semi-periphery nations such as South Korea, 
Brazil and India exhibit some aspects of core and periphery characteristics.  This 
world system is in constant change since quasi monopolies often exhaust themselves.  
As a result, core like processes eventually become peripheral and cyclical rhythms of 
expansion and stagnation occur something termed the Kondratieff cycle.   Even then, 
WST recognizes that semi periphery and periphery nations do not simply sit back and 
receive the narrow and short end of the stick while the core nations exploite and 
dominate them.  On the contrary, semi-periphery states and periphery states are spaces 
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for resistance and in fact, some of the former have moved upwards in the global 
hierarchy in ways that allowed them to transform the social relations or simply to 
maintain their relative position within the global system (Chase-Dunn 2001). 
It is important to highlight that WST argues that nation states exist within the 
world system primarily to regulate the functioning of a capitalist system enabling 
firms to consolidate profits inside and outside national boundaries.  Specifically, 
nations create and protect intellectual property rights, levy taxes, and provide the 
necessary public goods that are essential for the functioning of a capitalist system.  
Strong states influence the openness of trade with weaker states and the contradictions 
of the social relations are evident in constant collapse of negotiations at several rounds 
of the World Trade Organization (WTO). Overall however, individual nations do not 
have economies. Rather, they are part of a world system. 
The complex relationships of the institutions of the system are shaped by two 
opposite ideological themes: universalism where general rules apply to all, and racism 
and sexism which reflect discrimination.  Racism and sexism foster stratification and 
polarization in ways that generate political struggles that upset the balance of the 
system.   
Wallerstein (2005) believes that the current world system is in crisis.  He 
points to several phenomena as evidence of a system that is under strain in ways that 
could eventually lead to a revolution of one sort or the other.  Among the signs, the 
present day is characterized by declining US hegemony, increasing economic 
inequality, increasing cost of production, decreasing amount of natural resources as 
well as human resources that can be exploited, and even the current increase in 
military and health costs.  
In conclusion world system theory informs the current research in multiple 
ways.  First, it cautions against placing great value in nation state territorial categories 
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while failing to illuminate the complex interrelationships between states.  Second, it 
emphasizes the value of long term, historical analysis.  Rather than focusing only on 
understanding inequalities at a particular point in time and place, WST provides potent 
ideas on the value of learning from history.  Third, the WST point to the contradictions 
of modern form of capitalism as the basis of existing inequalities.  Fourth, WST 
reminds us that the complete picture of our social reality may not be understood from 
singular disciplinary vantage points.  Rather, careful attempts at social analysis require 
a multi disciplinary approach that seeks to find the cleavage between perspectives 
from economics, sociology, demography, anthropology and political science. Last, as 
argued by Chase-Dunn (2001) the WST provides intellectual space within which one 
can imagine an alternative world outside of modern western capitalism as we know it.  
He argues that this ‗new‘ system may take the form of a market socialist global 
democracy that is regulated by a strong and democratic global states, civil societies, 
and nation states.    Whether this transformation will be driven by periphery, semi 
periphery, core states remains debatable (see Chase- Dunn 2001 for a critique of the 
alternative strategies). 
 
5.3.4 Structural Functionalism 
The structural functionalism school of thought is credited to seminal ideas by 
Emile Durkheim in the late twentieth century and early twenty first century.  This 
approach was popularized in the United States by sociologists such as Robert Merton, 
Wilbert Moore, Talcott Parsons and subsequently by some of his graduate students at 
Harvard including Kingsley Davis and Wilbert Moore (Parsons 2003; Adler and Adler 
2007).  This school of thought gained much prominence in the mid 20th century, 
falling into disfavor around the 1970s and 1980s. 
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 Contrary to the Marxian tradition, structural functionalism assumes that 
societies are problem solving entities that lean towards by order and equilibrium 
(Adler and Adler 2007).  The basic premise is that in order to survive and thrive, each 
society has needs.  These needs may include, but are not limited to the law, justice, 
health, education, goods and services etc.  Each of these needs, institutions, and realms 
serves a particular function within society towards the pursuit of balance and 
equilibrium of the whole. The system itself has a way of self regulating such that over 
time it may replace multi-functional institutions such as the family, with more 
specialized ones (Parsons, 1977).  For instance, two centuries ago the family assumed 
responsibility for a myriad functions including economic production, procreation, 
socialization of children, social control and others.  Today, some of these functions are 
partially played by the family as other institutions emerged to take their place for 
instance day care centers, schools, prisons, law enforcement etc.  In short, the 
structural functionalist school emphasized function, interdependence within the 
system, and an equilibrium that comes about through shared norms and values.    
 Because individuals are inherently different, and invariably apply themselves 
differently to certain callings, it is therefore imperative for the system to have a way of 
regulating rewards to each according to what they deserve.  These rewards could be 
financial (income), or immaterial things such as status, prestige, and power. Within 
structural functionalist thought, social inequality is inevitable and necessary for the 
survival of any society.  In the absence of inequality, structural functionalists would 
argue, division of labor would be difficult. Besides, in order to sift people across jobs 
and assignments of differential difficulty and prestige, a viable reward system has to 
be in place in order to attract the most talented to the most appropriate jobs and 
functions within society (Davis and Moore 1945).   In other words, inequality plays a 
positive role because it facilitates the operation of various institutions in society. 
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Over time the structural functionalist school lost its appeal because of various 
inadequacies in its approach.  With regards to inequality, functionalist theory failed to 
shed light on what is considered functional or non functional? Further, it fell short of 
describing whose priorities take precedence in defining what is functional and 
necessary for society? (Calhoun et al 2003)  Moreover, its uncritical acceptance of a 
tendency towards equilibrium was inadequate in that it failed to challenge existing 
injustices.  In other words, it put balance and equilibrium at the center of its theory 
rather than challenge the structural forces that (re) produce inequality in society. As a 
result, it succumbed to unrelenting attacks from theorists within the conflict 
perspective.  The later rejected the functionalist notion that societies are efficient 
problem solving entities whose long standing practices and institutions represent 
satisfactory solutions to societal problems.  Rather, societies are spaces in which 
groups with fundamentally antagonistic interests fight each other.  Theorists in this 
tradition share this basic premise although they may differ on which groups and which 
struggles to emphasize.  As shown above, Karl Marx and neo-Marxists place 
capitalism and social classes at the center of their ideas on structural causes of social 
inequality.  Max Weber, on the other hand focuses on racial, ethnic and religious 
status groups.  Dahrendorf and Collins, and to a large extent Foucalt focuses on power, 
authority and domination (Adler and Adler 2007).  Feminists on the other hand focus 
on the causes, processes, and consequences of systematic gender inequality within and 
across societies. This critique, like other conflict theories, submits that the 
functionalist perspective neither accounts for the contexts in which some social and 
occupational positions are ascribed, nor the tendency for social reproduction in general 
(see Collins 1975 and 1977).  The next section gives an expanded discussion of 
feminist perspectives on social inequality. 
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5.3.5 Feminist Theories 
Feminist theory is distinctive from other social theories in that (i) it recognizes 
gender as a system of inequality (ii) it assumes that gender is a mutable rather than a 
constant feature of human societies, and (iii) feminists normatively espouse a 
commitment to a gender equitable society (Chafetz 2001). In other words, feminist 
theory seeks to explain inequality and barriers to women‘s social and economic justice 
(Rothman 2005). 
 Lorber (1998) states that historically there have been two waves of feminist 
theory.  The first came about in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries when the core 
focus was on suffrage rights. The current feminist tradition is dated around the period 
after World War II gaining prominence in the 1960s and 1970s. To date however, 
feminist theory is so fragmented leading Chafetz (1997) to state that there is no one 
form of feminist theory making the enterprise of summarizing it daunting.  The 
quantum of feminist theories one enumerates depends on whom they read.  For 
instance, Andersen (2000) distinguishes three main strands of feminist theory: liberal 
feminism, socialist feminism, and radical feminism.  Yet, Lorber (1998) list no less 
than eleven types of feminist theories.  The eleven types of feminism in Lorber‘s 
typology fall into three main categories.  First is Gender Reform Feminism which 
comprises liberal feminism, Marxist and socialist feminism, and development 
feminism.  Second is Gender Resistance Feminism which comprises; radical 
feminism, lesbian feminism, psychoanalytic feminism, and standpoint feminism.  
Third is Gender Rebellion Feminism which includes multiracial feminism, men‘s 
feminism, social construction feminism, and post modern feminism and queer theory.  
The goal of this section is not to summarize what each of these feminisms represents.  
Rather, I seek to capture the core values and goals of feminist theories as they relate to 
gender inequality. 
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 A key starting point within feminist thought is an acknowledgement of the 
nature of society in which men and men co-exist.  Feminist believe that generally, men 
and boys occupy a privileged social status within society.  In fact, Chafetz (2001) 
submits that men have long dominated and monopolized central institutions within 
society from the home, community, polity, religion, education and the like.  She also 
recognizes that not all men are the same.  Rather, a small elite group of men control 
the policy and decision making institutions within their societies.  All forms of 
femininity are ranked below these hegemonic masculines.  Other forms of masculinity 
are generally ranked somewhere in between.    
 Feminist theory came is inspired by two main concerns.  The first is 
substantive understandings of the structural features of society that (re) produces 
gender inequality.  Second, feminist theory emerged as a radical critique of the way 
knowledge is generated.  Even though I will discuss these in turn, in practice, they are 
interrelated as will become evident in my narrative. 
 Substantively, feminists are concerned with the sources of and consequences of 
gender inequality.  Most feminists point to patriarchy as the root cause of gendered 
social relations within society.  Patriarchy is a set of social relations within society 
which is hierarchical in nature and has a material basis.  Patriarchy places the center of 
power and control on men while creating and reproducing solidarity and 
interdependence among men in ways that enable them to dominate women in all 
spheres of life (Hartmann 2001).  Though it is hierarchical in form (men of different 
classes, race, and ethnic groups occupy different social positions), it also unites men in 
their shared supremacy over women.  In fact, these hierarchies exist because they 
create a need to maintain a status quo.  Also, it is possible to have small groups of elite 
hegemonic masculinity because the lower ranked men still occupy privileged social 
positions that allow them to dominate other men, and most women.  Materially, 
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patriarchy thrives because of men‘s ability to control and manipulate women‘s labor, 
restricting them to specific spheres.  In fact, the French radical feminist Simone de 
Beauvoir argued in 1949 that: 
 
―One is not born, but rather, becomes a woman…it is civilization as a 
whole that produces this creature…which is described as feminine‖ 
 
Feminists believe that it is theoretically possible to have sexual division of labor that is 
egalitarian.  However in practice the socially acceptable division of labor is one that 
accords relatively lower status to women (Hartmann, 2001). 
 Although patriarchy predates capitalism, it did not disappear during epochs of 
socialism.  In fact, some feminists argue that is within capitalist social organization 
that patriarchy assumes unique forms that are intermingled with capitalism in ways 
that are mutually reinforcing (Chafetz 1997).  To start with, women‘s work is divided 
between production and reproduction roles.   The later involves unpaid child bearing 
and child rearing practices that is key to societal survival.  Within the economic 
(production) sphere, however, is where the structural forms of gender inequality are 
most evident.  Within capitalist systems, women subordination and structural forms of 
inequality are evidenced through for instance occupational segregation (Bielby 2001; 
Jacobs 2001), devaluation of women‘s work (England 2000) informalization of 
women‘s work and feminization of global production of goods and services (see for 
instance Beneria 2003). Empirical research in all these areas tries to document how 
much inequality exists, what drives it, and how much and in which direction the trends 
are moving? It is important to highlight that feminist theory does not assume that 
women are passive actors within a society that oppresses and dominates them.  Rather, 
women form distinct classes of social resistance and renewal.  Yet, as Chafetz (2001) 
correctly notes, the agency that women may express is a partial one because 
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dominated groups are highly constrained in the choices they make without incurring 
heavy penalties for their actions.  She further argues that when rebellious acts result in 
intolerable penalties, few women will ―choose‖ to imitate.  When most or the majority 
of women are constrained in ways that make them be conformists, the process 
reinforces the very system that dominates and oppresses them.  
 Epistemologically, feminist theory emerged as an unapologetic rejection of 
Eurocentric masculinist epistemology that is generated from the standpoint of western, 
white, middle class male academics.  The core argument here is that all knowledge 
about the social world is situated.  In other words, knowledge reflects the social 
position of the knower.  For instance, theories and empirical findings produced by men 
is partial in its scope and limited in its depth because it‘s derived from a privileged 
standpoint.  The most vicious attacks at mainstream Eurocentrist epistemological 
approaches were targeted at extreme positivism that claimed to be value neutral and 
objective.  Feminist theory then developed an approach which is otherwise known as a 
feminist standpoint which, among other things, requires the researcher to be invested 
socially and emotionally in the research enterprise and subjects they study.  This 
approach called for (i) a new and elevated level of connectedness between the 
researcher and the researched, (ii) emotions and empathy that helps to validate the 
research process, and (iii) an ethic that reflects clear integrity and honesty of the 
researcher (Chafetz 1997: 102).  Even then, feminists recognize that a woman‘s and 
feminist standpoint is no less situated and partial than a masculine one.  In fact, it is 
possible for the oppressed to be simultaneous the oppressor. Moreover, feminist 
scholarship sometimes suffered from the very forms of bias evidenced in Eurocentric 
masculinist worldviews.  In this sense, feminist theory evolved from the standpoint of 
middle class white women whose ‗standpoints‘ did not represent the universal reality 
of white women, much less minority women and the rest of the women from other 
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world regions. Still, the value of feminist epistemology is that it reminds us that the 
key to understanding the social world resides in having multiple actors and multiple 
voices that raise new questions and draw from new data sources.   
 
5.4 Demographic Transitions and Inequality 
Apart from economic and sociological theories, population factors are known 
to affect the levels and trends in social inequality within and across nations.  The pace 
and scope of demographic explanations for inequality is largely driven by dynamics in 
mortality, fertility, and migration.  For the purposes of this study, I limit myself to 
discussing mortality and fertility transitions and their effect on inequality.  Especially 
pertinent is the way in which fertility and mortality transitions alter not only 
population size, but age structure within countries.  To the extent that these transitions 
do not occur evenly within and across population, it is important to elaborate on the 
consequences of fertility and mortality transitions in shaping inequality patterns within 
countries, especially among children. 
 
5.4.1 Mortality Transitions  
Mortality transitions (sometimes called the epidemiological transition) refer to 
the sustained fall in aggregate death rates within a nation.  In Europe and most of the 
Western world, mortality transitions occurred in three general phases: the 
pretransitional phase of high mortality (before 1950), a transitional phase (1850-1950); 
and the late transition phase (1950 to present).  Due to pestilence and famine, life 
expectancy ranged averaged between 20 and 40 years during the pretransitional phase.  
Epidemic and infectious diseases declined so much during the transitional phase that 
life expectancy rose from about 42 years in 1850 to over 65 years a century later in 
1950.  The decline in epidemics and infectious diseases is often attributed to increases 
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in economic development and subsequent improvements in living standards, 
institutionalized sanitary reforms and public health interventions, social reforms, as 
well as advances in medicine (McKeown 1965).  During the late transition phase 
mortality continued to decline with life expectancy rising to over 70 years.  However, 
this period is also marked with a steady increase in lifestyle and degenerative diseases.  
Countries in sub-Saharan Africa, however, did not follow this prototypical 
trajectory of mortality transitions as observed in western countries where poor nations 
followed diverse routes to low mortality (see Caldwell 1986).  In many countries, 
however, infant mortality remained high and some countries experienced major 
reversals in child mortality in the last half of the 20
th
 century (Hill and Pebley 1989).  
Additionally, the HIV AIDS pandemic presented yet a new negative frontier in the 
quest for higher life expectancy in sub Saharan countries, especially those in East and 
Southern Africa (Bongaarts 1996; see also UNAIDS 2004, 2006 & 2008).  To the 
extent that AIDS mortality occurs most predominantly among adults and young adults, 
it results in population age structures with a narrow middle reflecting an imbalance 
between providers and dependents.   
 Various socio-economic factors are widely recognized as markers of mortality 
inequality within countries.  These include race and ethnicity, rural and urban 
differentials, gender, income and education, occupation, as well as marital status 
(Weeks 2005; Yaukey 2007).  Within sub Saharan Africa, it is the rural/urban and 
especially the socio-economic mortality gradient that is most troubling. 
 
5.4.2 Fertility Transitions  
Fertility transition refers to the sustained change from a situation where women 
have many children to where they have fewer children.  This transition usually, but not 
always, follows after the mortality transition (within the Western world France is an 
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exception here).  In Europe fertility declines occurred around the late 19
th
 century to 
the beginning of the 20
th
 century.  Fertility transition is by far the most studied 
demographic transition with scholars trying to establish its timing, its causes, how it 
occurs within the population, and its consequences.   
What causes fertility to decline, and to remain low within countries?  Mason 
(1997) identifies six explanations for the triggers of fertility transition.  First, the 
classic demographic transition theory attributes the drop in birth rates to the changes in 
social life associated with the industrial revolution (Thomson 1930; Notestein 1953).  
Second, Lesthaeghe (1983 & 1995) argues that beyond industrialization, it is in fact 
the increase in individualism associated with modernization that leads people to have 
fewer or no children.  Becker (1960) provides the neo-classical rational choice theory 
that suggests that individuals and families weigh the costs and benefits of having 
children before making a decision on conception. Easterlin and Crimmins (1985) 
propose a regulatory microeconomic theory that adds psychic and other social costs to 
financial costs of having children.  Fifth the ideational theory attributes fertility 
declines to the diffusion of birth control practices, and a change in social norms 
associated with fertility (Cleland and Wilson 1987).  Last, Caldwell (1982) argues that 
in most developing countries, fertility transitions are slow or stalled because o cultural 
norms that govern wealth flows between aged parents and their children.  For as long 
as parents will depend on their children for old age support, it is the case that they will 
have many children in order to maximize the chances of having some who will 
support them later.  Mason (1997) argues that none of these theories individually 
provides a complete explanation for specific transition within individual countries.  
For the most part, it takes two or even more of these theories to explain the causes of 
fertility transitions within countries. 
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 While most countries in Europe started their transitions at the turn of the 20
th
 
century, women in sub Saharan African countries continued to bear a high number of 
children way into the mid to late 20
th
 century.  One question that remains contested is 
whether African countries have begun their transitions or not?    After all, the average 
total fertility rate in sub Saharan Africa (5.1) is about twice the world average (2.5), 
over twice Latin America and the Caribbean and East Asia and the Pacific.  Sub 
Saharan African fertility is even three times that observed in Europe and OECD 
countries.  
Cohen (1998) argues that Demographic and Health Surveys that became 
available in the late 1980s made it possible for scientists to make reliable estimates on 
the presence or absence of fertility transitions in Africa.  For instance earlier studies by 
Freedman and Blanc (1992) or latter ones (see for instance Kirk and Pillet 1998) found 
significant fertility in some countries with solid trends observed in Kenya, Botswana 
and Zimbabwe.  These countries shared three key attributes including low infant 
mortality rates, high levels of education, and widespread state supported family 
planning programs (Caldwell et al 1992).   In short, the nature, timing, causes, locus, 
pace, and trends of fertility transitions within individual African countries is very 
variable, and still contested.  But, it still helps to get a snapshot of the current average 
fertility levels within individual African countries.   Sub Saharan Africa contains 
countries with low average fertility levels such as Mauritius (1.6), Seychelles (2.3) and 
South Africa (2.5) and Botswana (2.9).  Yet, it is also home to countries that some of 
the highest fertility levels in the world.  For instance, Niger (7.1), Mali (6.5), Somalia 
(6.4), Uganda (6.3), Chad (6.2), and the Democratic Republic of Congo (6).  In the 
rest of the region, women have between four and six children. 
Additionally, it is important to note that once fertility transitions are underway 
sometimes they stall, or even reverse (Bongaarts 2006).  Demographers give several 
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reasons why some countries fail to experience sustained fertility transitions and these 
include; level of economic development, tradition and religion that places a high 
premium on ancestry and descent, polygyny especially in West and Middle Africa, the 
strength and safety of numbers, poor family planning programs, or collective 
childrearing that is made possible by string extended family networks and in some 
cases economic reversals (Caldwell et al 1992; Eloundou-Enyegue and Cornwell, 
2000). It is for these reasons that Caldwell and his colleagues argue that the fertility 
transition in Africa is distinctive from that witnessed in other world regions, especially 
in Western Europe.  
So far I limited my discussion to defining fertility transitions, their causes, as 
well as their variations across space.  This discussion is only useful in as much as it 
provides a rich background for the consequences of fertility transitions.  In particular, 
this study is mostly concerned with inequality among children.  Therefore, what is 
most pertinent for this study is (i) how fertility transitions within countries shape 
inequality in the burden of child rearing across the region by altering individual 
countries‘ age structure, and or (ii) how fertility transition processes within countries 
shape different dimensions of inequality among children? 
 Fertility transitions have a bearing on children‘s social outcomes (especially 
education) in as much as they affect family size (Blake 1980), family structure 
(McLanahan 2004), both family size and structure (Eloundou-Enyegue and Williams 
2006; Eloundou-Enyegue and Stokes 2008), or the demographic dividend (Eloundou-
Enyegue and Giroux, forthcoming).  In order to understand how this occurs at 
household or at population level (in the case of the dividend theory), it is key to lay 
out how fertility transitions occur within countries.  Is it the case that when fertility 
begins to decline, it does so evenly across all regions, ethnic groups, or across all 
socio-economic groups in an individual country? It turns out it‘s the contrary.  Fertility 
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declines often happen in a staggered fashion, beginning among the wealthy and among 
the urbanites and then trickling down to the poor and to rural women (Shapiro and 
Tambashe 2001).  Also, does fertility decline within or outside marriage? The latter 
suggests that it is the combination of both family size, and family structure that has 
broader implications on the levels and trends in socio-economic inequality among 
children (Eloundou-Enyegue and Williams 2006).   
Resource dilution theory (Blake 1980) emphasizes that at household level, high 
fertility levels reduce the size of average resources available for children.  The 
resource divergence theory argues that it is not only family size that matters, but also 
family structure.  If more children are being born to poor, unmarried women, it implies 
divergence in lived experiences of children at aggregate level.  Eloundou-Enyegue and 
Williams (2006) and Eloundou-Enyegue and Stokes (2008) highlight the need to 
conceptually and empirically merge the dilution and divergence theories.  More 
recently, Eloundou-Enyegue and Giroux (forthcoming) formalize the dividend theory, 
the idea that fertility transitions affect inequality in as much as they alter age structure 
at population level.   They note that sustained reduction in fertility alters age 
dependency, and age dependency in turn reduces real dependency.  Assuming steady 
or increasing national resources, and proportion of resources allocated to children, as 
real dependency decreases, one would expect an increase in average resources 
available to children.   
 
5.5 Conclusion 
This chapter captures several macro-level (world systems, dependency), meso 
level (Kuznets, functionalist, Marxist, and feminist), as well as micro-level theories 
(fertility and mortality transitions).  The diversity of these theories is a sign of how 
complex children‘s issues are in terms of the level of analysis from which they can be 
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approached, as well as the substantive focus.  Good theories should be precise, 
parsimonious, falsifiable, and hold promise for generating reasonable predictions 
about the social world.  Together, these theories provide a solid platform for the 
formulation of hypotheses on the social world of children in sub-Saharan Africa – 
from what is happening at continental level; gender dynamics, as well as what is 
happening at household level.  The results chapters will explicitly articulate how well 
these theories account for emerging trends in inequality among children within sub 
Saharan Africa.  Even before then, it is clear that most of these theories were not 
developed with the social world on children in mind.  Yet, their major themes do 
apply, to an extent, to the world of children.  Where necessary, the study will shed 
light on new ideas that account for the future of inequality in the region. 
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CHAPTER 6 
METHODOLOGY 
 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter provides a summary of the data, measures and methods used to 
evaluate the levels, trends, and determinants of inequality among children in sub 
Saharan Africa.  The chapter begins with a concise description of secondary data 
sources used in this study. This is followed by a summary of the advantages and 
limitations of these data.  Third, the chapter presents the standard inequality measures 
and their desirable properties.  This is followed by a brief outline of methods used 
including decomposition techniques to account for drivers of inequality over time, 
indices of demographic concentration used to evaluate the effectiveness of informal 
networks in buffering inequality among children at macro-level, and finally 
multivariate regression models used to explain variation in fosterage prevalence and 
effectiveness.  
 
6.2 Data Sources 
This study uses data from three main sources; The World Bank, and the 
Demographic and Health Surveys.  These data sources are discussed below. 
 
6.2.1 The World Bank’s World Development Indicators Online  
This study uses the World Bank‘s World Development Indicators (WDI) to 
answer the following questions: 
(i) How much income, and health inequality exists among children in sub Saharan 
Africa? 
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(ii) How have these levels changed over time and what factors drive the changes? 
(iii) What contextual factors account for variability in fosterage prevalence and 
effectiveness in? 
The World Bank‘s World Development Indicators (WDI) is a comprehensive database 
that captures data from 210 countries and up to 18 aggregates.  WDIs are available for 
35 countries in East Asia and Pacific, 57 in Europe and Central Asia, 38 in Latin 
America and the Caribbean, 21 in Middle East and North Africa, 3 in North America, 
8 in South Asia, and up to 48 countries in sub Saharan Africa.  These data cover a total 
of 990 variables organized within ten categories; Economic Policy and Debt (270 
variables), Education (88 variables), Environment (122 variables), Financial Sector 
(39 variables), Health (82 variables), Infrastructure (77 variables), Labor and Social 
Protection (76 variables) Poverty (23 variables), Private Sector and Trade (138 
variables), and Public Sector (75 variables).  These data are consolidated from national 
sources such as national central statistical offices, from other secondary sources such 
as World Bank or Demographic Health Surveys, or from independent agencies such as 
Transparency International that collect data for specific variables. The database covers 
the period from 1960 to 2009.  This study draws on this database for data that 
includes, gross domestic product per capita, annual growth in gross domestic product, 
total population, youth population, infant mortality rate, total fertility rate, government 
expenditure in education, urbanization, HIV/AIDS prevalence, literacy rates, and Gini 
and transparency indices.   
 
6.2.2 Demographic and Health Surveys 
This study seeks also to evaluate the effectiveness of the African extended 
family in buffering inequality among children, at macro level.  Additionally, it aims to 
determine the level child mortality inequality sub Saharan Africa.  In order to explore 
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these questions, the study draws from the Demographic and Health Surveys managed 
by Macro International.  Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS) data are drawn from 
nationally representative samples of between 3000 and 30000 households in 83 
developing countries including former Russian States.  So far, DHS collected up to 
278 surveys across these countries.  In order to evaluate levels and changes in 
fosterage effectiveness as well as the child mortality gradient within countries, the 
study draws on data gathered through 79 surveys from 33 countries.  Study countries 
include: Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, 
Republic of Congo, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Cote d‘Ivoire, Ethiopia, 
Gabon, Ghana, Guinea, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, 
Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Africa, 
Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.  Over two thirds of 
these countries have two or more surveys.   
In collecting data, Macro International works closely with local agencies such 
typically the national central statistical offices to train, sample, implement, and record 
the surveys. In some cases, Macro International also may work with local NGOs, 
Family Planning agencies, or Ministries of Health.  Most surveys are implemented 
within five year intervals where possible.  Data is collected from women of 
reproductive age (15-49) covering diverse issues such as child health and nutrition; 
child and infant mortality; maternal health including female genital mutilation; family 
planning; fertility and fertility preferences; malaria; socio economic variables such as 
education, gender and domestic violence; women empowerment; HIV AIDS 
prevalence, knowledge, attitudes, and behavior.  Additionally, the surveys collect 
standard information on household characteristics such as family size, ages of 
household members, and relatedness of household members.  These data make it 
possible for Macro to divide households across five distinct wealth profiles in ways 
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that allow analysis of socio-economic change by wealth status.  Each DHS wave does 
not track the same individuals interviewed in previous studies.  Rather, each wave 
takes a different sample that may or may not include households that were previously 
sampled  
  
6.3 Data Quality 
This study finds the World Bank and Demographic and Health Survey data 
desirable for a number of reasons.  First, the datasets make it possible to make cross 
country comparisons because they cover several countries over a long period of time.  
The World Bank‘s WDIs indicators contain data for some variables going back to 
1960.  DHS datasets are collected at five year intervals within countries as described 
above.  Both datasets contain data on several socio-economic variables.  However, 
these data are also susceptible to standard problems associated with survey techniques 
of collecting data.  These may include errors in survey design, data collection, data 
entry and reporting.  The World Bank data is as accurate as the records gathered from 
national statistical agencies and the carefulness of data analysts at the Bank.   
The World Bank and Macro International (DHS surveys) continue to develop 
and support existing institutions that collect and manage national statistical data. For 
instance, the General Data Dissemination System (GDDS) of the World Bank is a 
framework that assesses national statistical systems,  encourages countries to improve 
the quality of official statistics, and provides a framework for evaluating data 
improvement needs while setting priorities for statistical development.  Additionally, 
this framework also helps developing countries to disseminate reliable economic, 
financial and socio-demographic statistics.  Moreover, the World Bank, in 
collaboration with the International Monetary Fund, developed the Data Quality 
Assessment Framework (DQAF), an innovative methodology that assesses data 
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quality and brings together best practices and internationally accepted concepts and 
definitions in statistics. Taken together, these institutional capabilities give me 
confidence to trust the economic and demographic figures I am working with as the 
best available estimates since they are generated through the combined intellectual 
expertise of the World Bank, and in country statisticians.  
 For both data sources, one key weakness is missing cases as some countries 
typically lack data for extended periods (Somalia for instance).  This omission is non 
random and therefore may bias results because it is possible that this country is 
distinctive from other sub Saharan African countries for which data is available.  
Therefore, all my conclusions are bound by a caveat that they speak to the reality 
within the countries for which data is available. 
Further, critics of survey data often site that survey data is weakened by errors 
of non-response, recall errors, as well as deliberate misinformation.  But, to the extent 
that this study draws on data for household composition (number, age and gender of 
household members) as well as infant mortality, I believe that these variables are 
much easier to verify and respondents are less likely to misreport as they would for 
sensitive information such as income.  It is possible, however, that some respondents 
may identify children in their households as their own, even if they are fostered 
because the African culture does not distinguish between biological and fostered 
children.  For that reason, the numbers and trends in fosterage reported here may be 
considered conservative in that they reflect the lower bound on the extent of fosterage.  
Moreover, the study traces mortality along wealth gradients within countries.  
Fortunately, wealth is measured by indices of household possessions, rather than 
monetary units.  As such, most of the items included in the derivation of indices are 
those that enumerators can observe, rather than ask, during an interview. 
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 The above weaknesses notwithstanding, the richness of the World Bank, and 
Demographic and Health Surveys provides a solid platform for multi year, cross 
country comparisons that would not be possible from isolated ethnographic 
observations, or individually fielded surveys.  To my knowledge, these two datasets 
are the best suited for the kind of enquiry envisaged within the current study. Besides, 
all forms of data collection and management are prone to some level of error.  Fear of 
these errors should not paralyze scientific enquiry. Rather, the scientific community 
continues to devise ways to minimize these errors in ways that make available data 
more reflective of the realities of social lives experiences by people throughout the 
world.  
 
6.4 Measures 
This study employs four standard inequality measures; the Gini Coefficient, 
the Theil Index, the Squared Coefficient of Variation; and the Mean Logarithmic 
Deviation to examine the levels and trends in income, health, and educational 
inequality among children in sub Saharan Africa.  Before I discuss these indices, I 
present below some of the desirable characteristics of inequality indices. 
 
6.4.1 Properties of Inequality Indices 
Because several measures of inequality exist, it is important to have set criteria 
for choosing one measure over another.  The general approach for choosing a 
desirable inequality measure involves exploring what properties the inequality 
measure satisfies, or taking the axiomatic approach where an inequality measure or 
groups of measures are characterized by a specific set of properties (Chakravarty 
1999).  Inequality indices are generally expected to conform to certain characteristics 
that include (1) scale invariance (2) Pigou-Dalton principle of transfers (3) transitivity 
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(4) directionality (5) symmetry, and (6) equal additions (Allison 1978; Fossett and 
South 1983).  Scale invariance requires that inequality remains unchanged if an 
individual‘s resource endowments are multiplied by a constant.  The variance, for 
instance fails to satisfy this principle because if everyone‘s resources are doubled, the 
variance quadruples.  Scale invariance is intuitively salient because for instance a 
change in the units of measurement does not represent a change in the distribution of 
that resource. For instance, derivations of income inequality should not depend on 
whether the income is measured in dollars or pounds or any other currency.  
Moreover, a scale invariant inequality measure makes it unnecessary to adjust for 
inflation.  Most inequality measures can be converted into scale invariant measures by 
dividing by the mean or some function of the mean.   
In the presence of many inequality measures that satisfy the scale invariance 
measure, one can check if a measure satisfies the Pigou-Dalton principle of transfers. 
Dalton (1920) argued that measures of inequality should increase whenever resources 
are transferred from the lower end of the distribution to the upper end of the 
distribution and vice versa.  This principle is especially important when the resource 
under consideration has diminishing returns, for instance income.  Money has positive 
utility but the rate of utility increase decreases as higher levels of income are reached.  
As a result, a transfer of income from a richer to a poorer individual yields a net utility 
gain. 
Inequality scores must be transitive.  For instance, given three groups, A, B 
and C where A has an advantage over B and B has an advantage over C.  It should 
follow that A has an advantage over C and that A‘s advantage over C is greater than 
A‘s advantage over B.  If this principle is satisfied, an inequality measure yields scores 
that can be ordered unambiguously.   
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The next principle is that of directionality.  The measurement of inequality 
normatively implies that resource distribution is skewed towards or against some 
groups.  Thus, a good inequality measure is one that clearly shows a point of perfect 
equality and one of perfect inequality.  Values above the point of perfect equality 
should illustrate some degree of advantage of one group over another.   
Further, inequality indices are easiest to interpret if they are symmetrical 
around zero with a lower and upper limit of negative and positive one.  If this is the 
case, the sign of the measure reflects group advantage and the value of the measure 
indicates how far inequality is from its maximum or minimum.  However, the lower 
and upper bounds of inequality indices tend to vary depending on whether one is 
dealing with finite or infinite populations.  For infinite populations, the Gini 
coefficient varies between zero and 1 while the CV and Theil vary between zero and 
infinity.  Some simple transformations can allow these indices to have an upper bound 
of 1.  For instance to make CV have an upper bound of one you divide the CV score 
by CV +1.  To make the Gini vary between minus and plus infinity, take its logit: 
(G/(1-G)).  This transformation helps by removing the boundedness which limits 
regression estimation if the Gini scores are used as dependent variables.  On the other 
hand, in finite populations, the Gini has an upper bound of 1-1/n; the CV has and 
upper bound of square root of n-1; and the Theil has an upper bound of log n.  The 
upper bound represents a situation where one person has everything and everyone else 
has nothing. To allow these indices to vary between zero and 1 independently of n, 
simply divide the indices scores by their upper bounds.  
Last, inequality indices should conform to the principle of equal additions.  To 
ensure that an inequality measure is sensitive to relative inequality, it should show 
greater equality between groups when a positive constant is added to all incomes. 
Conversely, the measure should show higher inequality levels when a negative 
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constant is added to all incomes.  If this principle is satisfied, one can be certain that 
any given absolute difference in income becomes less important as the overall level of 
incomes rise, and more important when the level of incomes falls. 
A major limitation of full measures of inequality when applied to between 
group inequality is that every member within a group is pegged at the group mean. In 
other words, the analysis does not take into account within group inequality.  In some 
circumstances, inequality measures are chosen on the basis of the ease of 
decomposition.  For instance, the MLD, the Theil index, and the squared coefficient of 
variation are generally easier to decompose than the Gini coefficient.   
 
6.4.2 Inequality Indices 
The four inequality indices (Gini Coefficient, MLD, CV and Theil) are a 
function of population shares and resource shares.   
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Where pj indicates the population shares and rj indicates resource ratios. And 
f is the functional form that is used to transform the resource ratios.  The above 
equation is important because it captures the essence that levels of inequality are a 
function of not only dynamics in demographic transitions, but also those of resource 
upturns or downturns.  The four indices can be represented as below: 
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Where: 
pj indicates the share of the total population living in country j 
rj indicates per resources in country j divided by average resources in a region 
and rj can be fully represented by the formula 
xpx jj jj /  and x j  is per capita 
resources in country j.   
Because of the different functional forms of the four inequality measures given 
above, it is important to note that each of these inequality indices gives different 
sensitivity to changes in income and population distributions in different quintiles of 
the entire population spread 
Conceptually, the Gini coefficient is a measure of inequality that is calculated 
as a ratio of the areas on a Lorenz curve that is derived from the Lorenz Curve (Lorenz 
1905; Gini 1909 & 1921). The Lorenz curve is an illustration of observed income 
distributions that are compared to the state of perfect equality.  Once a distribution is 
rank ordered the Lorenz shows what proportion of, for example, the bottom x% of 
households control what percentage y% of the total income in the population. The 
percentage of households is plotted on the x-axis, the percentage of income on the y-
axis. The Gini coefficient is then computed by first measuring the area between the 
Lorenz Curve and the 45 degree equality line. For complete inequality, in which only 
one person controls all income, the Lorenz curve would coincide with the straight 
lines at the lower and right boundaries of the curve, so the Gini coefficient would be 1.  
The Gini coefficient is sensitive to transfers from the middle of the distribution.  This 
is because its sensitivity to transfers depends on individuals‘ ranks rather than their 
numeric scores.  In other words, after a numeric transfer in resources, the change in 
inequality (Gini) depends on the number of individuals with resources below and 
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resources above the reference individual.  Income distribution often follows a shape 
that has fewer people at both the lower and upper ends and more in the middle.  The 
Gini therefore is most sensitive to transfers around the modal levels of resource 
distribution. 
The Theil‘s index on the other hand is derived from information theory and the 
concept of entropy and varies between zero and log n, where n is the total number of 
subgroups being compared.  This index can be decomposed into between and within 
group components.  When the country‘s population shares equal its resource share, the 
Theil index equal zero and becomes log n when there is total equality (Korzeniewicz 
and Moran 1997).   The Theil index is sensitive to transfers or changes at the top of the 
distribution. 
The squared coefficient of variation is a measure of dispersion about the group 
mean.  The CV tends to be more symmetric and further expresses inequality in more 
relative terms, i.e., compared to the overall level of resources.   
The mean logarithmic deviation is most sensitive to resource transfers from the 
lower to the upper end of resource distribution..  In other words, it is sensitive to 
transfers of resource endowments from the poor.  This is in contrast with the Gini 
coefficient which is most sensitive to changes in endowments of in the middle of the 
distribution while the Theil index is most sensitive to changes or transfers from the 
richer end of the distribution.  
 
6.5 Methods 
This study employs three methodological approaches to access levels and 
determinants of inequality among children in sub Saharan Africa.  These include 
inequality decomposition techniques, multi-level regression modeling, and derivation 
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of indices of demographic concentration.  Below, I provide a summary of these 
approaches. 
 
6.5.1 Accounting for Change in Inequality: Decomposition Techniques 
To account for the changes in inequality among children over discrete time 
periods of choice.  For this, I apply standard decomposition techniques (see Kitagawa 
1955; Firebaugh and Goesling 2004; and Chevan and Sutherland 2009).  I especially 
follow the framework proposed by Eloundou Enyegue and Rehman (2009) in 
apportioning the change in income inequality among children to those due to 
population size, population age structure, and economic transformations as shown 
below:  
 
Inequality (IR) = fn (IG, IK, IP) where,      
   
 
Inequality among African children in sub Saharan Africa (IR) reflects inequality in 
national budgets (IG), in total budget allocated to children (IK), and in size of 
children‘s population reflects, (IP).  This inequality (IR) can also be expressed as a 
function of resource ratios as in equation [1] above.  Using the Mean Logarithmic 
Deviation, change in inequality among children between two time periods can be 
captured as: 
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Where: rj is resource ration of country j relative to population weighted regional 
average, wj is share of African child population found in country j and rj are dependent 
upon the country‘s GDP ratio (gj) and public commitment ratio kj, and child population 
ratio pj. Therefore, change in income inequality among children (IR, or MLDt1- t2) is 
driven by four respective influences; how much SSA countries vary in their share of 
the regional child population (population effect), how much they vary in their child 
dependency ratios (Age Dependency), how much they vary in national incomes 
(Income effect) and finally, by how much countries increasingly differ in their 
allocation of income to children (Allocation Effect).  
Kanbur (2006) submits that decomposition exercises are generally carried out 
for normative purposes of recommending policy and thus he provides a critique of the 
policy usefulness of inequality decomposition techniques.  He notes the common 
pitfalls that trap analysts when they abstract from decomposition results to policy 
recommendations.  First, he notes the intrinsic significance of groups such as racial or 
gender categories wherein a low between group contributions to the overall inequality 
does not always suggest that only policies ought to focus on within group differences.  
This aspect is especially important in contexts where it is normatively important for 
equalize outcomes and opportunities between groups as well as within groups.  
Second, inequality decompositions may be affected by group composition integrity or 
Pop Size Effect Age Dependency Income Effect 
Allocation Effect 
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stability.  For instance, migration patterns may shift group composition that result in 
inaccurate derivations of decomposition scores since data is often time lagged.  
Moreover, resources and people tend shift between boundaries in the real world.  
Inequality decomposition may fail to capture the scope and depth of sharing across 
categories.  Last, policy recommendations are typically difficult to predict the 
effectiveness of alternative policies given that information is often incomplete a priori.  
Overall, decompositions are a useful tool to apportion the sources of drivers of 
observed changes in inequality. 
 
 6.5.2 Wealth-Mortality Gradient: Simple linear regression 
The next task is to investigate if and to what extent there is a wealth-mortality 
gradient within African countries.  In other words, how does social class position 
shape the levels of child mortality within countries and how has that changed over 
time?  This part of my analysis is made possible by DHS data that not only captures 
child mortality levels, but also and family wealth categories.  Therefore I regress to 
observed levels of infant mortality on wealth quintiles using 71 DHS survey data from 
35 SSA countries.  This simple linear regression model is reflected by equation 1 
below: 
 
Yij = α + βIij + ε        [5] 
 
Where:  Y = infant mortality in country i at time period j, and Iij = change in income 
along wealth profile in country i at time period j. 
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6.5.3 Fosterage Effectiveness:  Index of Demographic Concentration 
This study aims also to estimate the levels and changes in the effectiveness of 
African extended family systems in buffering inequality among children.  In other 
words, to what extent can the informal African extended system be relied upon to care 
for, and educate children?  This question requires an understanding of changes in 
household composition over time.  DHS datasets make it possible to derive indices of 
concentration for fostered children.  In other words, it helps to answer the question: at 
national level are fostered children systematically overrepresented in larger or in 
poorer households? 
To derive the index of concentration, the DHS allows one to distinguish 
between total number of biological children and total number of fostered children in a 
household.  My analysis is based on children less than 15 years of age.  First, I classify 
all children within the sampled households into different family types based on family 
size and I form ten categories of family sizes 1 through 10+.  Importantly, these data 
show only the destination of children but not their families of origin.   The index of 
demographic concentration is based on the assumption that if informal fosterage 
occurred in the same manner as biological distribution, we would expect the 
proportion of fostered children (in respective family sizes) to mirror those of 
biological children.  Because these data show destination of fostered children, it makes 
it possible to calculate indices of demographic concentration as: 
 
IC= (Oi - Ei) * ln(ri)         
 
Where:  
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IC=index of concentration; i=index group (family size in the case of demographic 
concentration);  Ei= percentage of children expected to be fostered into the group, if 
children were distributed proportionately according to group importance; Specifically, 
E is the percentage of biological children in this SES (sibsize) group, relative to all 
biological children; Oi=percentage of children actually fostered in this group (out of 
all fostered children); ri= SES (or sibsize) ratio; that is, group SES divided by average 
SES.  This formula is such that an over-representation of fostered children into smaller 
sized families makes a positive contribution while an over representation into larger 
families makes a negative contribution.   The index of concentration takes values on 
either side of zero.  A value of zero reflects no buffering effect from fosterage while 
negative values suggest that informal fosterage systems are reinforcing inequality 
among children.  
 
6.5.3 Fosterage Prevalence and Effectiveness: Multivariate Regression 
Modeling 
What contextual factors explain the variation in child fosterage rates and child 
fosterage effectiveness across countries?  Theoretically, I expect that demographic, 
economic, cultural and geographic factors could explain observed differences.  My 
dependent variables are; proportion of 10-14 year olds living with neither of their 
biological parents, and index of demographic concentration.  My explanatory variables 
are captured in Tables 6.1 and 6.2.  My analysis begins from the standpoint that 
observed rates of fosterage in a particular country in a given year are a result of 
decision taken by families in previous years given their lived economic and social 
experiences at that time.  As such, I lag the explanatory variables by taking the 
average figure of the last five years preceding each DHS survey in each respective 
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year.  Given that the DHS surveys are collected in different years, building this dataset 
required slow and careful iterations for each country, and for each survey year.    
 
 
 
TABLE 6.1.  Correlates of Fosterage Prevalence 
Variables Explanation Expected Effect 
Demographic Youth Pop Population ages 0-14 (% of 
total) 
Positive 
 HIV Prevalence of HIV, total (% of 
population ages 15-49) 
Negative 
Cultural Urbanization Urban population (% of total) Negative 
 Literacy Literacy rate, adult total (% of 
people ages 15 and above) 
Negative 
Geography East Country is located in East 
Africa 
Reference 
Group 
 West Country is located in West 
Africa 
Unknown 
 Central Country is located in Central 
Africa 
Unknown  
 South Country is located in Southern 
Africa 
Unknown 
Economic lnGDPpc Natural logarithm of gross 
domestic product per capita 
calibrated at purchasing power 
parity 
Negative/ 
Positive 
 GDP Growth GDP per capita growth (annual 
%) 
Positive 
Inequality Gini Coefficient Gini Index Negative/ 
Positive 
Democracy Transparency CPIA transparency, 
accountability, and corruption 
in the public sector rating 
(1=low to 6=high) 
Positive 
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TABLE 6.2.  Correlates of Fosterage Effectiveness and Theoretical Expectations 
Variables Explanation Expected Effect 
Demographic TFR or Fertility rate, total (births 
per woman) 
Negative 
 Youth Pop Population ages 0-14 (% 
of total) 
Negative 
 HIV Prevalence of HIV, total 
(% of population ages 15-
49) 
Negative 
Geography East Country is located in East 
Africa 
Reference Group 
 West Country is located in West 
Africa 
Unknown 
 Central Country is located in 
Central Africa 
Unknown  
 South Country is located in 
Southern Africa 
Unknown 
Economic lnGDPpc PPP Natural logarithm of gross 
domestic product per 
capita calibrated at 
purchasing power parity 
Negative 
 GDP Growth GDP per capita growth 
(annual %) 
Positive 
 Education 
Expenditure 
Education expenditure (% 
of GNI) 
Positive 
 Literacy Literacy rate, adult total 
(% of people ages 15 and 
above) 
Negative 
Inequality Gini Coefficient Gini Index Negative/ 
Positive 
Democracy Transparency CPIA transparency, 
accountability, and 
corruption in the public 
sector rating (1=low to 
6=high) 
Positive 
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6.6 Conclusion 
This chapter provides a concise summary of the study methodology.  It 
discusses the sources and limitations of World Bank and DHS datasets used for this 
study.  In addition, it lays out methodological approaches used to study inequality 
among children in sub Saharan Africa.  These include inequality decomposition, 
indices of demographic concentration, and multivariate regression modeling 
techniques.  These methodological approaches push the frontiers of inquiry into 
inequality dynamics among children in ways that improve our understanding while 
providing a platform for developing newer theoretical propositions. 
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CHAPTER 7 
FINDINGS 
Inequality Trends Among Children in sub Saharan Africa (1971-2007) 
 
7.1 Introduction 
Inequality, especially inequality among children across sub Saharan African 
(SSA) countries is both understudied and underappreciated.  This omission is rather 
surprising given ongoing socio-economic and cultural changes that might suggest 
possible divergence in social outcomes for children.  For instance, economic booms 
spurred by forest, mineral and oil resources in some countries are equally matched 
with significant economic reversals or civic unrest in others.  Apart from differences 
in economic performance, SSA countries vary in their level of financial commitment 
to child. Moreover, even though they have begun their demographic transitions, the 
rate and pace differs significantly across (Bongaarts 2006) and within countries 
(Shapiro and Tambashe 2001).  On the one hand, uneven fertility transitions across 
countries spur inequality as they change relative age structures and concentration of 
children cohorts and young adults in particular countries.  On the other hand, uneven 
fertility transitions within countries could result in poor families carrying the largest 
child rearing burden as middle class women precipitously reduce their fertility and 
concentrate their resources on fewer children (Blake 1981, McLanahan 2004).  This 
chapter seeks to determine how these economic and demographic factors shape 
patterns of income and health inequality among children. 
 I ask three interrelated questions: (i) what are the levels and trends in 
educational resource and health inequality among Africa children, (ii) how do trends 
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in resource inequality among children compare to those among adults, and (iii) what 
factors account for the observed changes in resource inequality over time?   
 I use data from Penn World Tables, World Development Indicators, and 
Demographic and Health surveys to estimate standard measures of inequality (Gini 
coefficient, Theil index, Coefficient of variation, and Mean Logarithmic Deviation).  
Further, I apply decomposition techniques to account for the factors that drive changes 
in inequality over time.  Results show that educational resource inequality among 
African children increased steadily between 1971 and 1999 before gradually declining 
but remaining high and stable thereafter (Gini of 0.59 in 2007).  For the entire study 
period, levels of resource inequality among children were over double those among 
adults.  Nigeria and South Africa have inordinately large effects on observed 
educational resource inequality trends.  Child mortality inequality across countries 
remains low and relatively unchanged over the study period. But, if one examines 
mortality inequality within countries, socio-economic status is a consistent marker of 
child survival.   Age structure, size of economy, and allocation to children (education) 
drive changes in inequality compared to variation in population size per se. Overall, 
this study provides an alternative lens through which to evaluate the welfare of 
African children at a time of globalization and standardization of welfare benchmarks. 
 The rest of the chapter is organized as follows.  First, I briefly discuss the 
relevance of investigating inter-country inequality among children.  Second, I discuss 
the previous studies on inequality among children and illuminate the nature and locus 
of existing knowledge gaps.  This is followed by a description of data sources and 
their limitations.  Fourth, I outline inequality measures and decomposition techniques 
employed in this study.  Last, study findings are presented followed by a discussion 
and conclusion. 
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7.2 Relevance 
This study is timely and relevant for several reasons.  First, by placing 
inequality at the center of scientific inquiry, this study enriches our understanding of 
the wellbeing of African children beyond routine preoccupation with poverty.   We 
know that eliminating poverty does not suggest an equalization of economic 
opportunity nor does it signal a convergence in social outcomes (Dollar and Kraay 
2002; Ravallion 2005; Edward 2006).  Moreover, development literature, including 
research on individual happiness, acknowledges the disjuncture between absolute and 
relative deprivation (Graham and Felton 2006; Firebaugh and Schroeder 2009).  As 
such, it is important to recognize that the discourse on African children‘s welfare 
remains incomplete if one does not acknowledge the coexistence of poverty, and 
inequality. 
Second, SSA is rearing 17% of the world‘s children even though it controls 
only 2.3% of the global income resources.  Given recent economic up and downturns 
within countries in SSA countries, it is important to evaluate how they impacted social 
and economic resources available to children. Recognizing the diversity of 
experiences of countries in terms of democracy, civil wars, and new economic 
resources from forestry, mining and agriculture,
20
 it is unclear how all these translate 
into substantive investments and social outcomes for children.  Besides, I focus on 
income because resources are an instrumental means to a social end (Seers 1972, Sen 
1999) and on infant mortality because the wealth of Africa is closely tied to the health 
and survival of its people (Bloom and Canning 2004). 
 Third, demographic transitions underway in SSA are uneven both within and 
across countries.  For instance, Shapiro and Tambashe (2001) find evidence that 
                                                             
20
The continent has experienced civil wars in Liberia, Angola, Uganda, the Democratic Republic of 
Congo, Sudan, and Niger; yet at the same time, new mineral resources such as oil (Ghana, Angola, and 
Gabon) and diamonds (Botswana and Zimbabwe) continue to redefine economic trajectories.  
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fertility transition are occurring in a staggered fashion whereby middle class women 
reduce their fertility at a faster rate than their poorer counterparts.  The implications of 
uneven fertility are two-fold.  Within countries, uneven fertility transitions result in 
placing the greatest child-rearing burden poor families who do not have sufficient 
economic resources to raise them.  Uneven fertility transitions between countries 
suggest a divergence in child dependency ratios.  In essence, it is likely that vanguard 
countries (such as Kenya, Zimbabwe, Ghana, South Africa, Mauritius, and Botswana) 
where fertility has now declined by about 30% now carry a lower relative share of the 
continent‘s children while countries where fertility transitions stalled (like Congo, 
Niger) will carry a heavier relative child rearing burden in future.  In short, if one 
assumes unchanging distribution of income across countries, then uneven fertility 
transitions will work to increase inequality among children through its effect on 
relative child dependency ratios.  In the absence of dwindling international donor 
support, this effect will be even greater if the countries with unchanging fertility rates 
tend to be countries that also have limited economic resources. 
 Fourth, understanding inequality patterns among children is extrinsically 
important in its own right.  Yet, as Eloundou-Enyegue and Rehman (2009) argue, 
inequality among children is also important because it foretells future patterns of 
inequality because the momentum for inequality among tomorrow‘s adults is built in 
within the current cohorts of children.  Inequality among children, they submit, is like 
an ―entry point in the process of stratification‖. 
 Fifth, while it is important to understand the levels and trends in inequality 
among children, it is equally imperative to evaluate how these compare with those of 
other demographic groups such as adults.  Similarly, given that global inequality 
studies always single out SSA as a distinctive continent, it is helpful to quantify to 
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what extent the continent itself differs and how children‘s wellbeing varies across the 
sub region. 
Overall, inequality among children in SSA assumes greater significance 
because divergence is occurring in a context where basic needs are not yet met.  
Therefore, not only are children growing up poor, they also are witnessing 
unprecedented levels of inequality in the distribution of material and other social 
resources.  At a time when the world has standardized expectations for children‘s 
welfare including their rights to education (UN 1948, UN 1960; UN 1989, UN 2000), 
it is important to continually check how well political commitment is matched by 
substantive progress, especially how the social progress equalizes the playing field for 
children across countries.   
 
7.3 Current Inequality 
I begin by describing the current inequalities in childrearing across SSA 
countries. Figure 7.1 shows Lorenz curves for the distribution of the region‘s overall 
population and gross domestic product (Panel A), and for the distribution of the 
regions‘ children and resources available to children as at 2007, the most recent year 
for which data was available (Panel B).  These curves are derived from ranking 
countries by their population sizes (x-axis) and then plotting the y-axis to represent the 
share of the region‘s population found in the bottom 5%, 10% etc.  The same is done 
for regional income.  Similarly, countries are ranked by the size of their economies (x-
axis) and the y-axis plots the proportion of resources found in say the bottom 5% or 
10% of countries.  The core idea is that if there is perfect equality, all observations 
will lay on the diagonal, that is, 5% of the countries control 5% of the population or 
resources respectively.   
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Panel A 
 
Panel B 
 
 
 
FIGURE 7. 1. Lorenz Curves for the distribution of sub Saharan African 
Population and GDP (Panel A) and the distribution of sub Saharan African 
children, and resources for children (Panel B) 
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The magnitude of inequality (which is also the basis for the derivation of the Gini 
index) equals the area between the Lorenz curve and the line of equality.  Clearly, the 
Lorenz curves in Figure 1 depart significantly from the point of equality both for the 
overall population (Panel A) and for the children (Panel B).  For instance, the bottom 
half (50%) of sub Saharan African countries contain 10% of the region‘s population 
and control only 8% of the region‘s income or GDP.  Similarly, the burden of child 
rearing is not evenly spread across the African continent, neither are resources located 
in countries with proportionate child population sizes.  Rather, the bottom 50% of 
countries contains 10% of the region‘s children and control only 7% of the region‘s 
resources allocated to children.  
Another way to examine how the burden of child rearing is spread across sub 
Saharan Africa is to look at individual countries, and what proportion of the region‘s 
children are located therein compared to the proportion of the region‘s resources 
(education budgets) available in that respective country.  Appendix A1 captures how 
the 41 study countries rank in terms of the size of the children‘s population as at 2007.  
Column 4 of this table ranks the region‘s countries according to their resource ratios – 
how an index country‘s resources per child differ from the region‘s average. A quick 
look at this table reveals striking dissimilarities.  For instance, Nigeria contains a fifth 
of the region‘s child population yet its resource ratio (0.18) falls way below the 
region‘s population weighted average.  Other countries that carry a heavier load of the 
region‘s children include Ethiopia (11.7%), Kenya (6.4%), Uganda (6.2%), South 
Africa (5.6%), and Madagascar (4.3%). Of these countries, Kenya‘s resource ratio is 
just over the region‘s average (1.1) and therefore it could work as a useful benchmark 
against which we can measure the performance of other countries.  Unsurprisingly, 
South Africa spends over six times resources per each child compared to the region‘s 
average.  Other countries that control fairly high resource ratios include; Mauritius 
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(10.7), Botswana (7.5), Swaziland (4.9), Cape Verde (4.0) Namibia (3.3), Lesotho 
(2.7), Gabon (2.4), Angola (1.3).  On the other hand some countries with a heavy child 
rearing burden have to educate their children using fairly modest resources.  For 
instance, the resource ratios for Ethiopia (0.53), Uganda (0.38), and Madagascar (0.16) 
fall way below the region‘s average.  Conversely, other than South Africa and Angola, 
most of the countries with high resource ratios are raising a very small proportion of 
the sub continent‘s children; Mauritius (0.1%), Botswana (0.2%), Swaziland (0.1%), 
Cape Verde (0.07%), Namibia (0.3%), Lesotho (0.3%), Gabon, (0.2%).   
 Overall, the sub continent‘s children are concentrated in just a handful of 
countries.  Specifically, over 55% of African children are located in just six countries 
(Nigeria, Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda, South Africa, and Madagascar) out of the 41 in the 
study sample.  On the contrary, almost 16 countries contain less than 1% each of the 
continent‘s children (Togo, The Republic of Congo, Liberia, Central African 
Republic, Mauritania, Namibia, Lesotho, Guinea Bissau, Gabon, Botswana, The 
Gambia, Swaziland, Mauritius, Comoros, Equatorial Guinea, and Cape Verde).  
Another ten countries each contain between 1 to 2% of the sub continent‘s children 
(Zimbabwe, Mali, Burkina Faso, Senegal, Burundi, Benin, Niger, Sierra Leone, Chad, 
and Guinea).  Another handful of countries have between 2 and less than 4% each of 
the sub continent‘s children (Mozambique, Sudan, Ghana, Cameroon, Malawi, 
Zambia, Angola, Rwanda, and Cote d‘Ivoire).  Therefore, it is clear that the child 
population is very unevenly distributed and so are economic resources.  This fact is 
further revealed by summary measures of inequality that I present below. 
 
7.4 Levels and Trends in Resource Inequality 
This section addresses the two interrelated questions: how much resource 
inequality exists among African children, and have inequality levels changed over 
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time?    Figure 7.2 (top panel) shows the levels and trends in resource inequality.  As 
at 2007, resource inequality among children was (0.63) for MLD, (0.7) for the Theil 
Index, (0.59) for the Gini Coefficient.  The squared coefficient of variation stood at 
(2.37) (Figure 7.2 middle panel).  However, if one excludes South Africa from the 
sample, the MLD for 2007 drops by 53%  to (0.41), if one excludes Nigeria inequality 
drops by 16% (0.54), and finally if both South Africa and Nigeria are omitted,  
resource inequality among children located in the remaining  39 countries declines 
from 0.63 to 0.32 [Figure 7.2 lower Panel].  In other words, I still observe relatively 
high levels of educational resource inequality among African children even after 
accounting for the influences of South Africa (large child population and immense 
resources), or Nigeria (20% of the region‘s child population and limited resources).  
 
How did income inequality among African children change over time?  For the 
overall period (1971 to 2007), the MLD increased by 89% from 0.33 to 0.63; the Gini 
coefficient increased by 34% from 0.44 to 0.59, the Theil index increased by 79% 
from about 0.39 to about 0.70 and finally the squared coefficient of variation increased 
from about 1.22 to about 2.4%.  Also, the data reveals a steep increase in inequality 
across all indices between 1971 and about the turn of the century (1999).  The MLD 
more than doubled from its 1971 level of 0.33 to about 0.84 in 1999.  In the same 
period, the Theil index also increased from 0.39 to 0.75, the Gini coefficient increased 
from 0.44 to 0.64 while the squared coefficient of Variation increased from 1.22 to 
2.16.  It is unclear if this sharp increase is real or could be a data artifact?  Even if one 
takes the latter explanation, and considers inequality for the recent period (between 
2000 and 2007) for which one can have higher comfort levels with data quality, one 
still observes very high levels of inequality in the distribution of resources among 
Africa children 
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FIGURE 7. 2. Trends in Resource Inequality Among Children (1971-2007) 
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7.5. Children versus Adult Trends 
How do observed inequality trends among children compare with adult trends?  
The top panel of Figure 7.3 shows the absolute values of resource inequality among 
the whole sub Saharan African population compared to the trends for children.  The 
bottom panel shows the ratio of adult versus children‘s population.  The data indicates 
that regardless of time period, resource inequality among children is about double the 
level observed for the rest of the population.  Clearly, this evidence reflects how 
children‘s experiences are distinctive to those of adults and therefore it would be 
erroneous to draw inferences on inequality patterns without looking at children as a 
subgroup. 
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7.6. Drivers of Inequality 
What factors drive the observed changes in inequality?  I apply decomposition 
techniques to apportion the change in inequality into the influences changes in the 
child population size, child dependency ratios, size of each nation‘s GDP, and also to 
changes in the proportion of the GDP that is allocated to children. First, we know that 
sub Saharan African economies widely differ in size, as well as in the share of the sub 
continent‘s children located therein.  What needs further elaboration is how nations 
differ in terms of what proportion of their GDP they spend on children‘s education. 
Unsurprisingly, the data shows a clear gradient that ranges from the countries that 
spend high proportions (>5%) of their income on education (Lesotho, The Sudan, 
Botswana, Namibia, Swaziland, and Kenya) and those that spend low proportions -- 
less than 2% (Guinea, Central African Republic, Chad, Nigeria, and Equatorial 
Guinea).  The rest of the sub continent lies between 2 and 5% in terms of average 
educational allocations in the last decade (Figure 7.4).  
What is profound, however, is the extent to which countries that are almost 
identical in the size of their economies, and the burden of child rearing may differ 
significantly in how much of their income is spent on children (Appendix A2).  If one 
ranks African countries in order of the size of their economies, their child populations, 
and then their budgetary allocation to children, interesting similarities and striking 
differences can be observed.  Take for instance Burkina Faso and Malawi.  These have 
similar sized economies, child populations (6.7 million), and dedicate similar
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FIGURE 7.4. Comparative Education Expenditures in sub Saharan Africa (Average for 1998-2007) 
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proportion of their national budgets to children (4.5% and 4.3% respectively).  Yet, the 
reverse is true if one focuses on a different set of countries like Zimbabwe and Chad.  
Both countries have similar incomes, and similar child populations (about 5 million), 
but, Zimbabwe allocates 4.6% of its GDP to education compared to Chad (1.7).  
Assuming that these sets of countries are similar in all other dimensions, one would 
expect some level of divergence in the experiences of children.  The question then 
becomes -- To what extent does the economic and or demographic differentials drive 
the observed changes in inequality among African children? 
Table 7.1 shows results for inequality (MLD) decomposition for four distinct 
time periods: 1971-2007, 1980-1998; 1998-2003, and for 1980-2007.  But, I limit my 
description for the overall period from 1971 to 2007.  It appears that the increase in 
resource inequality among children was largely driven by both demographic and 
economic factors although the latter had a larger influence.  Differential economic 
growth accounted for (152%) while changes in budgetary allocation to children 
accounted for (-129%) although these two worked in opposite directions.  While 
economic growth tended to increase inequality, changes in budgetary allocation to 
children tended to reduce inequality.  A significant component of the increase (103%) 
in inequality came about because of the changes in the distribution of child rearing 
across the continent while differentials in population size worked to reduce levels of 
inequality (-26%). 
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TABLE 7.1. Decomposition Results for the Drivers of Resource Inequality 
Increase Among African Children 
 
 
Period 
Population 
Size 
Age 
Structure 
GDP per 
Capita 
Allocation to 
Education Total 
1971-2007 -0.036 0.141 0.208 -0.177 0.137 
 [-26%] [103%] [152%] [-129%]  
      
1980-1998 -0.017 0.086 0.165 -0.073 0.160 
 [-11%] [53%] [103%] [9%]  
      
1998-2003 -0.007 0.039 -0.079 -0.126 -0.172 
 [4%] [-22%] [46%] [-30%]  
      
1980-2007 -0.035 0.164 0.161 -0.248 0.042 
 [-82%] [387%] [382%] [-588%]  
            
 
 
The above section discussed the levels, trends and drivers of resource 
inequality among children.  To the extent that the sub continent continues to witness 
divergence in the amount of resources available to children, to what extent do these 
mirror patterns of other social outcomes such as health. This is the focus of the next 
section.  
 
7.7. Trends in Health Inequality 
The evidence shows very low levels of inequality in child mortality across 
African countries and this result is robust across three measures of inequality; the 
Theil index, the coefficient of variation, and the MLD (Figure 7.5). 
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FIGURE 7. 5. Trends in Mortality Inequality (1980-2008) 
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While the evidence on inter country mortality inequality shows a high level of 
convergence, further analysis of mortality patterns within countries reflects an 
opposite trend – divergence.   
I use DHS data (71 surveys from 35 countries) to examine the extent to which 
deaths of children between age 1 and age 5 depend on household wealth.  For each 
country, DHSs classifies households into five distinct wealth categories.   I therefore 
estimate simple linear regression models with IMR as the dependent variable and 
wealth quintile as the explanatory variable.  For the majority of the countries and 
surveys, the evidence reveals a very strong positive linear relationship between child 
mortality and household wealth (see the β coefficients for the wealth quintiles in Table 
7.2).  For instance, countries that reveal the strongest positive
21
 linear wealth-mortality 
gradient include Senegal 1997, 2005 and 2008; Ghana 1993 & 2008; Cameroon 1998 
& 2004; South Africa 1998; Cote D‘Ivoire 1994; Mozambique 1997; Togo 1998; 
Guinea 1998; Nigeria 2008; and Uganda 2000-01.   
                                                             
21
 Adjusted R-Squared Values > 0.90 
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TABLE 7.2. Mortality Gradient Along SES Lines within Countries 
Country and Survey Year 
α child 
mortality 
β child 
mortality 
R² adj child 
mortality 
Benin 2001 108.84 -12.18 0.84 
Benin 1996 123.78 -12.08 0.63 
Burkina Faso 2003 140.7 -10.72 0.51 
Burkina Faso 1998/99 171.18 -14.84 0.61 
Cameroon 2004 111.07 -14.18 0.97 
Cameroon 1998 117.01 -15.83 0.94 
Cameroon 1991 120.37 -17.07 0.94 
CAR 1994-5 81.49 -6.21 0.78 
Chad 2004 80.36 5.98 0.16 
Comoros 1996 46.86 -5.56 0.69 
Congo Democratic 2007 93.84 -9.2 0.79 
Cote d'Ivoire 1998-99 115.12 -16.08 0.85 
Cote d'Ivoire 1994 97.82 -11.7 0.95 
Eritrea 2002 72.6 -7.22 0.39 
Eritrea 1995 110.46 -9.48 0.13 
Ethiopia 2005 68.46 -4.44 0.09 
Gabon 2000 47.96 -5.42 0.80 
Ghana 2008 53.85 -7.61 0.94 
Ghana 2003 68.77 -7.47 0.58 
Ghana 1998 80.06 -10.08 0.83 
Ghana 1993 107.27 -15.35 0.92 
Guinea 2005 128.46 -14.62 0.77 
Guinea 1999 143.66 -15.66 0.98 
Kenya 2003 59.13 -6.73 0.60 
Kenya 1998 57.74 -7.3 0.76 
Kenya 1993 52.67 -6.85 0.88 
Madagascar 2003-4 76.32 -11.16 0.85 
Madagascar 1997 99.01 -9.83 0.83 
Malawi 2004 96.83 -8.61 0.76 
Malawi 2000 127.94 -9.06 0.72 
Malawi 1992 151.62 -10.84 0.27 
Mali 2006 161.67 -16.39 0.33 
Mali 2001 171.26 -15.42 0.28 
Mali 1995-6 52.67 -6.85 0.88 
Mauritania 2000-01 56.4 -6.34 0.21 
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TABLE 7.2. (Continued)    
Country and Survey Year 
α child 
mortality 
β child 
mortality 
R² adj child 
mortality 
Mozambique 2003 76.91 -5.33 0 
Mozambique 1997 121.87 -13.95 0.95 
Namibia 2006-7 38.16 -5.84 0.77 
Namibia 2000 31.89 -3.51 0.05 
Namibia 1992 51.52 -6.34 0.73 
Niger 1998 240.65 -17.03 0.02 
Nigeria 2008 164.69 -26.17 0.98 
Nigeria 2003 205.67 -30.63 0.67 
Nigeria 1990 184.3 -25.78 0.98 
Rwanda 2005 122.1 -11.44 0.61 
Rwanda 2000 135.81 -11.47 0.86 
Senegal 2008-09 81.41 -14.57 0.96 
Senegal 2005 125.5 -20.22 0.99 
Senegal 1997 138.99 -21.91 0.90 
Sierra Leone 2008 70.99 -2.47 0.01 
South Africa 1998 32.26 -5.94 0.95 
Swaziland 2006-07 39.86 -2.88 0.12 
Tanzania 2004-5 205.67 -30.63 0.67 
Tanzania 1996 73.22 -5.92 0.39 
Togo 1998 109.94 -14.66 0.97 
Uganda 2000-01 108.67 -11.83 0.99 
Zambia 1996 116.44 -7.22 0.52 
Zimbabwe 1999 47.09 -5.01 0.67 
Zimbabwe 1994 40.51 -4.97 0.47 
    
min 31.89 -30.63 0.00 
max 240.65 5.98 0.99 
avg 101.99 -11.15 0.65 
stdev 47.60 6.80 0.31 
 
On the other hand, a few of the country surveys show either a weak 
relationship
22
 between mortality and wealth (see for instance Mozambique 2003; 
                                                             
22
 Adjusted R-Squared Values < 0.20 
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Sierra Leonne 2008; Niger 1998; Namibia 2000; Ethiopia 2005; Swaziland 2006/07; 
Eritrea 1995 and Chad 2004).  Finally, a handful of countries show a curvilinear 
relationship between child mortality and household wealth.  These include Burkina 
Faso 1993; Chad 1996/97; Congo Brazzaville 2005; Ethiopia 2000; Lesotho 2004; 
Liberia 2007 & 2009; Niger 2006; Rwanda 1992, Tanzania 1999; Zambia 2007; and 
Zimbabwe 2005-2006. These mixed experiences on the relationship between child 
mortality and household wealth within countries and over time raise a number of 
questions.  In particular, what are some of the contextual variables that account for 
observed differences in wealth mortality gradient?  For instance, research needs to 
determine whether, and in what ways observed mortality gradients along SES groups 
depend on the country‘s stage in demographic transition? These questions are subject 
for future research. 
 
7.8. Discussion 
Previous studies on the wellbeing of African children typically focused on 
poverty or on socio-economic inequality within countries.  While these studies are 
needed and helpful, they provide a partial picture of the emerging differentiation of 
African countries.  This study seeks to complement existing bodies of literature by 
placing inequality at the center of discourse on the wellbeing of African children 
across countries.  Specifically, I document levels and trends in income and mortality 
inequality, and account for factors that drive income inequality changes.  First, my 
analysis shows that while at global level income inequality among children is 
converging (Eloundou-Enyegue and Rehman 2009), the opposite is true for African 
countries.  Studies focused on other world regions, like the United States (Lichter and 
Eggebeen 1993; Ozawa and Lum 1996) found also high and worrisome divergence in 
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economic resources and social outcomes among children. Second, while mortality 
inequality at global level diverged over time (Eloundou-Enyegue and Rehman 2009), 
my analysis shows very little inequality in child survival across African countries.  
However, when I examined mortality inequality within countries, I observe steep 
gradients along socio-economic lines.  These results are contrary to the convergence 
recently observed within 22 Latin American countries (Sahn and Younger 2005).  
What remains unknown is what contextual factors explain the differences in the 
mortality gradient along socio-economic lines within sub Saharan African countries?  
Moreover, my analysis adds to existing literature that calls for examination of children 
as distinct demographic groups whose experiences may differ significantly to those of 
other sub populations such as adults or the elderly.  Similar to observations at the 
global level and the United States (Ozawa and Lum 1996; Eloundou-Enyegue and 
Rehman 2009), my evidence shows substantially higher levels of inequality among 
children compared to other adults suggesting that it is erroneous to infer children‘s 
trends from adult trends.  Last, most studies on global inequality highlight the 
exceptionalism of Africa, especially its tendency to drive levels and trends in overall 
income inequality or inequality among children (Svedberg 2004, Kenny 2005, 
Eloundou-Enyegue and Rehman 2009).  While this recognition is critical, it leaves 
―Africa‖ as a black box.  In other words, these studies do not go far enough to 
illustrate which African countries influence global trends in inequality, or shed light 
on internal differences among African countries themselves.  Indeed, my analysis 
shows that sub Saharan Africa does not provide an even playing field, at least for 
children.  Even after accounting for the influences of Nigeria and South Africa, 
substantial educational resource inequality exists across sub Saharan African countries 
– largely driven by differential economic performance, uneven fertility transitions that 
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shape child rearing burden across countries, and also government allocation to 
children‘s education.  Overall, my study provides a nuanced lens through which the 
wellbeing of African children can be evaluated.  Therefore, it is important to recognize 
how uneven economic trajectories and demographic transition have begun to, and will 
likely continue to shape the size and changes in socio-economic inequality among 
African children. 
 
7.9. Conclusion 
As African nations celebrate half a century of independence from colonial rule 
and the world evaluates how well each country is marching towards achieving the 
2015 Millennium Development targets, the discourse on children‘s wellbeing will 
likely center around issues of hunger, poverty, and access to schooling. A somewhat 
forgotten part of the puzzle is to what extent African countries themselves are 
becoming dissimilar economically over time (Kandiwa 2006), and much less on how 
children‘s economic resources and social outcomes could be diverging across 
countries.   This study attempts to provide an alternative perspective to the experiences 
of African children.  While the scope and drivers of poverty are well appreciated, I 
submit that resource inequality among children across sub Saharan Africa is not only 
high, but remains grossly underappreciated.  While child mortality inequality 
converged across African countries, within countries, socio-economic status shapes 
patterns of child survival.  On the other hand, educational resource inequality among 
children increased from the 1970s before peaking around 1999 and tapering slightly 
thereafter.  After accounting for the influences of Nigeria and South Africa, 
educational resource inequality among African children remains high.  Notably, 
educational resource inequality among children is more than double the rates for 
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adults and decomposition results reveal that differential economic growth, differences 
in budgetary allocation to children, and changes in child rearing burdens across 
countries drive observed trends in inequality while child population size per se has 
little effect.  Overall, the extent to which these patterns will continue largely depends 
on the pace of ongoing demographic transitions which will in turn shape population 
age structure. Future inequality might also depend on economic factors such as GDP 
growth and the share of that amount which is allocated to children. Future research on 
structural factors that shape stratification patterns among African children could 
identify contextual factors that account for the differences in the mortality gradients 
along socio-economic lines within countries, estimate trends in inequality for other 
social outcomes such as educational attainment, or evaluate the effectiveness of 
existing public policies and private strategies aimed at buffering inequality among 
children.   
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CHAPTER 8 
MITIGATING INEQUALITY: CHILD FOSTERAGE IN SUB SAHARAN 
AFRICA 
 
8.1 Introduction 
Recent studies show that while global income inequality between countries 
declined in the last two decades (Firebaugh and Goesling 2004 and others), the trend 
in sub Saharan Africa went in the opposite direction (Kandiwa 2006).  Even more 
disturbing, Chapter 8 highlights emerging income and health inequalities among 
children in sub Saharan Africa, a trend that might fuel future inequality. The question 
that arises is: what institutional arrangements are available to buffer these inequalities 
among children in sub Saharan Africa?  In a perfect world, each African country 
would have universal and effective formal social safety nets that cover the needs of 
children from less fortunate backgrounds.  These safety nets may include cash 
transfers, in kind transfers such as food relief, or public works (Munro 2005).  In 
reality, however, most African countries have missing or inadequate formal social 
safety nets.  Where safety nets exist, they are prone to targeting problems where they 
either excessively cover non eligible individuals, or conversely where they fail to 
reach deserving populations (Cornia and Stewart 1993).  In the absence of universal 
and effective formal social safety nets, who steps in to buffer inequality among 
children?   
Historically the African extended family system was the primary mechanism 
through which families shared the burden of child rearing.  In that context, fertility is a 
national burden not an individual choice.  Individuals who bear more children often 
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distribute their progeny among relatives with fewer children or to those with more 
economic resources.  In some ways, this may suggest that in Africa there really is no 
room for individual affluence because the burden of child rearing is shared.  As such, a 
national fertility regime, rather than an individual one, matters because over time, all 
children end up being raised by someone within their extended family line. Over time 
however, economic downturns, fertility transitions, and cultural changes raised 
questions about the continued effectiveness of this institution.   Can the African 
extended family system be relied upon to continue to buffer inequality among 
children?  This chapter seeks to shed light on this question by asking the following 
questions: 
i) How prevalent is the practice of child fosterage and what factors explain cross 
country differences in scope of fosterage? 
ii) How effectively does the informal mechanism of child fosterage operate at 
national level and how has the effectiveness changed over time within and 
across countries? 
iii)  Does fosterage effectiveness vary across gender?  
iv) What contextual factors explain observed differences in fosterage effectiveness 
across countries in sub Saharan Africa? 
These questions are pertinent and timely because they provide key insights on an 
institutional mechanism that cares for African children even if its relevance is seldom 
acknowledged in the literature.  Results show that child fosterage is still widespread in 
sub Saharan Africa, where between one in ten and up to one in three children grow up 
in a household without their biological parents.  Still, some countries, especially those 
in West Africa show significant declines in the proportions of fostered children 
(Rwanda Niger, Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, 
151 
 
Madagascar) while percentages  in East Africa remain unchanged (Eritrea) or 
increased in a few countries (Nigeria, Namibia, Malawi, Zambia, Zimbabwe and to a 
lesser extent Kenya, Mali, Rwanda, and Tanzania).  Unsurprisingly, multivariate 
analysis shows that HIV/AIDS prevalence and GDP per capita are positively 
associated with fosterage prevalence.  Further, results show that ‗the invisible hand of 
child fosterage‘ has largely been effective in distributing children across family types 
even if there is a large variation in the level of effectiveness across countries and 
between genders.  Multivariate analysis identifies factors that explain why some 
countries are better at channeling children within the extended family system in ways 
that may buffer inequality.  Economic performance (GDP growth) in prior years is 
significantly associated with changes in fosterage effectiveness.  Further, I find strong 
evidence for regional differences in fosterage effectiveness.  West and Central African 
countries are significantly less effective in distributing children at national level 
compared to East African countries.  No significant difference is found between 
fosterage effectiveness of Southern and East Africa countries.  These results help us 
understand the internal functioning of the African extended family system.  Given the 
sheer scope of coverage of this system, future research on the wellbeing of African 
children should examine other dimensions of this system.    
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows.  First, I briefly discuss the 
conceptual framework and theoretical expectations that guide my analysis.  I then 
present findings on levels and determinants of fosterage prevalence.  Third, I discuss 
findings on fosterage effectiveness across countries over time.  I also elaborate on 
differences in fosterage effectiveness between boys and girls. Last, I present 
multivariate regression results on the correlates of fosterage effectiveness.  A 
conclusion then follows. 
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8.2. Conceptual Framework and Theoretical Expectations 
In Chapter 4 I discuss in detail the salience of the African extended family in 
buffering inequality among children.  Essentially, if the African extended family 
represents an important institutional arrangement for the care of children, it should (i) 
provide wide and non discriminatory coverage, (ii) ensure that fostered children 
receive adequate care within the households where they are raised, and finally (iii) 
occur in ways that move children from less fortunate backgrounds to households 
where they would likely enhance their chances of survival, schooling, and 
socialization.   
 First, what can we say about the scope of coverage of the extended family 
system?  Has it remained high, low, or unchanged over time and why?  Seminal 
studies (Isiugo-Abanihe 1985) as well as more recent analyses (Mensch 1999) identify 
high levels of child fosterage in sub Saharan Africa.  However, other scholars 
(Madhavan 2004) recently raised questions about how well the extended family 
system could continue to provide care to as many children as it has done in the past.  
Several factors suggest that the scope of coverage of the extended family system could 
be in gradual or even precipitous decline.  On the one hand, cultural transformations 
and adoption of Western practices may have led affluent middle class families to 
embrace nuclear family structures where they focus on their biological children only, 
reducing the level of altruistic fosterage.  Second, even if the wealthier middle class 
families wanted to foster children, perhaps economic downturns limit their ability to 
do so.  All this is occurring at a time when fertility transitions within countries unfold 
unevenly in such a way that middle class women are bearing fewer and fewer children 
compared to poorer women. As such, if indeed Westernization and family nucleation 
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are gaining ground, and economic austerity restrict altruistic behavior, the largest 
burden of child rearing will in future fall among the households that are least capable 
to provide sufficient care for those children. In that regard, the extended family system 
could be on a decline. 
 Second, even if the extended family system still offers refuge to a large 
proportion of children, how deeply can it support these children?  This question has 
not escaped the attention of social scientists.  Rather, a significant body of literature 
examines the care, education, and health outcomes of fostered children compared to 
biological children in sub Saharan Africa (see for instance Bledsoe et al 1988; Bledsoe 
and Brandon 1992; Foster 2000; Gage 2000; Kobiane et al. 2005).  Together, this body 
of literature sheds light on microlevel effectiveness of the African extended family 
system as it explores what occurs within households and what difference it makes on 
the wellbeing of fostered children, including orphans.  But, I argue that these studies 
only offer a partial analysis. A more complete evaluation requires attention to the 
scope of coverage but also to the quality of care at micro level, and to patterns of 
macrolevel flows.  While the first two have been addressed in the literature, the 
missing component is the bird’s eye view on the effectiveness of the extended family 
system at national level.  In other words, if you take a single country at a given point 
in time and look at the stock of fostered children – in what family types are these 
children growing up?  Do fostered children move from households of large sibship to 
those with smaller sibship sizes?  Do they move from economically deprived 
households to households of better wealth standing? Or, is it the case that the 
Hamilton Rule observed by Case et al (2004) obtains – where the opportunities for 
fosterage accrue along familial lines only, rather than to the neediest in society? 
Further, do these fosterage flows differ along gender lines? These additional questions 
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are critical because they also contribute to shape the effectiveness of the extended 
family system at the macro level.  Ongoing economic downturns, cultural 
transformations and westernization could portend negative outcomes for child 
fosterage patterns at the macro level.   
The effectiveness of African solidarity networks in equalizing opportunities 
among children depends on the directionality of flows at macro level.  In other words, 
to what extent does the African extended family system able to distribute children in 
ways that hold potential for improving their wellbeing.   Specifically, does the system 
systematically channel fostered children in ways that concentrates them in particular 
family types?    
Figure 8.1 shows three ways in which the extended family system may 
circulate children within a national context; Circulation, stepwise convergence, and 
convergence.   
 
      Source: Eloundou-Enyegue and Kandiwa (2007) 
FIGURE 8.1. Three Theoretical Modes for Children’s Circulation at Macro-
Level 
Circulation 
Step-Wise Convergence 
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First, consider family hierarchies organized according to family size or socio-
economic status.  It may be the case that the system channels children from larger and 
poor families to be fostered in equally endowed households.   
This scenario, circulation, is inequality enhancing because children end up no better 
than they began.  Secondly, it may be the case that the system channels children from 
a socio-economic strata directly below to one above in a step-wise sequential manner.  
This scenario has moderate potential for bridging the inequality gap.   
Third, it may also be the case that children from the lowest socio-economic 
groups leap frog the intermediate strata and end up growing up with the smallest and 
most economically endowed households.  Theoretically one would expect this 
scenario to lead to convergence in opportunities available to children.  Needless to say, 
the directionality of flows is a necessary but insufficient condition for convergence 
because ultimately, it will depend on micro-level dynamics within the destination 
homes.  Yet, it‘s equally important to understand whether fostered children are largely 
overrepresented in inferior family types.  Last, the three modes describes above 
suggest an upward flow.  Yet, in reality it need not be so because possibly the system 
may also channel children in the reverse direction but following the same patterns of 
stepwise or convergence. I hypothesize that macro level fosterage flows tend to 
―circulate‖ children in household not unlike their original birth places, and that the 
quality of macro level flows within countries does not significantly differ between 
boys and girls. Next I present results on levels and determinants of fosterage 
prevalence. 
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8.3. Prevalence and Change in Child Fosterage Levels 
In the past, the limited availability of data limitations made it extremely 
difficult to conduct historical or comparative analyses of child fosterage.  This 
limitation is increasingly overcome with Macro International‘s Demographic and 
Health Surveys, which periodically collect information on household characteristics, 
including relatedness and residence status of children in a household.    
Figure 8.2 shows the most recent estimates of fosterage prevalence among 10-
14 year olds in up to 35 sub Saharan African countries. Results show that the extended 
family system is still a core institutional arrangement for the care of children in sub 
Saharan Africa.  Between one in ten (for instance Eritrea, Niger, Burkina Faso, Mali, 
Nigeria, and Ethiopia) and up to over one in three (for instance Namibia, Swaziland, 
Zimbabwe, Sierra Leone, Liberia, South Africa, Zambia, Lesotho, and Malawi) 
children grow up in a household with neither of their biological parents.  Additionally, 
the results show that fosterage increases with child age – a smaller proportion of 
children of younger ages (0-2 year olds) live in households without their biological 
parents compared to older children.  This is true of most countries except for 
Swaziland and Namibia that reflect double digit percentages for these toddlers.  
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FIGURE 8.2. Fosterage Prevalence (10-14 year olds) across sub Saharan African Countries: Most Recent Surveys 
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Table 8.1 shows how fosterage rates changed over time, and how they vary across age 
groups.  The table shows fosterage levels captured in 79 surveys across 33 countries.  Of these 
countries, 22 countries have more than one survey providing up to 40 data points on changes in 
fosterage within countries over time.  As expected, changes in fosterage rates vary across 
countries with some countries witnessing declines, while in other countries fosterage rates 
remained unchanged or even increased.  For consistency, I examine changes in fosterage rates 
among 10-14 year old children in respective countries.  The steepest decline (-19%) occurs in 
Niger between 1998 and 2006 while the highest increase (38%) occurs in Zimbabwe between 
1999 and 2005.  Countries showing declines include Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Ethiopia, 
Ghana, Guinea, Madagascar, and Rwanda.  Countries where fosterage rates remained largely 
unchanged include Zambia (between 1992 and 1996), Kenya (between 1993 and 1998), and 
Eritrea (between 1995 and 2002).  Countries where more and more children are growing up in 
households without their biological parents include Nigeria (27% increase between 1999 and 
2003); Namibia (25% increase between 1992 and 2000); Malawi (19% increase between 1992 
and 2000), and Zambia (18% increase between 1996 and 2001).  Kenya, Mali, Rwanda and 
Tanzania also witnessed modest increases in the number of fostered children.  In short, these 
statistics reflect the wide diversity of experiences across sub Saharan African countries.  The 
question that arises is: why is it that some countries have a higher proportion of fostered children 
compared to others? 
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TABLE 8.1.  Child Fosterage Prevalence by Age Group 
 
Age Group (%) 
Change between Survey Periods 
(10-14) 
  0-2  3--5 6--9 10--14 Nominal %  
Benin 2006 1.4  8.1 14.3 18.3 -3.1 -14.5% 
Benin 2001  1.5  9.5 16.7 21.4 -1.7 -7.4% 
Benin 1996  1.1  8.9 18.5 23.1   
Burkina Faso 2003   0.8  5.5 10.8 13.7 -3.2 -18.9% 
Burkina Faso 1993  0.6  6.7 12.6 16.9   
Cameroon 2004  3.6  11.8 17.5 21.6 0.9 4.3% 
Cameroon 1998  3.1  9.6 15.6 20.7 -0.5 -2.4% 
Cameroon 1991  2.4  9.3 15 21.2   
CAR 1994-95  1.9  10.1 19.4 23.6   
Chad 2004  1.3  7.5 10.8 15.9 -0.5 -3.0% 
Chad 1996-97  1.5  6.7 12.9 16.4   
Comoros 1996  4.7  15.9 20 23.8   
Congo 
(Brazzaville) 2005  3.1 
 
10 15.9 22.5   
Congo DRC 2007  3.1  9.1 12.1 19.8   
Cote d'Ivoire 1994  2.1  11 16.8 25.7   
Eritrea 2002  1.2  2.6 6 9.1 0.1 1.1% 
Eritrea 1995  1.4  3.2 6 9   
Ethiopia 2005  1.5  5.2 9.7 13.9 -2.8 -16.8% 
Ethiopia 2000  2.1  7.5 11.5 16.7   
Gabon 2000  6.7  14.3 20.1 22.1   
Ghana 2008  4.4  12.6 18.1 23.3 -1 -4.1% 
Ghana 2003  2.4  12.1 18 24.3 0.7 3.0% 
Ghana 1998  2.6  12 18.8 23.6 1.1 4.9% 
Ghana 1993  2.1  11.5 17.4 22.5   
Guinea 2005  1.6  11.7 15.8 19.1 -1.2 -5.9% 
Guinea 1999  2.5  11.3 16.9 20.3   
Kenya 2003  2.2  8 12.5 16.3 2.2 15.6% 
Kenya 1998  2.6  7.4 11.1 14.1 0.2 1.4% 
Kenya 1993  3.1  6 10.3 13.9   
Lesotho 2004  9.2  22.3 24.8 29.5   
Liberia 2007  6.8  16.3 23.2 29.7   
Madagascar 2008-09  2.8  9.2 13.1 18.2 1.3 7.7% 
Madagascar 2003-04  3.5  10.1 13.2 16.9 0.5 3.0% 
Madagascar 1997  2.6  10.3 12.7 16.4 -0.6 -3.5% 
Madagascar 1992  2.1  8.5 11.5 17   
Malawi 2004  3  12.5 22.2 28.3 1.6 6.0% 
Malawi 2000  2.8  11.5 19 26.7 4.2 18.7% 
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TABLE 8.1 (CONTINUED) 
  Age Group (%) 
Change between Survey Periods 
(10-14) 
  0-2  3--5 6--9 10--14 Nominal %  
Malawi 1992  2.2  9.9 15.3 22.5   
Mali 2006  1.7  7.5 10.8 15 0.5 3.4% 
Mali 2001  1.4  7.3 10.6 14.5 1.7 13.3% 
Mali 1995-96  1.3  7.6 11.3 12.8   
Mauritania 2000-01  3.7  11.6 13.2 15.9   
Mozambique 2003  2.3  8.7 15.9 21.6 -0.3 -1.4% 
Mozambique 1997  2  8.8 13.9 21.9   
Namibia 2006-07  14.4  31.3 35.4 42.8 0.6 1.4% 
Namibia 2000  15.1  30 37.6 42.2 8.4 24.9% 
Namibia 1992  16.1  30.8 32 33.8   
Niger 2006  3.3  9.9 12.2 13.2 -3.1 -19.0% 
Niger 1998  2.7  12.3 14.5 16.3 -1.8 -9.9% 
Niger 1992  3.8  12 15 18.1   
Nigeria 2008  1.9  6.7 10.6 14.6 -2.7 -15.6% 
Nigeria 2003  2.3  7.8 12.1 17.3 3.7 27.2% 
Nigeria 1999  1.9  6.4 10.8 13.6   
Rwanda 2005   2  7.6 12.5 21.1 -0.1 -0.5% 
Rwanda 2000  2.1  9 16.9 21.2   
Senegal 2005  2.3  10.6 16.4 19.5 2.1 12.1% 
Senegal 1992-93  2.2  9.9 14.6 17.4   
Sierra Leone 2008  8.5  21.4 25.9 30.9   
South Africa 1998  13.2  22.7 27.4 29.6   
Swaziland 2006-07  14.7  30.2 34 37.5   
Tanzania 2004-05  2.9  10.2 14.4 21 0.2 1.0% 
Tanzania 1999  2.6  11.1 17 20.8 1.4 7.2% 
Tanzania 1996  3.3  12.9 16.3 19.4 1 5.4% 
Tanzania 1991-92  2.7  10.7 15.3 18.4   
Togo 1998  2  10.5 17.8 24.3   
Uganda 2006  4.4  14.3 21.5 26.2 0.7 2.7% 
Uganda 2000-01  3.6  12.1 20.1 25.5 -1.1 -4.1% 
Uganda 1995  3.9  14.1 20.6 26.6   
Zambia 2007  2.5  9.8 18.2 29.6 2.4 8.8% 
Zambia 2001-02  3  9.5 18.5 27.2 4.2 18.3% 
Zambia 1996  2  10.9 17.3 23 0.3 1.3% 
Zambia 1992  3.3  11.2 15.8 22.7   
Zimbabwe 2005-06  7.7  21 29.4 34 9.3 37.7% 
Zimbabwe 1999  6.5  17.3 23.3 24.7 2 8.8% 
Zimbabwe 1994  7.1  17 18.4 22.7     
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TABLE 8.1 (CONTINUED) 
*Fosterage refers to children living with neither of their biological parents, including orphans 
Source: Macro International Inc, 2011. MEASURE DHS STATcompiler. 
http://www.measuredhs.com, January 31 2011. 
 
8.3.1 Determinants of Fosterage Rates 
What factors explain the variation in child fosterage rates across countries?  
Theoretically, I expect that demographic, economic, cultural and geographic factors could 
explain observed differences in fosterage rates. First, I expect that countries with high youth 
dependency rates contain a larger stock of needy children and therefore will tend to have higher 
fosterage rates.  This is also partly possible because of the nature of uneven fertility transitions 
that are occurring in countries where women who still bear five or more children tend to be the 
ones least able to raise the children.  On the other hand, I expect that the orphan crisis spurred by 
HIV/AIDS mortality increases the stock of children in need of fosterage opportunities.  
Logically, I expect countries with higher rates of HIV/AIDS prevalence to have higher rates of 
fosterage all other things held constant.  Second, cultural shifts spurred by urbanization could 
also affect the rates of fosterage.  The relationship could be mediated by a number of reasons.  
First, as more families move to urban areas it could signal a decline in the demand for fosterage 
by children who often move from rural to urban areas in search of better educational 
opportunities because they would have moved with their own families.  Second, increased 
literacy (or a desire for literacy) may lead families to choose smaller nuclear households than to 
foster and have more children among which the family budget is shared.  Third, for historical 
reasons (many of which would be hard to determine a priori), some parts of Africa could be more 
likely to foster children than other.  Last, I expect economic factors to affect the levels of 
fosterage in a country.  Economic downturns or expectation of downturns in the future might 
dampen the willingness of households to foster children. Further, the level of income inequality 
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within countries matters as well.  On the one hand, sending families see the need to out foster 
their children to wealthier relatives.  Yet, on the other hand, perhaps the rich may be least likely 
to foster so therefore the sign and magnitude of this variable could go either way.  The quality of 
government performance is another potential factor.  Assuming transparent governments spend 
national resources equitably, one could expect that average families may be less prone to out 
foster their children because they probably have adequate social amenities in their local 
environments. 
  I draw on the World Bank‘s World Development Indicators database to obtain national 
statistics for variables that explain the variation in fosterage rates across countries. A note on the 
process of estimating the multivariate regression model is in order here.  I begin from the 
standpoint that observed rates of fosterage in a particular country in a given year are a result of 
decision taken by families in previous years given their lived economic and social experiences at 
that time.  As such, I lag the explanatory variables by taking the average figure of the last five 
years preceding each DHS survey in each respective year.  Given that the DHS surveys are 
collected in different years, building this dataset required slow and careful iterations for each 
country, and for each survey year.   Table 8.2 shows results from the multivariate analysis. 
Model 1 examines whether youth dependency and HIV prevalence is significantly 
associated with changes in fosterage prevalence.  As expected, HIV prevalence is positively 
associated with changes in fosterage rates. Surprisingly, youth dependency is negatively 
associated with fosterage prevalence however this effect wanes after control for other variables 
in subsequent models.  HIV prevalence retains a significant positive relationship even for the full 
Model 6.  Urbanization has no effect on fosterage rates.  Literacy rates seem to have a significant 
positive relationship with fosterage prevalence but this effect fades away when geographical and 
economic factors are controlled.  In other words, countries in West Africa and Southern Africa 
 TABLE 8.2. Factors Associated with Change in Fosterage Prevalence 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6   
  Demographic Cultural Region Economic Inequality Democracy  
Variable Beta     Beta     Beta     Beta     Beta     Beta     
Main Effects                          
Youth Dependency -0.951 [-.346] *** -0.802 [-.289] * 0.040 [.014]   -0.025 [-0.009]   -0.077 [-0.028]   -223 [-.089]  
HIV Prevalence 0.496 [.530] *** 0.340 [.363] ** 0.269 [.287] ** 0.313 [.335]   0.323 [.346]   0.408 [.548] ** 
                          
Cultural                         
Urbanization     -0.032 [-.063]   0.037 [.073]   0.022 [.043]   0.010 [.020]   0.031 [.073]  
Literacy     0.081 [.280] * 0.092 [.319] ** 0.091 [.314] * 0.076 [.262] † 0.066 [.287]  
                          
Regional Effects                         
West         1.108 [0.084]   1.277 [.096] *** 1.365 [.103]   0.906 [.092]  
Central         -0.352 [-0.017]   -0.509 [-.024] † -0.554 [-.026]   -2.981 [-.184]  
South         9.634 [0.460] *** 8.788 [.42] ** 6.497 [.310] ** 0.334 [.012]  
                          
Economic Effects                        
ln (GDPpc PPP)             0.231 [0.067]   0.287 [.083]   0.932 [.351] † 
GDP Growth Rate             -0.100 [-0.042]   -0.046 [-0.019]   -0.21 
[-
0.122]  
                          
Inequality                        
Gini Coefficient                 0.150 [.215] ** 0.001 [0.002]  
                          
Democracy                         
Transparency                      -2.623 [-.301] † 
                          
Constant 61.977 ***   52.839 **   11.557    13.355    9.725    26.777   
R. Sq Adjusted 0.461    0.470    0.599    0.587    0.614    0.399   
df 67     66     66     66     66     60     
†p <.1; * p <.05; **p <.01; ***p <.001 ;   Numbers in parentheses are standardized betas    
Dependent Variable: Fosterage rate for 10-14 year olds    
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are likely to foster more children than those in East Africa but this relationship is not 
statistically significant.  The full Model (Model 6) shows that GDP per capita is 
positively associated with fosterage rates.  That is, all things remaining constant, 
wealthier countries tend to have higher rates of fosterage.  Interestingly, Model 5, 
which examines the effect of inequality (Gini Coefficient), turns out significant and 
positive suggesting that if inequality rises in a country, families are more likely to 
foster, all other factors remaining constant.  But, this influence also wanes after 
control for democracy or transparency of government. Overall, only HIV prevalence, 
GDP per capita, and Transparency seem to be consistently associated with changes in 
fosterage levels within sub Saharan African countries. 
The above section discussed the levels and correlates of fosterage prevalence.  
But, how effectively does the extended family system buffer inequality among 
children by channeling them across various family types?  Addressing this question is 
the object of the next section. 
 
8.4. Fosterage Effectiveness 
Given the high prevalence of fosterage, it is useful to examine how well the 
system works at national level. This section explores evidence on the macro-level 
effectiveness and how it changes over time within and between countries. To explore 
these interrelated questions, I apply an index of demographic concentration to evaluate 
how effectively the extended family system channels children, at national level, 
among various family types.  Discussed in Chapter 7.5, the index of demographic 
concentration makes it possible to examine whether fostered children are 
overrepresented in large (small) sibship households compared to biological children or 
in wealthier (poorer) households.   
IC= (Oi - Ei) * ln(ri)         
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Where:  
IC=index of concentration; i=index group (family size in the case of demographic 
concentration);  Ei= percentage of children expected to be fostered into the group, if 
children were distributed proportionately according to group size; Specifically, E is 
the percentage of biological children in this (sibsize) group, relative to all biological 
children; Oi=percentage of children actually fostered in this group (out of all fostered 
children); ri= is the sibsize ratio; that is, group sibsize divided by average sibsize.   
 The index is calibrated for easy interpretation.  If fostered children are as likely 
to be in large households as they are to be in smaller households, the index value is 
zero.  If, on the other hand, fostered children are overrepresented in larger households 
compared to smaller ones then the index value is less than zero.  Conversely, if 
fostered children are overrepresented in smaller sibship households than large 
households, then the index value is greater than one. Thus, positive values indicate 
effective fosterage that tends to reduce inequality by selectively fostering children into 
households that have smaller sizes.   
DHS surveys collect data on family or household characteristics.  For each 
household, one can determine the household sibship size, relatedness of every 
household member, residence status of each member.  As such, for each survey, I 
select all children below the age of 14 and allocate them into respective household 
categories starting from a household with 0-1 child, to those with 10 children or more.   
Table 8.3 illustrates the distribution patterns for children in the top (South Africa, 
Namibia, Swaziland, and Congo Brazzaville) and bottom four countries (Benin, 
Ghana, Rwanda, and Senegal) in terms of fosterage effectiveness.  Each table 
represents a particular DHS survey in the respective country at a given point in time.  
As such, these eight surveys are a subset of the 79 surveys that I analyzed. 
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Each of the Tables in 8.4 has detailed information on the distribution of 
children across family types.  The last column (Ci) shows also in which family type 
fostered children are underrepresented (negative sign) or overrepresented (positive 
sign).  For instance, in South Africa in 1998, fostered children were underrepresented 
in just one type of family (sibsize 5) while in Namibia, they are underrepresented in 
families of sibsize 4 and 5.   
The sum of the Ci column gives the overall index of demographic 
concentration. In this case, the best four countries are South Africa (29.07), Swaziland 
(24.26), Swaziland (24.06), and Congo Brazzaville (22.44).  The countries that show 
negative concentration of fostered children include Senegal (-7.19), Ghana (-5.46), 
Benin (-1.93), and Rwanda (-0.95).  Overall, the index varies from the lowest index 
recorded for Senegal in 1997 (-7.19) to the highest index recorded for South Africa in 
1998 (29.07).  The mean index value is 9.74 with a standard deviation of 7.4.  
Because it is impossible to discuss each survey individually, Table 8.4 provides a 
quick summary of the levels and distribution of the index of demographic 
concentration across all 33 countries and how it changed over time in some countries 
with panel datasets.  Four countries reflect negative buffering for fostered children 
along demographic lines; Rwanda 2005 (-0.95), Ghana 1998 & 2003 (-5.46 and -1.07),  
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TABLE 8.3. Indices of Demographic Concentration of Fostered Children in Top 
and Bottom Four Countries 
South Africa 1998 
Sibsize Bio Fostered Relative Expected Observed      
  Kids   Group Size  (Ei)  (Oi) ri Ci 
1 1401 1056 2457 13.94 11.35 1.27 0.62 
2 2914 1828 4742 28.99 19.65 2.45 8.37 
3 2548 2018 4566 25.35 21.69 2.36 3.14 
4 1692 1452 3144 16.83 15.60 1.62 0.60 
5 858 1147 2005 8.54 12.33 1.04 -0.13 
6 326 736 1062 3.24 7.91 0.55 2.80 
7 193 535 728 1.92 5.75 0.38 3.75 
8 83 253 336 0.83 2.72 0.17 3.32 
9 10 143 153 0.10 1.54 0.08 3.65 
10 27 137 164 0.27 1.47 0.08 2.97 
Total 10052 9305 1936    29.07 
        
Namibia 2006/2007 
Sibsize Bio Fostered Relative Expected Observed      
  Kids   Group Size  (Ei)  (Oi) ri Ci 
1 1002 730 1732 13.84 8.60 1.10 0.50 
2 1812 1364 3176 25.02 16.06 2.02 6.30 
3 1736 1642 3378 23.97 19.33 2.15 3.55 
4 1226 1462 2688 16.93 17.21 1.71 -0.15 
5 669 1141 1810 9.24 13.43 1.15 -0.59 
6 463 845 1308 6.39 9.95 0.83 0.66 
7 164 536 700 2.26 6.31 0.44 3.28 
8 75 357 432 1.04 4.20 0.27 4.09 
9 50 166 216 0.69 1.95 0.14 2.51 
10 44 250 294 0.61 2.94 0.19 3.92 
Total 7241 8493 1573    24.06 
168 
TABLE 8.3. (CONTINUED) 
 
Swaziland 2006/07 
Sibsize Bio Fostered Relative Expected Observed      
  Kids   Group Size  (Ei)  (Oi) ri Ci 
1 427 331 758 10.20 6.83 0.84 -0.59 
2 810 658 1468 19.35 13.57 1.62 2.81 
3 964 860 1824 23.03 17.74 2.02 3.72 
4 804 740 1544 19.21 15.26 1.71 2.11 
5 625 675 1300 14.93 13.92 1.44 0.37 
6 288 540 828 6.88 11.14 0.92 0.37 
7 150 417 567 3.58 8.60 0.63 2.34 
8 61 235 296 1.46 4.85 0.33 3.78 
9 35 217 252 0.84 4.48 0.28 4.65 
10 22 176 198 0.53 3.63 0.22 4.71 
Total 4186 4849 904    24.26 
        
Congo Brazzaville 2005 
Sibsize Bio Fostered Relative Expected Observed      
  Kids   Group Size  (Ei)  (Oi) ri Ci 
1 744 363 1107 8.65 9.43 0.89 0.09 
2 1728 636 2364 20.09 16.53 1.90 2.28 
3 2231 760 2991 25.94 19.75 2.40 5.42 
4 1834 714 2548 21.32 18.56 2.05 1.98 
5 1153 552 1705 13.41 14.35 1.37 -0.30 
6 493 371 864 5.73 9.64 0.69 1.43 
7 175 147 322 2.03 3.82 0.26 2.41 
8 84 156 240 0.98 4.05 0.19 5.07 
9 53 46 99 0.62 1.20 0.08 1.47 
10 106 103 209 1.23 2.68 0.17 2.58 
Total 8601 3848 1245    22.44 
        
Senegal 1997 
Sibsize Bio Fostered Relative Expected Observed      
  Kids   Group Size  (Ei)  (Oi) ri Ci 
1 235 217 452 1.94 2.55 0.22 0.92 
2 702 530 1232 5.81 6.23 0.60 0.22 
3 1214 697 1911 10.04 8.20 0.93 -0.14 
4 1767 861 2628 14.61 10.13 1.28 1.09 
5 1806 989 2795 14.93 11.63 1.36 1.01 
6 1498 854 2352 12.39 10.04 1.14 0.31 
7 1100 762 1862 9.10 8.96 0.90 -0.01 
8 933 587 1520 7.72 6.90 0.74 -0.25 
9 811 503 1314 6.71 5.92 0.64 -0.36 
10 2027 2503 4530 16.76 29.44 2.20 -9.99 
Total 12093 8503 2060    -7.19 
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TABLE 8.3. (CONTINUED) 
 
Benin 2001 
Sibsize Bio Fostered Relative Expected Observed      
  Kids   Group Size  (Ei)  (Oi) ri Ci 
1 810 286 1096 7.33 10.22 0.79 0.68 
2 1499 455 1954 13.56 16.26 1.41 -0.93 
3 1945 515 2460 17.59 18.41 1.78 -0.47 
4 1889 435 2324 17.09 15.55 1.68 0.80 
5 1495 360 1855 13.52 12.87 1.34 0.19 
6 1024 236 1260 9.26 8.43 0.91 -0.08 
7 669 157 826 6.05 5.61 0.60 -0.23 
8 480 120 600 4.34 4.29 0.43 -0.04 
9 423 72 495 3.83 2.57 0.36 -1.29 
10 821 162 983 7.43 5.79 0.71 -0.56 
Total 11055 2798 1385    -1.93 
        
Ghana 1998 
Sibsize Bio Fostered Relative Expected Observed      
  Kids   Group Size  (Ei)  (Oi) ri Ci 
1 868 300 1168 11.43 14.53 1.21 -0.59 
2 1462 520 1982 19.25 25.19 2.05 -4.27 
3 1759 386 2145 23.16 18.70 2.22 3.56 
4 1514 422 1936 19.94 20.45 2.00 -0.35 
5 946 204 1150 12.46 9.88 1.19 0.45 
6 476 106 582 6.27 5.14 0.60 -0.57 
7 258 85 343 3.40 4.12 0.36 0.75 
8 111 17 128 1.46 0.82 0.13 -1.29 
9 114 12 126 1.50 0.58 0.13 -1.87 
10 86 12 98 1.13 0.58 0.10 -1.26 
Total 7594 2064 966    -5.46 
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TABLE 8.3. (CONTINUED) 
        
Rwanda 2005 
Sibsize Bio Fostered Relative Expected Observed      
  Kids   Group Size  (Ei)  (Oi) ri Ci 
1 1514 769 2283 8.45 22.46 0.96 0.53 
2 3320 996 4316 18.53 29.09 1.82 -6.32 
3 4443 813 5256 24.79 23.74 2.22 0.84 
4 4044 452 4496 22.57 13.20 1.90 5.99 
5 2920 250 3170 16.29 7.30 1.34 2.61 
6 1259 91 1350 7.03 2.66 0.57 -2.46 
7 277 38 315 1.55 1.11 0.13 -0.88 
8 92 12 104 0.51 0.35 0.04 -0.51 
9 51 3 54 0.28 0.09 0.02 -0.75 
10        
Total 17920 3424 2372    -0.95 
 
 
Where: Ei=% of biological children located in sibsize group i relative to total of all 
biological children; this is also the expected distribution if the invisible hand of child 
fosterage within the extended family system was working effectively and fairly. 
Oi=% of fostered children in sibsize group I relative to total number of fostered 
children; this is the distribution we observe and need to compare with expected. 
Ri= resource ratio or relative group size, that is, ratio of total number of children 
(biological and fostered combined) located in sibsize group relative to the group 
average. 
Ci=sum of (Ei-Oi)*ln(ri).  If Ci>0 it means positive buffering, and if IC<0 it means 
negative buffering 
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TABLE 8.4. Child Fosterage Effectiveness across sub Saharan African Countries 
 
Country Name Survey Year N  
Index of Demogr 
Conc 
Index Change 
Benin 1996 13173 3.43  
 2001 13853 -1.93 -5.36 
 2006 42912 4.23 6.16 
Burkina Faso 1993 15669 0.94  
 1998-99 15384 0.73 -0.21 
 2003 28285 2.69 1.96 
Cameroon 1991 9143 4.50  
 1998 11146 6.27 1.77 
 2004 21687 6.34 0.07 
Centr. Afr. 
Republic 1994-95 12400 10.99  
Chad 1996-97 17603 8.02  
 2004 13978 5.58 -2.44 
Comoros 1996 5680 12.92  
Congo 
(Republic) 2005 12449 22.44  
Congo DRC 2007 21120 13.25  
Cote d'Ivoire 1994 17216 2.88  
 1998-99 5252 6.13 3.25 
 2005 9834 14.19 8.06 
Ethiopia 2000 28184 4.31  
 2005 29587 3.15 -1.16 
Gabon 2000 12494 6.49  
Ghana 1993 10415 1.82  
 1998 9658 -5.46 -7.28 
 2003 11457 -1.07 4.38 
 2008 18591 5.31 6.38 
Guinea 1999 15418 9.90  
 2005 19311 8.63 -1.27 
Kenya 1993 18366 18.22  
 1998 16768 12.84 -5.38 
 2003 15813 7.58 -5.26 
 2008-09 16782 10.81 3.23 
Lesotho 2004 13916 14.60  
Liberia 2007 15737 18.64  
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TABLE 8.4. (CONTINUED) 
 
Country Name Survey Year N  
Index of Demogr 
Conc 
Index Change 
Madagascar 1992 13181 21.91  
 1997 14998 14.41 -7.50 
 2003-04 15869 17.05 2.64 
 2008-09 38667 14.93 -2.12 
Malawi 1992 10995 18.00  
 2000 29312 14.68 -3.33 
 2004 27885 15.11 0.43 
Mali 1995-96 23456 2.83  
 2001 31388 4.78 1.95 
 2006 34905 5.23 0.45 
Mozambique 1997 19207 14.95  
 2003 27788 14.05 -0.90 
Namibia 1992 11016 9.14  
 2000 12280 19.75 10.61 
 2006-07 15734 24.06 4.31 
Niger 1992 15825 6.41  
 1998 17147 13.91 7.50 
 2006 23899 12.14 -1.77 
Nigeria 1990 21892 9.83  
 1999 16787 1.68 -8.15 
 2003 14773 6.85 5.17 
 2008 69810 0.28 -6.57 
Rwanda 1992 14369 7.42  
 2000 20501 1.11 -6.32 
 2005 21344 -0.95 -2.06 
Senegal 1992-93 14732 -5.16  
 1997 20596 -7.19 -2.03 
 2005 24589 4.78 11.97 
Sierra Leone 2008 18834 11.12  
South Africa 1998 19357 29.07  
Swaziland 2006-07 9035 24.26  
Tanzania 1991-92 20676 15.77  
 1996 17608 15.73 -0.04 
 1999 8121 17.91 2.18 
 2004-05 21541 16.47 -1.44 
Togo 1998 20585 3.64  
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TABLE 8.4. (CONTINUED) 
Country Name Survey Year N  
Index of Demogr 
Conc 
Index Change 
Uganda 1995 17388 10.02  
 2000-01 18088 9.59 -0.43 
 2006 22641 15.26 5.66 
Zambia 1992 15358 9.32  
 1996 17732 13.54 4.22 
 2001-02 17425 15.99 2.45 
 2007 16635 8.44 -7.55 
Zimbabwe 1994 13271 15.42  
 1999 11913 17.26 1.84 
  2005-06 18099 19.48 2.22 
 
Benin 2001 (-1.93), and Senegal 1992/93 and 1997 (-5.16 and -7.19) respectively.  
The next set of countries that show very modest positive buffering (<10) include 
Nigeria, Burkina Faso, Mali, Togo, Benin among others. The top ten countries with 
positive buffering for fostered children are South Africa 1998 (29.07), Swaziland 
2006-07 (24.26), Namibia 2006-07 (24.06), Congo Brazzaville 2003 (22.44), 
Madagascar 1992 (21.91), Zimbabwe 2005-06 (19.48), Liberia 2007 (18.64), Kenya 
1993 (18.22), Malawi 1992 (18.00), Tanzania 1999 (17.91).  Contrary to expectation, 
the data suggest that countries that carry the largest HIV/AIDS disease burden and its 
associated orphan population seem to be doing well in channeling children from larger 
to smaller households.  
How do observed indices change over time within countries?  The largest 
positive change is recorded in Senegal between 1997 and 2005 (11.97) and the largest 
negative change is recorded for Nigeria between 1990 and 1999 (-8.15). Out of 22 
countries with multiple surveys, up to 15 countries (Benin, Burkina Faso, Chad, 
Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mozambique, Nigeria, 
Rwanda, Senegal, Tanzania and Uganda) show a negative change and only seven 
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show a positive change over time.  Seven countries (Cameroon, Cote d‘Ivoire, Mali, 
Namibia, Niger, Zambia and Zimbabwe) show negative buffering in the most recent 
survey periods. This could signal the waning effectiveness of the African extended 
family system. Also, it appears that countries that carry relatively larger HIV/AIDS 
and orphan burdens seem to be channeling children in a positive way.  For instance, 
Zimbabwe, Zambia, Malawi and South Africa show relatively high indices of 
demographic concentration.  Clearly, these findings are mixed and show the diversity 
of experiences across sub Saharan African countries.  
 In particular, these findings should be taken with caution because they only 
examine one aspect of macro level flows – along demographic lines.  Therefore, they 
say nothing about the wealth profile of those larger (or smaller) family types and 
neither do they speak to the distribution of resources among children within 
households.  The next section addresses the gender dimension of fosterage flows. 
 
8.4.1. Fosterage Effectiveness: Does it differ by Gender? 
Does fosterage effectiveness vary depending on the gender of children under 
consideration?  To evaluate this question, I took the most recent DHS surveys from 
four countries (Zimbabwe, Cameroon, Namibia, and Senegal) and estimated 
demographic concentration indices in three ways -- for all children, for boys, and for 
girls for each respective country.  The data suggest that the invisible hand of child 
fosterage works better in Zimbabwe and Senegal for girls compared to boys (Figure 
8.3).  In Zimbabwe the index for all children combine is 19.48 whereas that for girls is 
13.64 and for boys the index lies at 9.5.  In Senegal the overall index is -7.19 while 
that for girls is 14.92.  On the other hand, Cameroon and Namibia reflect that boys are 
more likely to be fostered in smaller sibship households than girls (relative to observed 
rates for biological children).  For Cameroon, the overall index is 4.5 while girls and 
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boys are at -7.98 and 3.92 respectively.  Finally, in Namibia the index for all children 
combined is 24.06 while the indices for girls and boys lie at 22.09 and 27.1 
respectively. 
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FIGURE 8.3. Fosterage Effectiveness by Gender 
How significant are these differences?  Why do some countries‘ fosterage 
flows discriminate across gender lines? Unfortunately, the present analysis does not 
shed light on these questions, and these are to be addressed in future research.  
However, these nominal differences in fosterage effectiveness suggest that gender is a 
possible marker for inequality among children in sub Saharan Africa – at least in terms 
of how it shapes patterns of macro level flows of fostered children. 
So far I discussed fosterage rates and its correlates.   I also presented evidence 
on effectiveness of the extended family system and briefly discussed gender 
176 
inequalities therein. The next section examines the factors that could explain the 
observed differentials in fosterage effectiveness across sub Saharan African countries. 
. 
8.4.2 Correlates of Fosterage Effectiveness 
Table 8.6 shows large international and historical variation in fosterage 
effectiveness.   What contextual factors explain this variation?  Theoretically, I expect 
demographic, geographical, economic and demographic factors to affect how well the 
extended family works within various countries.  I draw on the World Bank‘s World 
Development Indicators for contextual variables that might explain observe variation. 
First, demographic factors such as total fertility rate, youth dependency, and 
HIV/AIDS prevalence appear to boost the sheer numbers of children in need of 
fosterage.  As such, I expect these factors to be negatively associated with fosterage 
effectiveness. In the model however, I only include TFR and omit youth dependency 
since the two variables are highly correlated.  Second, because of historical and 
cultural differences, I expect certain regions of the continent to be more effective 
redistributors than others.  However, I cannot predict the magnitude or the direction of 
effectiveness for any specific country a priori.  Third, assuming that families willingly 
foster children
23
  we might expect a positive relationship between economic wellbeing 
(GDP per capita and GDP growth) and fosterage effectiveness.  Similarly, if the 
government invests more money in education, it may suggest that the host family may 
be more willing to foster because it carries a financial burden of educating a foster 
child.  On the contrary, it might be the case that the more educated people become, the 
more they embrace Western culture and the more they reject traditional practices such 
                                                             
23
 Even if we know this is seldom the case, see Eloundou-Enyegue and Stokes 2002. They find that 
some individuals are never consulted before a fosterage move occurs.  Instead, some relatives may 
simply arrive, and over time blend into the family, regardless of the opinion of the receiving household.  
In such a case, fosterage occurs as an imposition from without rather than a choice for the host family 
or individual.   
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as child fosterage.  Further, I expect the level of income inequality in a country (Gini 
index) to have conflicting effects.  The level of effectiveness largely depends on 
whether the gap between the wealthy and the poor inspires the former to foster more 
children, or to sever ties with poorer relatives.  It is an empirical question.  Last, I 
include a variable for transparency and democracy in my model to explore if it 
possibly affects effectiveness of fosterage.  I expect that more open and transparent 
societies have governments that are more likely to invest in social services, thereby 
increasing fosterage effectiveness.   
 I estimate several bi and multivariate regression models using the Predictive 
Analytics Software (PASW).  Table 8.5 shows interesting results.  First, the bivariate 
Model 1 between fosterage effectiveness (index of demographic concentration) and 
total fertility rate (TFR) shows the negative association expected.  However, after 
controlling for HIV/AIDS prevalence in adult population, the effect of TFR fizzles 
away and remains insignificant for all subsequent models.  At this point (Model 2), the 
disease burden seems to have a strong positive relationship with fosterage 
effectiveness. However, the HIV/AIDS prevalence variable also becomes insignificant 
in Model 3 after control for geographical location of countries.  By far, regional 
location shows the strongest results as it reflects that West and Central African 
countries are less effective at channeling fostered children compared to East African 
countries.  Southern African countries show a slightly positive result compared to East 
African countries but this relationship is not statistically significant.  Models 4 and 5 
control for economic and educational factors. 
 
 TABLE 8.5. Correlates of Fosterage Effectiveness 
 
Model 6
Variable Beta Beta Beta Beta Beta Beta
Main Effects 
TFR -2.676 [-0.342] ** -1.492 [-0.191] -1.126 [-0.144] -1.391 [-0.178] -1.898 [-0.249] -2.029 [-0.266]
Disease Burden
HIV Prevalence 0.430 [0.393] *** 0.149 [0.136] 0.203 [0.185] 0.198 [0.187] 0.2 [0.188]
Regional Effects
West -7.125 [-0.462] *** -6.799 [-0.441]*** -8.226 [-0.541]*** -8.268 [-0.544] ***
Central -3.839 [-0.166] -5.127 [-0.222]† -7.613 [-0.321] ** -7.841 [-0.330] **
South 2.329 [0.095] 0.841 [-0.034] 7.812 [0.329] 7.144 [0.301]
Economic Effects
ln (GDPpc PPP) 0.286 [0.071] -0.381 [0.098] -0.424 [-0.109]
GDP Growth Rate -0.626 [-0.226]** -0.529 [-0.189] † -0.495 [-0.177] †
Education
Education Expenditure -1.335 [-0.334] -0.15 [-0.376]
Literacy -0.038 [-0.583] -0.05 [-0.154]
Inequality
Gini Coefficient 0.096 [0.121]
Constant 25.629 *** 16.140 ** 18.458 ** 18.541 ** 31.941 ** 29.873 *
R. Sq Adjusted 0.104 0.232 0.363 0.390 0.457 0.457
df 71 67 67 67 65 65
†p <.1; * p <.05; **p <.01; ***p <.001 ;   Numbers in parentheses are standardized betas
Dependent Variable: Index of Demographic Concentration
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Demographic Disease Burden Region Economic Education Inequality
1
7
8
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Results show that country‘s average economic wellbeing (GDP per capita) does not matter when 
it comes to fosterage effectiveness (see Models 4 through 6).  Rather, it is the change in 
economic performance that matters. Economic growth is surprisingly negatively associated with 
changes in fosterage effectiveness. Last, results show that levels of income inequality within 
countries (Gini coefficient) do not influence the effectiveness of the African extended family 
system. Overall, among all variables considered here, only geographical location and economic 
growth matters.  The fit of the full Model (Adjusted R-Squared 0.457) suggests that there could 
be other variables whose effects are unaccounted for.  Also, the limited number of DHS surveys 
used severely limits the models‘ degrees of freedom. But, this Model is specified with the best 
data available at this point. 
  
8.5.   Conclusion 
Inequality, especially inequality among children in sub Saharan Africa is increasing. At a 
time when the world has standardized expectations for children‘s welfare including their rights to 
education and health (UN 1948, UN 1960; UN 1989, UN 2000), it is important to identify and 
evaluate the institutional arrangements that hold promise for buffering inequality among 
children.  This chapter submits that the African extended family system has historically been 
relied upon for the care and wellbeing of a significant proportion of children.  However, recent 
developments such as economic reversals, cultural shifts and uneven demographic transition 
raise questions about how much longer society can continue to rely upon this informal system?  
This chapter sought to answers questions about the prevalence and effectiveness of fosterage.  
Results reveal the wide diversity of experiences across African countries both in terms of 
fosterage rates, and fosterage effectiveness.  While it is encouraging to see that the African 
extended family system still nurtures a huge proportion of African children (up to 40% in some 
countries like Namibia), its coverage seems to be on the decline in many countries.  Results 
underscore how the HIV/AIDS pandemic shapes fosterage patterns across countries and they 
highlight the role of countries‘ economic performance.  Also, I observe significant regional 
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differences in fosterage effectiveness and find that economic growth might have consequential 
effect on fosterage effectiveness.  Even as these results shed light on several understudied 
aspects of children‘s wellbeing in Africa, many questions remain for future research.  This study 
tracks only the quality of macro-level flow of fostered children along demographic lines.  Future 
research could evaluate how this system works along socio-economic lines.  Further, while this 
study shows gender differences in fosterage effectiveness, these differences are unexplained  
Overall, scientists and policy makers who care about children‘s wellbeing should increasingly 
pay attention to the extended family system because the sheer proportion of children who 
circulate within this system signal its central place in buffering inequality among children. 
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CHAPTER 9 
CONCLUSION 
 
This dissertation documents levels, trends, drivers, and buffers of socio-
economic inequality among children in sub Saharan Africa.  By focusing on 
inequality, it expands the discourse on the wellbeing of African children beyond the 
preoccupation with poverty dynamics.   At a time when the world has taken giant steps 
in standardizing values and measures for human wellbeing (UN 1948; UN 2000), it is 
important to evaluate the distributional aspects of economic opportunities and social 
outcomes among children in sub Saharan Africa.  This analysis is necessary and 
timely given uneven demographic transitions, as well as economic and cultural 
transformations that portend a future of greater inequality among children.  The study 
develops several methodological innovations, makes key substantive findings, and 
puts forward theoretical propositions on the future of inequality among children in sub 
Saharan Africa.  Further, it draws key policy, and research implications. 
 Methodologically, the study illustrates ways in which secondary data sources 
such as the World Bank‘s World Development Indicators, Penn World Tables, and 
Demographic and Health Surveys can be harnessed to explore issues of inequality 
among children across African countries.   Specifically, it employs standard inequality 
measures such as the Gini coefficient, the Mean Logarithmic Deviation, the Theil 
index, and the coefficient of variation to estimate levels and trends in educational 
resource inequality among children.  Further, it applies decomposition techniques to 
account for factors that drive inequality over time.  In other words, this technique 
helps to answer the question: to what extent is resource inequality among children 
driven by changes in economic factors (such as size of a country‘s economy and 
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proportion of the budget allocated to children) or by demographic factors (size of the 
child population in a country and by the proportion of children who are dependent 
within a country)?  Third, the study develops an innovative concentration index that 
makes it possible to examine the macro level effectiveness of the informal African 
Extended Family System in buffering inequality among children.  Last, the study 
develops multivariate regression models that explain variation in child fosterage, and 
fosterage effectiveness within the extended family system.   
 My analysis helps to establish a number of key findings.  First, educational 
resource inequality among children increased in the 1980s decade before declining 
slightly and remaining high thereafter.  The size of countries‘ economies, as well as 
their relative allocation to children largely drives changes in inequality over time.  
Also, age dependency, rather than the relative size of child population within countries 
per se tends to drive changes in inequality.  Further, my findings caution against 
inferring about children‘s wellbeing from findings that are based on adult population 
data.  Specifically, I find that over four decades, resource inequality among children 
was over double the observed rates of income inequality among adults.  Therefore, I 
corroborate previous studies that argue that children are a distinctive constituency both 
within households, and in my case within countries (Folbre 1988; Eloundou-Enyegue 
and Rehman 2009).  Mortality inequality, on the other hand, is low across countries.  
But, I observe steep mortality gradients across socio-economic groups within 
countries.   Further, in the absence of effective formal social safety nets, African 
countries typically rely on informal networks of social solidarity to buffer inequality 
among children.  Part of this dissertation examines to what extent the extended family 
system has been effective in buffering inequality among children.  My analysis reveals 
that the extended family system is still a potent mechanism for buffering inequality 
among children, at least in terms of scope of coverage.  However, the system is 
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beginning to show signs of breaking down in some countries raising questions about 
the future of inequality among children in those contexts.  Last, I identify social, 
economic, and cultural factors that account for changes in child fosterage rates, as well 
as child fosterage effectiveness within countries. 
 My study builds on existing theories that project levels and trends in global 
economic inequality (Kuznets 1955; Firebaugh and Goesling 2004; Eloundou-
Enyegue and Rehman 2009) by revealing possible future trends in resource inequality 
among children in sub Saharan Africa.  Additionally, by isolating the relative role of 
demographic and economic factors, I propose the pathways through which resource 
inequality among children can either converge or diverge.  Specifically, demographic 
theories on the relationship between uneven fertility transitions and inequality find 
empirical support in this study.  On informal buffer institutions, the evidence provides 
mixed signals.  On one hand, cultural theories of westernization and family nucleation 
(Madhavan 2004) largely fail to find support as evidence reveals high levels of child 
fosterage.  Instead, the high rates of fosterage support theories on altruistic behavior 
(Kolm 2000).  Westernization and family nucleation theories find support with regards 
waning effectiveness of extended family system buffering within countries, over time. 
Perhaps as observed by Case et al (2004) fosterage opportunities do not tend to accrue 
to the neediest children.  Rather, the flow of children is largely explained by the 
quality of one‘s social networks.    Still, I identify several theoretical gaps in this area 
of study.  For instance, we lack theoretical guidance on (i) under what circumstances 
levels and trends in inequality among children may shift or reverse (ii) factors that 
account for variation in fosterage effectiveness across countries and over time (iii) 
how to predict the future evolution of new hierarchies among African countries.  The 
need to develop more succinct theories that can guide analytical research around 
issues of inequality among children cannot be overstated.   
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 My findings make it possible to draw a few key research and policy 
implications.  First, research on demographic dividends should focus on children‘s 
inequality.  Research on children‘s wellbeing should examine trends and drivers of 
other dimensions of social and economic inequality among children that are not 
examined here. Additionally, future work could apply multi level modeling techniques 
to explain observed variation in the level of mortality gradients along socio-economic 
status within countries. Further, evaluative studies should examine the changing 
effectiveness of both formal and informal institutions.  While this study makes a 
significant contribution in illuminating the role of the African Extended family 
system, it needs to be complemented with systematic evaluations of formal social 
safety nets for all children within countries, as well as those available for vulnerable 
children such as orphans.  My findings suggest that in addition to the necessary 
attention given to poverty, policy makers may want to be aware of emerging socio-
economic trends, especially the factors that drive them. To the extent that this study 
reveals high levels of economic and social inequality, policy makers may need to 
strengthen both formal and informal institutions that bridge inequality and level the 
playing field for children.   
As the year 2015 approaches and progress towards the 2000 UN Millennium is 
tallied, many will celebrate achievements in children‘s health and education.  
Typically, scholars will highlight sub Saharan Africa‘s (lack of) achievements 
compared to other world regions.  Likely, dialogues on how much sub Saharan Africa 
itself has become more and more differentiated both within and across countries 
remain obscure. Even fewer studies may highlight how the world of children in sub 
Saharan Africa diverged over time.  Not only are sub Saharan African children 
growing up in an environment marked by unprecedented levels of hunger, poverty, 
malnutrition, and civil strife, but, that same world is shaped by great socio-economic 
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inequality. This dissertation seeks to place inequality at the center of discourse on the 
wellbeing of African children.  I argue that rigorous research on multi-dimensional 
poverty dynamics ought to be complemented with equally insightful research on 
stratification issues because meeting basic needs does not always suggest equalizing of 
opportunities.  This is especially critical given that inequality among current children 
generations portend a future of inequality.   
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APPENDIX A1. POPULATION SHARES AND RESOURCE RATIOS ACROSS 
SUB SAHARAN AFRICAN COUNTRIES (2007) 
 Children in School Population 
Shares 
Resource 
Ratios 
Rankings 
  (Total 282165307) Size Income 
Nigeria 58887966 20.87% 0.18 1 39 
Ethiopia 33050565 11.71% 0.53 2 22 
Kenya 18013937 6.38% 1.10 3 12 
Uganda 17643156 6.25% 0.38 4 29 
South Africa 15660234 5.55% 6.30 5 3 
Madagascar 11985544 4.25% 0.16 6 40 
Mozambique 10595236 3.75% 0.81 7 17 
Sudan 10221273 3.62% 3.56 8 6 
Ghana 8845372 3.13% 0.86 9 16 
Cameroon 8477225 3.00% 0.73 10 18 
Malawi 7633764 2.71% 0.38 11 30 
Zambia 6701203 2.37% 0.22 12 37 
Angola 6517596 2.31% 1.32 13 10 
Rwanda 6105218 2.16% 0.30 14 32 
Cote d'Ivoire 5818840 2.06% 1.29 15 11 
Zimbabwe 5225604 1.85% 0.90 16 13 
Mali 4816668 1.71% 0.49 17 26 
Burkina Faso 4565171 1.62% 0.72 18 19 
Senegal 4323221 1.53% 0.90 19 14 
Burundi 3929590 1.39% 0.24 20 35 
Benin 3798851 1.35% 0.40 21 28 
Niger 3724063 1.32% 0.45 22 27 
Sierra Leone 3684473 1.31% 0.38 23 31 
Chad 3679994 1.30% 0.53 24 23 
Guinea 3662115 1.30% 0.56 25 21 
Togo 2685146 0.95% 0.28 26 34 
Congo, Rep. 1666040 0.59% 0.53 27 24 
Liberia 1532271 0.54% 0.19 28 38 
Centr. 
African Rep. 1309265 0.46% 0.13 29 41 
Mauritania 1285157 0.46% 0.58 30 20 
Namibia 895062 0.32% 3.25 31 7 
Lesotho 863566 0.31% 2.66 32 8 
Guinea-
Bissau 786193 0.28% 0.23 33 36 
Gabon 713964 0.25% 2.37 34 9 
Botswana 709095 0.25% 7.49 35 2 
Gambia, The 605550 0.21% 0.28 36 33 
Swaziland 504517 0.18% 4.94 37 4 
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APPENDIX A1. (CONTINUED)   
 Children in School Population 
Shares 
Resource 
Ratios 
Rankings 
  (Total 282165307) Size Income 
Mauritius 294029 0.10% 10.68 38 1 
Comoros 291932 0.10% 0.50 39 25 
Equatorial 
Guinea 263314 0.09% 0.88 40 15 
Cape Verde 193327 0.07% 4.03 41 5 
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APPENDIX A2. COMPARISON OF COUNTRIES FOR EDUCATION 
EXPENDITURE 
Country 
Size of Economy 
(GDP) Child Population 
Educn 
Expenditure(%) 
South Africa 5.45642E+11 14980209 5.5 
Nigeria 3.72217E+11 63258597 0.8 
Sudan 1.03899E+11 16152405 10.3 
Angola 95652692322 8009880 2.6 
Ethiopia 94665130976 34759792 4.6 
Kenya 82738753445 16125446 6.2 
Cameroon 54824797797 7703549 2.8 
Mozambique 50436444153 9643722 4.2 
Cote d`Ivoire 47841390614 8260837 4.6 
Ghana 41507236494 8924693 4.5 
Uganda 39792837829 15051839 4.2 
Guinea 36483426689 4143685 1.8 
Zimbabwe 30481870250 5043916 4.6 
Chad 30058399766 4874587 1.7 
Zambia 28279126100 5690803 2.2 
Mauritius 25553771206 299298 4.0 
Senegal 23998617741 5232012 3.8 
Burkina Faso 21251508303 6770902 4.5 
Malawi 20177771432 6730976 4.3 
Botswana 19245237197 646468 9.4 
Madagascar 17082483506 8118276 2.9 
Mali 16845227383 5499466 3.6 
Namibia 14214232502 791978 6.8 
Congo, 
Republic of 14081100727 1450474 2.8 
Gabon 13050953888 531529 3.7 
Benin 12516081777 3640591 3.5 
Niger 12297803100 6989592 2.8 
Rwanda 11499742755 3987352 3.1 
Equatorial 
Guinea 11354316228 266681 0.7 
Sierra Leone 10773954293 2335764 4.4 
Swaziland 8918794420 467561 6.7 
Mauritania 7589568595 1256642 3.1 
Togo 5995835854 2557924 3.9 
Burundi 5381822316 3111298 4.4 
Lesotho 4927313641 802145 12.4 
Cape Verde 4064675051 185511 5.8 
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APPENDIX A2. (CONTINUED) 
Country 
Size of Economy 
(GDP) Child Population 
Educn 
Expenditure(%) 
Centr 
African Rep. 3934598252 1751823 1.8 
Gambia, The 2511238093 688684 2.5 
Liberia 1482524100 1564724 5.8 
Comoros 1136358845 240227 3.8 
Guinea-
Bissau 1014051708 657009 5.2 
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